

Norwegian Police University College, Oslo



POLITI HØGSKOLEN

**Profiling in Sweden and UK Police Services:
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats**

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Preface

Although Police Services in both Sweden and UK have used profilers for decades, this is not the situation in Norway as profiling has never been implemented as an investigative tool in major crime cases. For those who know something about profiling the association to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is often established, as their historical contribution is significant. For most Norwegians offender profiling is introduced through crime series and movies, often with a touch of something mystical where the profiler relying on hunches and gut feelings solves the most intricating murders. Profiling can be good tv, but how close is this to real life investigations?

I had the privilege to interview people that work full time as profilers within their Police Services, respectively Sweden and UK. It is always engaging to meet dedicated people and I learned a lot about the work of profilers thru these meetings.

I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisors Assistant Chief of Police Trond Myklebust, The Police Academy, Oslo, and Professor Laurence J. Alison, University of Liverpool. Without you, no thesis. Thank you!

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Working full time and writing master thesis in an already busy leisure time needs support from home. My dearest; Gry, Embla and Bork, thank you! YNWA.

Thanks to family, friends and colleagues for support and for making life a joy. A special thanks to my lifelong friend, Bernie, who always, very explicitly, have kept his fate in me and supported me through all years. This thesis is dedicated to you, my friend. Forever grateful.

Clas Fredric Andersen, autumn 2022.

*And you run, and you run to catch up with the sun but it's sinking.
Racing around to come up behind you again.
The sun is the same in a relative way but you're older.
Shorter of breath and one day closer to death.*

- *Time, Pink Floyd*

Sammendrag

Norsk politi har aldri hatt noen etablert tradisjon for bruk av profiling i drapssaker eller tilsvarende alvorlige saker. Enkelte ganger, særlig på 1990 tallet, samarbeidet Norsk politi med svenske kollegaer som nylig hadde opprettet sin profilings-gruppe. Både Sverige og UK har hatt etablerte profiling-grupper i egen politietat de siste drøye tjue årene. På hvilken måte er det disse gruppene bidrar inn i etterforskning av alvorlig kriminelle handlinger, og har feltet utviklet seg etter at FBI i stor grad påvirket Europeisk politi med sine kunnskaper på feltet? Profilere i Sverige og UK ble intervjuet for å belyse praksis og utvikling. Svarene gir grunnlag for at også Norsk politi bør vurdere å etablere kompetanse med tilsvarende funksjoner som Sverige og UK kan vise til.

Abstract

The Police Service in both Sweden and UK have utilised offender profiling in major crime investigations for decades, while as the Norwegian Police Service rarely have incorporated this investigative tool in their work. Contrary to Sweden and UK, Norway have never had an established group holding profiling competence within their organisation. On rare occasions during the 1990`s the Norwegian Police Service were supported by offender profilers from abroad. This study examines Swedish and UK profiler`s own evaluation of profiling work on different aspects and levels within their respective organisation. The results show that profiling might not be the same as twenty years ago. The profiler`s own evaluation of their work and how they support ongoing major crime investigations may lay the foundation of a profiling discussion within the Norwegian Police Services as profiling might be a tool for investigations also in Norway.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Early days of profiling

The crime scene in a murder case mirrors the behaviour of the offender. Although, there is no definition of offender profiling that is universally accepted (Alison et al., 2011), the profiler is focused on different aspects of the crime scene. What have the offender done, how has he committed the murder, and under which circumstances took the violent act place? The answers to these questions give pieces of information which the profiler will take advantage of when giving a statement of whom, most probably, the perpetrator is. By doing this, the profilers also reduce the number of suspects in the investigation (Muller, 2000; Palermo, 2002).

In the early 1990`s many Police Services in different countries in Europe utilised offender profiling in murder investigations, which was mainly a consequence of the comprehensive work of the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) through the 1970- and 1980`s. Using profiling in murder investigations was sometimes done despite the lack of transparency of the profilers work and a lack of solid and critical academic research during the 1980`s. The outcome of profiling in murder cases was mixed, sometimes reducing the pool of suspects to a manageable size for the investigations and sometimes pointing in a direction initiating a devastating investigative step sending innocent persons to custody. Such miscarriage of justice made the Police Service in UK to reorganise their profiling service and to rethink who should be holding profiling competency, in addition to anchor profiling to a more academic approach.

1.2 Profiling in Norway

The history of using profiling in the Norwegian Police Service is short. Only during a period of the 1990`s some single murder cases was supported by external persons holding profiling competence. Although, there might have been single case collaborations later, but to me acknowledge the use of profiling have been very limited. Around year 2000 The National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) had a group of three members who made up what seemed to be more of a pilot project. The groups footprints in major crime case volume in Norway seems scarce and the group probably dissolved after short time.

Watching *Silence of the Lambs* in 1991 was probably the first time I encountered the subject of profiling. Several years later, when reading offender profiles in real murder investigations, the fascination I remember having from the movie disappeared quickly. I must admit that I found the produced offender profile of no use as it did not bring clarity to the case

nor was it helpful forming out the next investigative step. From being fascinated through Anthony Hopkins and Jodie Foster`s screenplay, I quickly became a critical reader of real offender profiles in murder cases. At the same time, I also became very curious about the subject. There were many questions I would like to know the answers to, but perhaps this question reflects my position best: How come that Sweden and UK have used offender profilers, even employed in their respective Police Services, in murder investigations for twenty years if it is of no good? Obviously, neither Swedish nor UK Police Services will spend their time and money on something that is for no use. Admitting that it was something I probably have missed about profiling, I wanted to find out more about this subject. There were particularly two superior domains I was focused on:

- 1) What is modern profiling and how does it assist ongoing major crime investigations?
- 2) Is the competency of profiling something that the Norwegian Police Service needs and how will it eventually strengthen and improve the existing model of major crime investigations in Norway?

In trying to grasp the gist of profiling I went directly to the source and interviewed the profilers themselves. To collect as much information as possible, reflecting as best as possible the varieties of perspectives of profiling work within the Police Service, both SWOT and IGLO analysis were used. The profilers were asked about their own work on scales of Strengths (S), Weaknesses (W), Opportunities (O) and Threats (T) (SWOT), and further analysing the obtained data on both SWOT and Individual (I), Group (G), Leadership (L) and Organisation (O) (IGLO). This approach was anticipated to embrace a range of issues on different levels to such an extent that it would give a balanced and substantial information about today`s offender profiling in Sweden and UK.

It must be underlined that the term profiling and offender profiling perhaps is not the most accurate as in UK Police Service they are called Behaviour Investigative Advisors. In Sweden, although not a formalised change of name, they preferred to talk about themselves as "case analysts" and not profilers. For the mere practical aspect of this thesis, and since there is no formalised common name in Sweden and UK, I will use the term profiler although it is not any more the precise title (Knabe-Nicol et al., 2011).

To accommodate the aim of this thesis in best possible way, the following thematic points will be introduced:

- defining profiling
- two profiling anecdotes with different outcome
- historical backdrop of profiling, the central role of the FBI and critics of their work
- profiling and its scientific anchoring
- profiling and use of inferential logics, and profiling`s role in criminal law

These are very much historical thematic issues and will be a backdrop to understand what profiling once emerged to be. The next part of the introduction chapter profiling is put more into a modern investigative context as profiling is an investigative tool. With reference to issues and caveats concerning investigation in general, the intention is to present phenomenon in investigation which also concerns profilers and their work as this will make the grounds for later discussions. Bridging the first historical part with the modern investigative part, I will present the role of profiling in a well-known murder case in Norway. The role of profiling in this murder case very much reflects what profiling once was and what it no longer is. These are the thematic issues for the introductions latter part:

- profiling in the murder case of Birgitte Tengs
- heuristics and biases
- groupthink
- investigative process
- framing profiling competency within an organisation
- similarities and dissimilarities between teams of profiling and reviews

1.3 Defining profiling

The purpose of offender profiling is to understand the offender's motives and behaviour, the offender's psychological and sociological background, so the pool of suspects can be reduced. In this approach analysis of the crime scene is essential (Douglas et al., 1986). Decision making is pivotal to investigation and is often taking place under circumstances that changes rapidly (Roycroft, 2019) and offender profiling is an investigative tool to support and reframe decisions. Traditionally offender profiling has been utilised in murder and rape cases, particular in difficult-to-detect cases, so called "whodunits", which obviously is more

challenging when it comes to decision making compared to self-solvers (Innes, 2003; Woodworth & Porter, 1999).

1.4 The profiling of Metesky and Stagg

There are different views on the historical roots of profiling (Turvey, 2012). The literature of Sir Arthur Conan Dyle and Agatha Christie is often highlighted (Ingram, 1998), as well as Dr. Thomas Bond's profiling Jack the Ripper and the murders in Whitechapel in London (Alison et al., 2012). One of the earliest examples of profiling to support an ongoing police investigation in modern times was the case of "The Mad Bomber of New York" (Wilson et al., 1997). George Metesky was terrorising New York city by placing many smaller bombs in public places during a period of 16 years (1940-1956). The psychiatrist James Brussel made a description of what he assumed the offender to be (Alison et al., 2012). The aftermath of the arrest of "The Mad Bomber" produced stories about how accurate Brussel's profile of the offender was. It is fair to say that "The Mad Bomber"-profile by Brussel prepared the ground for profiling as a way of supporting decision makings in police investigations of serious crimes. More than 30 years after arresting George Metesky for the bombings in USA, another criminal profile was made in a murder case in UK.

Rachel Nickell went for a walk with her young son and their dog in Wimbledon Common, summer of 1992. The 23-year-old woman was stabbed repeatedly and killed in the park. Early in the investigation the police focused on several suspicious men. A criminal profiler at the time, psychologist Paul Britton, was contacted by the police to support the investigation (Alison & Canter, 2013). On the bases of victimology (knowledge about the victim) and interpretation of the crime scene, Paul Britton made a criminal profile which had several resemblances with one person in the pool of suspects. This person, Colin Stagg, was already a known criminal to the police. Based on Britton's offender profile, and a following incriminating undercover operation, Stagg was arrested and charged for the Nickell murder in August 1993 (Alison & Canter, 2013).

Approximately one year later Stagg was acquitted for the murder charge, amongst several reasons because of the incriminating investigative methods used in the undercover operation. After a cold case review the murder of Rachell Nickell was solved through a forensic check of exhibits with new DNA-methodology matching the perpetrator, Robert Napper. After killing Nickell, Napper committed several other serious crimes, thereof the killing of Samantha Bisset and her four-year-old daughter in 1993. The devastating use of profiling in the Rachel Nickell murder case released a shift at several levels in the UK Police

Service when it came to profiling.

These two anecdotes illustrate offender profiling being applied in major crime investigations although giving two distinct outcomes: Apparently helping the police to stop the bombings by George Metesky, while obviously leading the investigation into a dead end in the Rachel Nickell case. To understand why one case is solved and another ends up charging an innocent person, it is necessary to examine the foundation on which profiling is based. Both cases presented here are characterised by a clinical approach to offender profiling. As will be outlined later, there are different foundations which profiling are based upon.

1.5 Historical approaches to profiling

1.5.1 *Different names and approaches*

Offender profiling are named differently in international literature, for instance criminal profiling, criminal personality profiles (Douglas et al., 1986) and investigative profiling (Canter & Youngs, 2009). There are different traditions how to make offender profiling (Bjørklund, 2017). Alison et al., outlines three historical approaches to profiling: the criminal investigative approach, the clinical practitioner approach and the statistical approach (Alison et al., 2010). Others divide the historical background in two; profiling based on experiences and profiling based on statistics (Christianson et al., 2008). It is underlined that the diversity of profiling approaches thru the decades is more complex than brought forward in this thesis (Egger, 1999; Woodworth & Porter, 1999).

As the aforementioned anecdotes of Metesky and Stagg both represent the clinical approach of profiling, it is obvious that this approach has had various success. Understanding the motive of the perpetrator, providing hypothesis on social and demographic factors is essential to this way of profiling. The clinical approach shall not be regarded as a unified approach because the work of profiler`s varies on many variables for instance the degree of anchoring of the profiler's opinion in expert literature (Davis et al., 2018).

The statistical approaches often point to a broad empirical approach, frequently associated to the work of David Canter and his Investigative Psychology (Canter, 1994; Canter & Youngs, 2009). Investigative psychology (IP) is not a new discipline but encapsulates procedures within a scientific framework where Canter recognises three areas of the investigative process as important: criminal behaviour, information and evidence, and decision making (Alison et al., 1999). An additional approach based on statistics is the geographic profiling, a method aiming to locate the most probable area of the offender`s

residence (Rossmo, 1999). Geographic profiling is applied, not only in murder cases, but also in a broader policing context (Boldt et al., 2018). Combinations of statistical analysis, geographic- and criminal profiling have also been done for instance by Beauregard when script analysis was applied in studying the relationship between geographic behaviour and offending behaviour, and further considering the consequences for criminal profiling (Beauregard et al., 2007). Due to the limitation of this thesis, two other statistical approaches will be mentioned briefly: Criminal Investigative Analysis (CIA) and Crime Action Profiling (CAP). CIA uses analyses based on court files and media reports using observable features such as offence and victim characteristics to investigate behavioural crime links (Kapardis, 2017). The profiling approach of CAP uses multidimensional scaling to study crime behaviours correlations with different characteristics of the defender (Kocsis, 2008). This latter approach developed by Richard N. Kocsis, has a pragmatic orientation to profiling using the knowledge of psychopathologies and human behaviour with their statistical approach.

1.5.2 The FBI contribution

As the FBI and their Behavioural Science Unit in Quantico, Virginia, USA, often is mentioned as the founder of the term "Offender Profiling" (Alison et al., 2011), both clinical and statistical approach presented here may in diverse aspects being based on how the FBI developed their profiling approach. Overall, the FBI have a criminal investigative approach to profiling, additionally leaning on expert knowledge (for instance psychology) and statistical information. The FBI Academy was focused on so called objective approach (Turvey, 2012) based on the investigators experiences from different murder cases when they developed their profiling methodology. Persons like Robert Ressler and Tom Shachtman made important contributions on the topic (Runhovde, 2009), as well as the pioneering contributions of Howard Teten (Canter & Youngs, 2009). Essentially, the FBI profiling seeks to understand how an offender thinks because it directs the offenders` behaviour. Through understanding the offenders mind the FBI profiler believes he will find the offenders motive for the murder. Further, by understanding the perpetrators motive, the profiler will also understand what kind of person has committed the crime (Douglas et al., 1986). FBI underlines characteristics like experience, logic sense, intuition and the capability to isolate own feelings when the profiler seek to analyse the murder scene and trying to think like the offender did at the time of the murder (Hazelwood et al., 1987).

Before going more into details of the FBI profiling approach and its foundations, a short summarize of the mentioned profiling approaches might be appropriate to clear out

some basic differences. The work of FBI and the clinical approach is trying to get into the minds of the perpetrators. Crucial is the profilers former case experience as this being used as a navigating comparison. This approach is called "bottom-up", an inductive approach moving from empiricism towards theory and it's method of research is mainly interviewing with perpetrators. The other main approach, advocated by David Canter and Laurence Alison, is focused on the crime scene and comparisons with statistical research such as judgements based on correlations and analysing locality of the offending. This is a "top-down" approach, a so-called deductive approach, using theory as a starting point for working thru the case information. As the latter approach is quantitative, the bottom-up approach by the FBI and clinical profiling is qualitative in its theoretical inclination (Johnstone & Ward, 2009).

1.6 The gist of FBI profiling and its academic anchoring

Since the 1970`s the Behavioural Science Unit at the FBI have assisted murder investigations in the USA (Douglas et al., 1986), and a more thorough profiling program has developed since late 1970`s (Douglas & Burgess, 1986). Essential in developing the FBI offender profiling method was the understanding of the crime scene as a reflection of the offenders` psyche. Through analysing the crime scene, the profilers might identify personality and behaviour characteristics that will potentially be important for future investigative decisions. "Profiling unfortunately does not provide the identity of the offender, but it does indicate the type of person most likely to have committed a crime having certain unique characteristics" (Douglas & Burgess, 1986) (p.2). For further development of profiling the FBI needed to establish their theory and practice in empirical data.

1.6.1 Studying sexual murderers

In the late 70`s and early 80`s FBI initiated different pilot studies before taking part in a well-known explorative study of 36 sexual murderers (Burgess et al., 1986). Ressler and Douglas represented the FBI Academy and Burgess, Hartman and McCormack represented different universities and a college. Keynotes in their findings are sexual fantasies and motivation affects the way the killing is accomplished. From 1979 to 1983 the authors collected information from two sources connected to the 36 participants. They obtained official records from different institutions like prison, trails and health care. Additionally, all 36 participants were interviewed concerning their childhood, adolescent and adult experiences related to violence. The data gathered revealed high prevalence of problematic behaviours during both childhood and adolescent, for instance chronic lying, cruelty to children, daydreaming and rebelliousness. Burgess et al. writes; "The central role of daydreaming and

fantasy in the lives of the 36 murderers is critical to what motivated them to kill" (Burgess et al., 1986) (p. 256). Central to this theorising is that aggression is linked to sexuality because of the loneliness as well as cognitive mapping and processing includes fantasies of sexual violent acts. In recent years loneliness is highlighted as a central component in some murderers (Stefanska et al., 2016).

1.6.2 Organised and disorganised

One cannot present FBI profiling and its development without mentioning the central concept of organised and disorganised personalities, a nomenclature which reflects organised and disorganised crime scenes. Based on the FBI investigators experiences from a multitude of homicide investigations, lust murders have been divided into a dichotomy of organised non-social and disorganised asocial personalities (Hazelwood & Douglas, 1980). Variables of profiling is grouped into different categories such as the offenders` background factors, the offender's pre-crime state, variables relating to the offender's residence, the vehicle used, the distance to crime scene and the variables of the post offensive behaviour (Ressler, Burgess, Douglas, et al., 1986).

According to FBI organised offenders are hallmarked by planning the murder. They are intelligent, and at the time of the crime they are angry, stressed or depressed and they might leave town or change job after the murder. On the contrary, the disorganised offenders are hallmarked by their likeliness of coming from a home with parental difficulties. This could be difficulties such as parent's history of sexual problems, unstable work for the father and having been treated with hostility while growing up. These disorganised murderers are likely to have sexual difficulties (inhibition, aversions) and live alone. They are more likely to commit the crime closer to their home or work and to know who the victim is (Ressler, Burgess, Douglas, et al., 1986). In many sexual homicides the FBI assisted the local law enforcement who considered the killings "motiveless" (Ressler, Burgess, Hartman, et al., 1986). According to FBI, the dichotomy organised and disorganised offers a framework to explain the motives behind such baffling murderers. As Ressler et al. underlines; "For law enforcement murder that appears to be motiveless- that is, the victim is a stranger and there is no profit to be gained from the death of the victim- suggests that the victim and offense must be seen as having symbolic meaning to the offender reflecting violent and sadistic fantasies" (Ressler, Burgess, Hartman, et al., 1986) (p.285).

Central to FBI in understanding the predators, is the emphasis of the persons problematic childhood or adolescent, cultivating fantasies of violent sexual acts. This are

fantasies which later develops into a motive to kill so the inner emotional turmoil can be more regulated and balanced. The quotation above also reveals that FBI was influenced by a psychodynamic approach to understand the minds of the criminal offenders. Profiling within the FBI focuses on an interdisciplinary approach as well as formulating of hypothesis, both which yields strong support from modern investigative techniques. The FBI profiling has also received harsh critics such as the lack of scientific rigor which they base their theory of perpetrators on.

1.7 Critics to the FBI profiling method

1.7.1 Problematic framing

Researchers have been surprised by the fact that many police officers requests profiler`s assistance when profiling lack scientific support (Snook et al., 2008). Snook et al. point to the absence of empirical support for the dichotomy organised and disorganised and that it is based on outdated theory of human behaviour. Research reveals that both organised and disorganised is represented in a crime scene (Canter et al., 2004). Others refers to what seemingly has been a misunderstanding through the years, as the organised-disorganised perspectives it is rather a scale (continuum) than a dichotomy (Davis et al., 2018), a perspective which is supported in an empirical study (Kocsis et al., 2002).

Other works of the FBI also reveals their idea of classifications. For instance, the rape-offender typologies of murders into power-assertive, power-reassurance, anger-retaliatory and anger-excitation. The typology is based on investigators experiences and for the best purpose, supporting investigative decision making as a tool for generating profiles (Keppel & Walter, 1999). Although applied in investigations, it was not empirically tested before several years later when Bennell et al. did not find any evidence for the typology and advised investigators to consider it to be invalid (Bennell et al., 2013). Categorisations in various aspects is a core part of the development of FBI-offender profiling, but it has been met with counter arguments as the supporting research is weak. The FBI typology reflects more psychodynamic processes rather than actual crime scene behaviour, meaning that this profiling approach is leaning more on intrinsic psychopathology and guesses about motive and less on “crime scene actions as experiences of behaviour” shaped by contextual factors such as interpersonal relationships and daily life experiences (Godwin, 2002) (p.10).

1.7.2 Factors of context and situations

Criticism have been directed towards the FBI motivational model as the consideration of contextual - and situational factors is absent. These factors are considered essential to

understand sexual homicides (Goodwill & Alison, 2007; Healey & Beauregard, 2017). Arguments put forward for developing a new model of profiling, is the need to consider homicide offences as a process, as behaviour developing over time, in addition to consider both situational and psychological factors for the specific homicidal behaviour presented (Crabbé et al., 2008). Additionally, others points to the FBI method as both nomothetic (making general predictions about offenders) and deterministic (thinking all offenders behaviour are affected the same way) (Alison, 2005), while research showing that sexual homicides and sexual offenders are a heterogeneous group (Healey & Beauregard, 2015). This heterogeneity also challenges the fundamental gist of the FBI profiling theory which holds that offenders show both consistency and homology when offending. Although research have provided some results for consistency in homicides, such as methods employed of controlling the victim (Salfati & Bateman, 2005), the FBI approach in general is too ambitious when clustering background characteristics and behaviour (Alison et al., 2012; Doan & Snook, 2008).

Critics to the lack of scientific rigor, both in developing and testing the FBI profiling method, maintains the perception of a weak method were both validity and reliability is questioned. Further, meta-analysis also show that profilers were no better than non-profilers when it came to prediction of offensive behaviour (Snook et al., 2007).

1.7.3 Scarce academic and scientific foundations

Though some research from the pro-FBI methodology has been published in peer reviewed journals (Hazelwood & Warren, 2003; Safarik et al., 2000; Safarik & Jarvis, 2005; Safarik et al., 2002; Warren et al., 1999) it is still more to go before the profiling method catches up with the complexity of sexual offenders and sexual homicides. When studying the context between offenders' characteristics - situational factors - body disposal pattern, results supports the FBI-dichotomy showing that organised offenders are more likely to not leave the body at the crime scene as are disorganised offenders (Beauregard & Field, 2008). Despite Beauregard and Field's findings, more research with sufficient scientific rigor supporting the FBI theories is needed to encounter sceptics considering profiling a pseudoscientific approach (Snook et al., 2008).

Using the nomenclature of science and referring to academic literature does not make the FBI profiling approach scientific (Hicks & Sales, 2006). David Canter gives critics to the FBI-method of profiling on various dimensions, but summarised and most fundamental he points to the dearth of scientific use of methods (Canter, 2000; Canter, 2010). For Canter, use

of intuition in profiling, or data from interviews with scarce systematisation, is no good foundations for profiling and decision making. Although, it must be mentioned, other researchers underline the crucial importance of intuition in investigative decision making (Wright, 2013). The FBI also focus on statistics and research, but contrary to Canter's profiling approach the FBI emphasis psychodynamic understandings of motives. Although Canter & Youngs (Canter & Youngs, 2009) joins the critics to FBI offender profiling for the lack of empirical research to support their methodology, they also recognise offender profiling as a potential investigative tool under certain circumstances as well as contributing to the developing domain of Investigative Psychology (Canter, 2011).

1.8 Scientifically grounded approaches to profiling

A few systematically reviews and meta-analysis on offender profiling has been conducted. One of them focused on the problematic side of the fact that 132 published articles showing that researchers seldomly published multiple articles on the same topic and spread their publications on different journals. All which the authors proclaimed made both knowledge transfer and knowledge synthesis problematic (Dowden et al., 2007). Dowden et al. also found an increase in related articles over time with a growing number of articles being peer reviewed in addition to using more statistical materials improving the scientific level of the articles.

Another research reviewed 130 profiling articles finding only 42% was based on scientific evidence while as much as 60% had anecdotal inferences. After year 2000 the authors noticed a significantly more articles that was statistically oriented. In this review the authors also found that profilers generally were more precise in their profiling compared to groups not labeling themselves as profilers (Snook et al., 2007). A third review and meta-analysis was conducted on 426 profiling publications showing that scientific rigor and self-assessment within the profiling discipline had improved considerably (Fox & Farrington, 2018). Fox and Farrington reveal that profiling has developed into a method based more on scientific and statistical grounds but underlines that this empirical approach must continue for making profiling an evidence-based discipline.

1.8.1 Investigative Psychology

Investigative Psychology emerged in UK, mostly due to psychologist David Canter's work after supporting British Police Service catching the "Railway Rapist", John Duffy, who committed three murders and proximately 25 rapes. Canter argue that a person's way of interaction is integrated in the personality, and as he views crime as an interpersonal

transaction between the criminal and the victim, the offender's personality is reflected in the criminal behaviour (Muller, 2000). Canter & Youngs underlines the applicability of Investigative Psychology (IP) in policing, an approach being a lot broader than just geographic and offender profiling (Canter & Youngs, 2009). For IP, profiling is just an example of a method amongst several (Bull & Carson, 2003), but if profiling shall aid police investigations, the profilers must have knowledge of "coherent consistencies in criminal behaviour and the relationship those behavioural consistencies have to aspects of an offender available to the police in an investigation" (Canter & Heritage, 1990) (p.185). Essentially in IP is the understanding of the Action (A) to Characteristics (C) equations, "which relate the set of an offender's actions in a crime to the set of his/her characteristics, such that these characteristics can be reliably inferred in the investigation context when the offender is unknown" (Youngs & Canter, 2006) (p.340).

An advantage for IP as a tool for decision making in crime investigations is the scientifically anchoring in the broad empirical traditions of applied psychology, meaning that IP lean on behavioural science in addition to statistics. Canter represented an antagonist to the bottom-up profiling approach provided by the FBI focusing on intuition and experience, as Canters top-down approach is fundamentally based on statistical data and scientific research. It must be mentioned that these two directions, which represents the "practitioner" (based on clinical experience) and the "academic" (based on applied scientific psychology) model, might be complementary (Alison et al., 2004).

Acknowledging the caveats of unobtrusive data collected by the law enforcement (Canter & Alison, 2003) also stresses the value how this is giving another perspective to criminal behaviour than the traditionally use of interviews and questionnaires. By trying to translate unobtrusive data into information that is applicable in real life detective work, IP focuses on elaborations of software programs and statistical models to produce relevance for investigations.

1.8.2 Several clinical limitations

Critiques to the statistical approaches to offender profiling has been put forward (Alison et al., 2010). When the base-rate of behaviour is set aside and studies are based on small or not representative samples, it is a question whether nomothetic research findings can be applied to idiographic cases. The Canter model has several limitations such as theoretical conceptual weakness (Hicks & Sales, 2006). This gives limited generations of hypothesis, data selections and challenging interpretations of the results and, according to Hick and Sales,

Canter does not solve the weakness of typology as former profiling methods also had. Other critics to Canter's IP is that it "does not necessarily offer anything new, although contributions from the field of environmental psychology do prove new avenues to explore", referring to Canter using new terms for concepts developed by the FBI and questioning whether Canter's theory is applicable to a country such as USA which has another geography than the UK (Wilson et al., 1997) (p.6).

From a meta perspective it is possible to claim that profiling of IP and FBI diverse themselves on two main parameters. The FBI believes that conflicts in childhood produce deviant sexual fantasies which later will be a motive mirrored at the crime scene. Because of this, it might be fair to say that FBI is focused on the inside of the offender which explains why psychodynamic (or psychoanalytical) psychology is vital in their approach. IP does not reject motive as important but stresses the relationship between Action and Characteristics and by such having a behavioural approach. Naturally, this also reflects what they consider to be interesting data and the strategy for collecting them. Whereas FBI's profiling method is based on qualitative data from interviews, the IP approach seems to prefer quantitative data gathered from a plethora of the law enforcement work about the offender's criminal behaviour.

1.8.3 Profiling in progression; forming today's BIA

Through the last decades there have been development in the professionalising of profiling. UK Police Service is probably where this change has been best documented. In the 1980's and -90's the Police Service in UK incorporated different profiling approaches to support decision makings in investigation of serious crimes (Rainbow, 2011). Two examples of this are the clinical approach in the Rachel Nickels murder case and a more scientific statistical approach by David Canter in the search for the Railway rapists and his following development of Investigative Psychology. The FBI profiling approach also reached the UK (Johnstone & Ward, 2009).

Later, another profiling development took place in UK as The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) replaced the term "Offender profiler" with "Behavioural Investigative Advisor" in 2001. This was one of several changes to structure the use of the competence and to secure the quality of the method in use (Rainbow, 2008). The content of focus changed from motivation and fantasy, as seen in the FBI approach, to more overt and reliable data such as criminal record, age and location (Wilson & Alison, 2013). This change in UK from a mere clinical profiling approach towards the establishment of the BIA is due much to the work of

Laurence Alison and David Canter during the 1990`s (Alison et al., 1999).

The development in UK Police Service have implications for the different types of support being offered in the investigation. Around the turn of the millennium “the role of “offender profiler” has extended beyond inferring offender characteristics from behaviour exhibited during a crime” (West & Alison, 2013) (p.381). The BIA is often called upon in difficult-to-detect-murderers (Innes, 2003), but the BIA does not only generate profiles of offenders, they give advises in different aspects of investigation through their "pragmatic application of behavioural science theory, research and experience" (Rainbow & Gregory, 2011) (p.33).

Other tasks that BIA accomplish is crime scene assessment, the generations of hypothesis for the investigations, assessing potential links between offences as well as suspect priorities. Additionally, the BIA may also give their support in interviews, risk assessment or in other policing areas where decision making is necessary such as handling media (Cole & Brown, 2014). Another aspect worth mentioning in this professionalising of profilers is the need of being accredited Behavioural Investigative Advisors to work as a profiler within the UK Police Service. The accreditation is done by ACPO under austere evaluations, a measure done to secure profiling quality within the UK Police Services.

1.8.4 The importance of transparency

The BIA is vigilant to the critics of offender profiling lacking empirical grounded argument (Almond et al., 2007; Snook et al., 2007). To meet this critic the BIA introduces grounded arguments and transparency in the process of deriving inferential for decision making. One such measure is the use of Toulmin`s argument of philosophy as a framework (Alison, Smith, Eastman, et al., 2003; Alison et al., 2004). With Toulmin`s approach each argument can be broken into parts (claim, strengths, grounds, warrant, backing, rebuttal) making it easier to consider strengths and weaknesses of the claims. By doing this transparently the arguments put forward opens for scrutiny. To strengthen the BIA approach for the future, and for balancing the practitioner and academic perspective, research needs to be directed more explicitly to what improve decision making in real life police investigation. Not just bringing parts of general research back to relevant policing (Rainbow & Alison, 2011; Snook et al., 2006; Villejoubert et al., 2009).

As profiling in Sweden naturally have been in a developing process too, it is more difficult to describe as there is no available literature on this topic to my knowledge. And, as

far as I am concerned, the history of profiling in Sweden has never had a "Rachel Nickell – case", which again might have given another tempo to the developing processes.

1.9 Inferential logics in profiling

1.9.1 *Deduction and induction*

The use of inferential logics, as deduction and induction, is mentioned several places in the literature of profiling. Although, they are used somewhat casually amongst forensic scientist (Turvey, 2012). Generally, inferential reasoning is also essential in police investigations (Carson, 2012), and is of particular use in murder investigations identifying investigators different thinking styles as common-sense reasoning, indexical reasoning, analogical reasoning and legal reasoning (Innes, 2003). Employing a hypothetical mindset is an important counteract to case constructions (Maguire, 2012) and this principal mindset is considered as "hard evidence" in investigation (Murphy, 2015).

Although this is bit of a simplistic definition, one might say that induction is inferences from particular to general, and deduction is inferences from general to particular. Turvey refers to deductive as logical/rational and inductive as statistical/experiential technics of profiling (Turvey, 2012). One important distinction between the two inferences is that in deductive reasoning the conclusion must be correct if the premises are true. While in inductive reasoning, though the premises are true, the conclusion needs not to be (Viskum, 2013).

1.9.2 *Abduction*

Another form of logics named abduction was introduced by Charles Sanders Pierce (Burks, 1946). Abductions are pragmatic guessing and though the premises are true, the conclusion need not to be correct (Fahsing, 2016). Innes refers to abductive logic as the approach "most commonly deployed form of investigative logic on murder enquires" (Innes, 2003) (p.184). At the same time, he warns about the caveat abduction reasoning may have if interpreting information to support the dominant hypothesis of the investigation. The three logical inferences, abduction, induction, and deduction, are all connected to an essential part of investigation, including profiling, namely the use of hypothesis. The constructions of hypotheses are made through abduction; the consequential clarifying of the hypotheses is made through deduction and further hypotheses are empirically evaluated by induction. Grounded in this logical operation abduction is the inference of a new idea formulated as hypothesis which is explanatory (Burks, 1946).

Although not outlined here it must be briefly mentioned that there are different

perspectives on the use of logics in profiling. Some favours the deductive approach but are critical to whether such philosophical paradigm fits into offender profiling because the human brain's functional processing is not so categorical (Kocsis & Palermo, 2007). Others consider the debate on deductive vs. inductive somewhat superfluous because of the development of a more eclectic profiling approach bringing in perspectives from experience, statistics and academics (Alison et al., 2010).

1.9.3 The importance of knowing the difference

It is pivotal to investigations that when profilers are giving advice on the bases of logics it is important that both profiler's and SIO's are aware of the differences between abductive, deductive, and inductive inferences. This because, for instance, equating conclusions of inductive reasoning with that of a valid deductive interference is of a potential threat to the investigation. Perhaps it was such a mistake that was presented in the Norwegian murder case of Birgitte Tengs when both police and the court administration relayed on profiling during the investigation process as well as the trial process. Before introducing the use of profiling in the murder case of Birgitte Tengs, issues of profiling in court proceedings in general will be given to illuminate the applicability of profiling in the court of law.

1.10 Profiling in court

1.10.1 The juridical language of preference

There are at least three reasons for why profiling is actualised in the court. First, because the use of inferential logics is essential to the legal system as it is to many profilers. Second, because the court proceedings are a direct extension of the investigative process. And thirdly, different kind of experts' statements are important to court proceedings as they assist the judges in their decision makings. When it comes to the latter, it is of great importance to be aware of both advantages and disadvantages of using for instance psychologists as experts in the legal system in general (Cox, 1999). When it comes to the applicability of profiling, it is necessary to evaluate to which extent this has been done and to what degree it has been useful or not. There are different arguments on whether profiling should be a method used in the legal process, such as in Canada, USA, Germany and the UK (Meyer, 2008). In these countries the prosecutors have introduced profiling as a method. And the courts have been presented with the profiling result as evidence to be considered in several criminal cases.

Ormerod underlines the courts rules of evidence when arguing that profiling should not be a part of the hearing against an accused (Ormerod, 1999). Amongst several pinpoints, Ormerod stresses the profiling's expert use of intuition and type of reasoning which is not

common to the legal system. With reference to profiling this means that court proceedings lean more to the deductive inferences, while as police investigation very much use abductive inferences in their work and, as pointed out earlier, these two inferential have different degrees for veracity in their basics.

1.10.2 Probabilities, not certainties

Additionally, the lack of reliability, objectivity and scientific stringency is problematic when evaluating evidence which obviously are managed differently as shown in the categories of approaches to profiling. In countries, where the rule of law includes a jury, there will be an issue whether a profiler testifying in court will prejudice the jury by making the impression of the accused as a criminal character (Paclebar et al., 2008). Rainbow and Gregory argue that Behavioural Investigative Advice (BIA) is for the use of investigation and not for the legal system. Because the BIA concerns probabilities and not certainties, the profiling report "should be deemed insufficiently relevant and reliable, and too prejudicial to be received by the court as evidence of the defendant`s guilt" (Rainbow & Gregory, 2011) (p.21).

Unfortunately, the practicing of profiling in the murder investigation of Birgitte Tengs illustrates how profiling should not be used during investigation nor in court proceedings. Although, forgotten by many, this is part of the profiling legacy of Norwegian Police Service. Therefore, it ought to be mentioned as this thesis might bring forward a new possibility for discussing profiling as a tool to support major crime investigation in the future.

1.11 The murder of Birgitte Tengs in Norway 1995¹

1.11.1 False confession

Birgitte Tengs was 17 years old and on her way home from a social gathering around midnight, in a weekend of May 1995, when she was brutally killed. Her cousin, also 17 years at the time of the murder, was arrested 20 months later, in February 1997. The cousin was held in isolation for a long period of time and interviewed several times, interviews that persisted for hours. The way these interviewing's were completed became exposed to harsh critics, from Norwegian experts as well as from experts abroad. A leading expert on witness psychology and false confession, Gísli H. Guðjónsson, was appointed as an expert witness by the court and concluded that the cousin had been exposed to leading and inhuman

¹ It should be noted that I worked in the National Criminal Investigation Service`s Cold Case team that resumed the investigation of this murder case in 2016.

interrogations. These interviews led the cousin to a false confession approximately one month after he had been arrested.

1.11.2 The order of profiling assistance

The FBI-trained Swedish profiler Ulf Åsgård, was a psychiatrist of profession and employed in the Swedish Police Service. Ultimo January 1997, the prosecutor wanted a profile to be made of the suspect cousin before the arrest because it was considered helpful when building a formal accusation against the cousin. The official mandate given to Åsgård was two folded: 1) Assist with expert evaluation of the behaviour/development of a witness that appears to the police to have a strange behaviour. 2) Evaluating the contents of the interviews of the witness and assist with expert guidance on how to penetrate certain blockages the police believe the witness have, and additionally, whether the opinion of the police can be right on professional terms². The term "blockages" refers to repressed memories and defence mechanism holding back information.

Åsgård visited the crime scene and had meetings with the local police 6. and 7. of February where he also gave a preliminary presentation on his evaluations. The next day the cousin was arrested for the murder. Åsgård gave his first written report to the Police Service in February 1997, after the cousin was arrested. Åsgård underlined that profiling seldom is made when the police already have a suspect. Nevertheless, he refers to his report as a "sketch of a criminal profile"³ and alluded to what he called the pioneering work of the FBI to understand murderers. He refers to FBI colleagues (Ressler, Burgess, Douglas) when writing about predators' characteristics such as gender, age, type of work, civilian status, relation to the victim and the offender's pre- criminal career. In this report Åsgård states that he considers the crime scene to be a mixture of organised and disorganised, with an emphasis on the latter, driven by an impulsive murder. Further, he claims that the cousin shows some characteristics of a disorganised offender and that he needed to be further scrutinised.

1.11.3 Psychodynamic interpretations

As a psychiatrist Åsgård reveals his psychodynamic approach when giving his interpretations of the cousin's statements from the interviews. For an example, Åsgård interpreted the cousin's interests in reading Donald Duck magazines as an expression of an immature personality. Another example is when the cousin reveals in the interview that he was tired after training and school the night of the murder (Friday evening). Åsgård rejects

² Both 1 and 2 are my translation from the original police document

³ My translations form the original police document

that a sportsman (like the cousin was) could be tired of daily activities and holds from a psychodynamic point of view that expressed tiredness is often confused by anger. Åsgård's reflections about the cousin's diversity of statements are explained in terms of repressed memories or defence mechanisms holding back the truth.

1.11.4 Court's decision leaning on profiling assistance

Åsgård's work reflects the profiling method of the FBI both in the nomenclature used (organised/disorganised) and in resonating how the crime scene reflects the offender's characteristics. In the District Court the accused cousin was convicted to 14 years imprisonment. In the Court of Appeal, the cousin was found not guilty, but despite of this the cousin was convicted to pay 100.000 Norwegian kroner to the parents of Birgitte Tengs by the civil lawsuit. This is possible because the probability level is lower in the civilian lawsuit than in the criminal case. Of interest to this thesis is the civilian lawsuit's grounds given to the convictions:

The Court of Appeal cannot explain "A"'s (the cousin, my remark) behaviour in no other ways than sexual attraction, rejection, earlier sexual behaviour and that a likely future condemnation created fear and aggression inside of him. "A" is gifted and doing well at school, but he failed to control his urges and to act rationally⁴.

The court's wording reflects Åsgård's profiling work, his psychodynamic interpretations of the cousin's statements and further his understanding of the cousin's motive for murdering Birgitte Tengs.

This case has been discussed for decades, especially about how police interviews can provoke fake confessions. To my knowledge the role of the profiler has rarely been mentioned except from a couple of news articles at the time of the trial. In the development of new methods, which profiling was in the 1990's, unfortunately mistakes happen. For all I know, Åsgård would not have done this in the same way today as he might have considered wearing two hats (profiler in the investigation and the court administration's expert) indeed was one too many. Anyhow, the responsibility for making this mistake lies only partly on Åsgård, as a professional he should have understood that the circumstances of the case was far from optimal when it came to make a profile. It is the Norwegian Police Service and the court administration who must take the responsibility for the devastating use of profiling in this

⁴ My translation from the original court documents

case. Using profiling to support ones main (and at the time only) hypothesis in the investigation is wrong. Further, using what is at its best intelligence as evidence leads to disastrous mistakes in court decisions.

The use of profiling in the Birgitte Tengs murder case also brings forward another aspect of requesting profiling as an investigative tool. When the SIO and the investigative team are under pressure, the SIO and the investigative team is particularly vulnerable for making mistakes. The request for profiling in the Birgitte Tengs murder case was perhaps blinded by the urge for the investigation to come to an end. As the result was devastating, it emphasizes the pivotal need for the SIO`s awareness of own vulnerability in particular situations. Of many skills the SIO`s need to possess, strategic awareness and adaption are amongst the essential (Smith & Flanagan, 2000).

1.11.5 The need for solid and sustainable evidence

Ormerod and Sturman underlines several factors why profiling might help the investigation, but not being reliable and valid tool to be used in courts (Ormerod & Sturman, 2005). Interesting to the Birgitte Tengs murder case is that one of the caveats the authors' stresses, is when the police are "hiring a profiler they may be likely to be provided with information which the profiler perceives them as wanting to hear" (Ormerod & Sturman, 2005) (p.172). Further, the admissibility of evidence in court is essential as the court is focused on one question: guilty or not guilty. The production of evidence must therefore be presented through a solid and sustainable scientific process. Further, it should be known to the court administration that giving psychodynamic understandings validity in court procedures is severely problematic. The philosopher Karl Popper holds that psychoanalysis is no more of a science than astrology which makes it a pseudo-science because it is neither testable, refutable or falsifiable (Meehl, 1970).

Although, profiling might have been something new to court administration, the validity of logical inferences and the tautological theories of psychoanalysis were, presumably, not new. This led to a very unfortunately sentencing in the murder case of Birgitte Tengs as claims were presented and used as deductive arguments having sustainable premises, while in fact they were inductive arguments resting on weak, non-scientific and tautological premises. Therefore, it is unfortunate that the verdict was not repealed before this

autumn, after 24 years. Although the probability level differs between a criminal case and a civilian case in the Norwegian court, the verdict must be founded on reliably evidence⁵.

1.12 Potential caveats in natural human processes

As other investigators, profilers too must be aware of the natural function and limitation of the human brain as it might influence investigative work in negative manners. Automatically our human brains take shortcuts when encountering a complex world of massive information, often referred to as heuristics. Making such quick judgments certainly has its advantage in everyday life. But, during the hunt for an unknown murder an investigator may be led on a stray, making one or several individual mistakes often referred to as confirmation biases, and biases are often derived from heuristics (Almond et al., 2012).

Like investigations, the work of profilers is also often carried out in groups. Working in groups clearly have many benefits, but the way human brains might function when collaborating tightly with others might also have disadvantages. In groups of profilers, where all participants are having the same focus and goal over time, issues of groupthink may appear. Profilers, as investigators in general, are prone to a diversity of threats thru heuristics, confirmation biases and group work. It is therefore necessary that investigators have “self-awareness of the nature of intuitive and more conscious forms of decision-making, and a deeper understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the canonical forms of reasoning employed” (Bryant, 2019) (p.64). As these factors and inferences potentially jeopardising the profilers` work this will be outlined further.

1.12.1 *Heuristics and confirmation bias*

Since one of the investigative tasks is to collect, evaluate and further draw inferences leaning on available information, these logical conclusions are indeed exposed to the investigator's mindset (Ask, 2013; Bryant, 2019). That will also include profilers' mindset. As attention and memory are interwoven and set limitations to cognitive capacity (Styles, 2006), it is not surprising that the human brain is prone to take shortcuts, trying to handle what is often felt as information overload during a major crime investigation (Stelfox & Pease, 2013). Additionally, investigators often have a range of previous experiences to which they, conscious or unconscious, compares the ongoing investigation with. This may or may not be to the benefit of the ongoing investigation (Innes, 2003).

Tversky and Kahneman addresses different mental operations, or heuristics, from the

⁵ Autumn 2021 a new suspect was arrested and charged for the murder. Autumn 2022 the suspect faces prosecution on charges he murdered Birgitte Tengs.

fact that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles by which they reduce the complex tasks of assessing likelihoods and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) (p.1). They categorise them in three, as Representativeness, Availability in addition to Adjustment and Anchoring.

1.12.2 The Barnum effect, tunnel vision, and need for closure

In two different studies examining individual's perceptions of ambiguous statements results showed that despite different profiles were given to the same case, both groups found the profiling helpful in the investigation (Alison, Smith, & Morgan, 2003). According to Alison et al., this is possible due to "meaning a joint process of selectively noting aspects of the profile that can be easily applied to the offender, ignoring those aspects that are not applicable, and constructing meaning from ambiguity" (p. 192-193). This means that the subjects interpreted ambiguous information in the profile in a way subjects believed to be suitable for their inquiry. The tendency to take ambiguous, general or vague information, and turn it into something meaningful is called the Barnum-effect (Snook et al., 2008). The tendency to overlook the information that do not fit or is perceived as contradictory information, so called tunnel vision, is another bias that potentially will jeopardise the investigation. Both the Barnum-effect and tunnel visions are examples of confirmation biases, meaning that the information presented is not evaluated in an objective manner, but instead coloured by an already fixed perception wanting to be confirmed (Findley & Scott, 2006).

When investigating a major crime incident, a very important task for the police service is to collect information to produce knowledge and evidence. These case constructions reflect the investigative perception of the truth, which will be scrutinised during the court proceedings (Innes, 2003). Obviously, if the collection of information of which the case is constructed upon is biased, consequently it will be a substantial hazard to investigation. This will also apply to another mechanism which takes place in humans, called Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC). This phenomenon is defined as a person eager to reach a conclusion ending the feeling of insecurity (Ask & Fahsing, 2018) and is a potential caveat to decision making in investigations. Some individuals show more tolerance than others to an insecure situation, or a situation where ambiguity is high. Individuals with less tolerance are more disposed to reach a cognitive closure (Choi et al., 2008). Need of cognitive closure "may also represent a dimension of stable individual differences" (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) (p.1050), as the variation of NFCC is also reflected by situational differences. Various contextual factors effect this cognitive mechanism such as time pressure and unexciting tasks (Mannetti et al.,

2002). Hence, the quality of decision makings in major crime investigations ought not to be influenced by NFCC as it may jeopardise the inquiry.

Although tunnel vision might be helpful to the human cognition (Kahneman, 2013), and perhaps even in investigation (Snook & Cullen, 2008), the hard fact is that case construction through the lens of tunnel-vision, or other types of aforementioned confirmation biases, increases the risk for detrimental consequences to the investigation. This relates also to other psychological phenomena like groupthink, as this also may bring inaccuracy to the inquiry (Poyser & Grieve, 2018).

1.12.3 Group work

Profilers often take part in two groups, working with their fellow profiler colleagues, and joining, at least for a period, the ongoing investigation group. Groups may guard against confirmation biases as, given the right climate, different opinions within the investigation group emerges (Mullins et al., 2012), but processes within a group may also cause harmful impact on decisions ahead. The latter was pinpointed by Janis who evaluated poor decision makings ending in unfortunate, or even disastrous incidents, due to groupthink (Janis, 1991). Groupthink is something that happens when member of a group strives for agreement to such an extent that the ability to realistically evaluate alternatives ceases. Cohesiveness within the group plays an important part for this bias to emerge.

1.12.4 Groupthink

According to Janis it is easy to believe that when cohesiveness increases within a group, the group members will be more confident in expressing their free thoughts, but it is the opposite that happens (Janis, 1971). Group cohesiveness is a core element to Janis in terms of its impact on quality of decision making (Mullen et al., 1994). When cohesiveness increases so too do the group conformity and the fear of asking critical questions about the groups` decision makings. Janis points to eight symptoms of groupthink and he clusters them into three categories: overconfidence, tunnel vision and strong conformity pressure (Janis, 1991).

1.12.5 Criticism of Janis` theory

Although Janis have made great contribution to understand dynamics in groups and decision quality, the matter of groupthink has also received its critics for not having enough empirical validity. For instance, criticism for lacking of differentiation on contextual factors (Hart, 1991) and that the quality of decision making in a group is not a simple result of group cohesiveness (Mullen et al., 1994). It has also received critics for not considering groupthink

to be a more wide-ranging phenomena than first thought, hence introducing the ubiquity model of groupthink (Baron & Zanna, 2005). The spectre of criticism is wide, from claiming the model "is a compelling myth" (Fuller & Aldag, 1998) (p.177) to others claiming that "the original model represents a brilliant construction" (Paulus, 1998) (p.371).

Despite that Janis introduction to the Groupthink model several decades ago, and although widely accepted, hence broadly applied, experimental studies which has tested the model adequately are limited (Rose, 2011). As humans are considered to be "groupish animals with a propensity to engage in motivated cognition to support their group identities" Janis groupthink model is still a model utilised in today's discussions of group dynamics when it comes to decision-makings and a silver bullet concerning the prevention of groupthink (Van Bavel et al., 2020) (p.66).

Although, heuristics, groups and even biases might be helpful to investigations in general and profiling in specific, these factors also hold potential caveat to decision makings in major crime cases. It is essential to meet these challenges with academic knowledge and scientifically based intervention by professionalising the Police Services and investigative methods. Structuring the investigative process is one such contribution, and for this thesis it would be very much of interest where profiling workplaces itself during the timeline of investigation.

1.13 The investigative process

1.13.1 The Investigative circle

As profilers are investigators taking part in ongoing major crime investigations, it is central to know not only how they work but also in what parts of an investigation they give their support. The categorisation of investigation into sequences is not new (Innes, 2005) and to visualise this the Investigative cycle will be utilised as a frame of reference. In the area of thinking styles Geoffrey Dean outlined different ways in how detectives experience and understands the process of investigation, as a Method, as a Challenge, as a Skill and as a Risk. In the thinking style named "Method" Dean describes the detectives way of thinking as a set of five procedural and basic steps (collecting-checking-considering-connecting-constructing) with the aim of building evidence thru information gathered legally (Tywoniak & Dean, 2006). Other authors also underline the investigative work as a repeating and cyclic process of identifying the best explanation of the available data in a case (Bjerknes & Fahsing, 2018; Fahsing, 2013). Based on different investigation models Fahsing established a new model called Investigative cycle and added "consult" to Dean`s five-stage model (Fahsing, 2016).

Consult is an essential step to secure the investigative quality by letting others having a critical view of the work and or adding more knowledge to the presented work.

1.13.2 Early profiling connected and constructed

During some of the murders taking place in Norway in the 1990`s the Norwegian Police Service requested profiling assistance from abroad. Having read thru several profiling reports, it is my impression that profiling assistance in the 1990`s reflects the procedural steps of Connect and Construct. Further, the profiling reports from murder cases in the 1990`s appears to me somewhat limited in the sense that they seem difficult to operationalise for the investigative group. For instance, when a profiler in their report claims that the perpetrator probably is younger than 40 years old, lives alone, are in a good shape, having a typical male profession, nice home and do not abuse alcohol or drugs; how shall the investigation applicate this for their purpose when these are traits common to perhaps over hundred living in the area or nearby⁶? It is therefore interesting to examine today`s placement of profiling in the investigative circle and whether profilers have expanded their professional remits, hence making their work more applicable for investigative steps.

1.13.3 The overall importance of good thinking

The core of investigating major crime is the identification, interpretation and ordering of information (Innes, 2003) and doing so by what Alison and Canter called good thinking which "is represented by a thorough search for alternatives without favouring what one already has in mind. Poor thinking involves missing something in the search and/or seeking evidence that prevents the scientist from choosing between alternatives" (Alison et al., 1999) (p.30). This quote reminds about the aspects of being an investigator, being a profiler, as there are potential caveats such as heuristics, conformation biases and groupthink presented in every investigative and profiling work. As both profilers and investigators are employed in the Police Service there is one more aspect that needs to be addressed; the organisational frame where this work takes place. Police Services are large and solid organisations in both Sweden, UK and Norway. As Sweden and UK have had profiling competence within their Police Services for more than twenty years it is interesting to learn how they experience their respective organisational frames. Representing a large and solid organisation might potentially both give opportunities as well as challenges.

⁶ My translation, taken from an original profiling report made during the 1990`s in a Norwegian homicide case.

1.14 The influence of the organisational chart

1.14.1 *Framing the profiling group within the organisation*

Not only juridical rules and structuring of investigations processes set the frames for how profilers perform their work. The mere organisation charts with its different levels of leadership, groups and individuals have impacts on profilers and their work. Issues such as which leader level decides what cases profilers should take or not, and how the group of profilers should be structured to meet the requests for assistance, is of great importance for the profilers. In large organisations which the police service is, a central issue is to what extent the organisation is aware of the profiling competency and practice. Being aware of when and how to request for assistance, as well as the competency profilers hold, is of importance for the organisational functioning.

Another issue central to Police Services is every employee's need for physical and mental well-being, including professional updates, so called Continued Professional Development (CPD). The need for professional updates or types of organisational support might differ profilers from other sections within the same organisation. How the Police Service handles these potential different needs will influence how profilers work and how they evaluate their work.

Other parts of the organisational chart having direct influence on profiler's work is the number of profilers and the tools within the organisation to enhance the profiler's performance. The first implies whether the group is proportional in size to cover the need, and the latter may for instance be a statistical tool such as VICCLASS (Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System) which some National Police Services holds. This system registers a diversity of information connected to a crime such as allowing investigators to seek statistical prevalence of a crime. It is also a valuable tool for crime-linkage where information about modus operandi or geographical behaviours might connect different criminal cases to the same suspect (Davies et al., 2019). Another tool for improving profiling work could for instance be the organisation approval to co-work with an academic institution, as it would open for direct academic support to the profilers if it is possible to share data from the Police Service for the purpose of relevant research.

1.14.2 *Securing quality and giving autonomy*

Although solved differently, all police services are focused on police work being performed at high standards. It will be of interest to know how this is being solved concerning the profiling work. Whether the organisation at its top-level set standards in any form to secure the quality or if the responsibility for this is distributed to the sections or the profiling

group itself. Mentioned here are just some of the organisational factors framing and influencing the profilers in their daily bases, there is a common underlying theme to all issues being raised: To what degree do the profiling group have autonomy themselves? In some organisations the autonomy is heavily distributed at the top, making sure decisions mostly being made up in the hierarchy. While other organisations being more decentralised, letting sections and groups taking more decisions, and by that more responsibility, for their own operations. It is reason to believe that the issues of organisational frames, including degrees of autonomy, will be reflected by the profilers as these are natural factors influencing everyone employed in a large organisation such as the Police Service.

1.15 Experts from outside; profiling groups and review teams

Profilers supports are requested at different stages of an investigation, but usually early during a major crime case when it is obvious that the investigation is facing an unknown perpetrator. Bringing in a team of experts, as profilers are, have some parallels to another expert team that sometimes also being brought in during investigations, namely review teams. Clearly, there are differences between a profiling team and a review team such as the cause for why the expert groups are requested. Although, there is also some resemblance too, as both groups coming from the outside, bringing in perspective which purpose is to help major crimes investigations go forward. When experts from outside, profilers or reviewers, acquires the same information as the investigative team, they may understand the case information in another way, literally reading the case with fresh eyes. This might lead to putting pieces of information together in a new way, analysing an event in another way or discovering one or several investigative steps so far not being carried out.

Supporting the ongoing investigation with their competency, both profiling teams and review teams might have, what I will call, a catalysing effect on the investigation as their expertise hopefully bring the investigation forward. Now clearly, the review team also have the function of being a controller, which is a function not being associated with profiling teams. Historically, the view of investigation as a phenomenon has moved away from being a craft or an art towards being established more on academic principles and scientific research (Diderichsen, 2013). This might have contributed to a change of dynamics between the ongoing investigation team and the team of experts coming in. For instance, the investigative team being more open to the team of profiling experts also when it comes to perspectives of a controller function. Sweden and UK both have profiling team and review teams⁷ and

⁷ In 2022 the Swedish Police Service have been in a process whether they shall reinstall a national review team

interesting to this thesis is whether the profilers will mention, not only the catalyst function, but also the potential controller function.

To generate as much information as possible, comprising divergent aspects of the profiling work, the profilers from both Sweden and UK were interviewed using SWOT questions (Helms & Nixon, 2010). All profilers were asked about Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of their profiling work. The answers were analysed both to the SWOT scale and to the IGLO scale, the latter containing Individual, Group, Leadership and Organisation (IGLO). Both SWOT and IGLO analyses were used as the combination can give more information (Hoff et al., 2009).

1.16 Questions of interest

Several questions of interest were made before administering the interviews and structured according to SWOT and IGLO.

1. Will the sample report more on Strengths than on Weaknesses?

Since the profiling groups have existed for more than two decades within their respective Police Service this alone signals that there are more positives than negatives associations to the groups. Additionally, the groups have survived different reforms and austerity cuts through the years indicating that the groups are viewed positively within their organisation. It would be reasonable to assume that these positives would be reflected in the profiler's own statements.

2. Will the sample report more on Opportunities than on Threats?

As both Sweden and UK have had profiling teams for years, it is reasonable to believe that potential starting problems no longer exist. This opens the possibilities for profilers having improved practice and transferred their competency into new areas of investigation.

3. Will the sample report more on Group than on Individual?

As there are several profilers in the Police Service, it is natural to believe that they are sectioned as a group. Therefore, it was assumed that profiling work most of all was carried out in groups, hence more reports on Group level than on the Individual level.

4. Will the sample report more on Leadership than on Organisation?

Since both profiling groups are well established, it was assumed that their focus on organisation would be less reflected in their statements. This because of the importance of relation to the SIO`s, or his or her equivalent, as they request the profiling competency. Presumably, the profiler's answers would mirror a strong relationship to those who ask for their help.

5. When combining SWOT and IGLO there are no major differences between the countries.

Both groups have existed for nearly twenty years and historically, at one point in some degree and in some respects, they were affected by FBI profiling approach. Further, both countries have their profiling competence organised within the Police Service, as a unit, working with various homicide cases. Altogether, it was therefore anticipated that there would be no major divergences between the Swedish and UK profiling groups.

2. Methods and materials

2.1 Aim

The aim of this study was to gather information about profilers and their work to establish a foundation to discuss whether Norwegian Police Service should acquire profiling competence when investigating major crime cases.

2.2 Design

It was considered necessary to obtain data from two different sources with long term experience. Practically, this resulted in interviewing profilers from two different Police Services, respectively Sweden and UK. Profilers were interviewed and asked to describe and evaluate different aspects of their work.

Although the origin of SWOT analysis is unknown it has become amongst the most popular tools, suitable both on organisation as well as on individual level, to improve decision making when facing complex strategic situations, and reduce the quantity of information (Helms & Nixon, 2010). The method also appears to be suitable for collecting quantitative data from semi-structured interviews (Hoff et al., 2009).

The current study combines quantitative and qualitative design. The data is collected and transcribed through a qualitative approach (interviews), but also converted to quantitative data to allow for supplementing descriptive statistics. The numerical translation of qualitative data is referred to as quantizing and is a part of mixed methods research (Driscoll et al., 2007; Sandelowski et al., 2009), an research approach having received much attention over the years (Srnrka & Koeszegi, 2007). The main approach in this thesis is qualitative method, but statistical methods is used to supply systematisation of similarities and differences between the countries.

This study has a deductive approach meaning that the variables for coding, SWOT and IGLO, was developed a head of the interviews. Having a theoretical standing, and applying it to the collected data, is also known as a "top-down" process. The principles of the interpretational methods of hermeneutics, where the whole must be understood by reference to the parts and vice versa, or the dialogical relation between knowledge and knowledge in advance (Alvesson & Sköldberrg, 2008), do not apply to the quantitative part of this study.

2.3 Qualitative and quantitative methods

As the intention of interviewing profilers was to collect their views and experiences working within the profiling group, the coding scales of SWOT and IGLO were helpful to

explore the questions of interest. The starting point of this study was phenomenological, but after the collection of data the design makes a methodological shift away from traditional qualitative approach to a quantitative approach, making the study more semi-phenomenological.

Methodically semi-structured interview is a qualitative design, but the coding of data in this study was completed quantitatively, which is possible in content analysis (Bukve, 2016). Therefore, the chosen methods of this study are a mix between qualitative and quantitative research approach. Traditionally content analysis is closer to natural science when it comes to epistemological anchoring compared to other qualitative methods. As a technique content analysis describes the data by quantitative measures, which makes up the fundament for further statistical interventions. The need for interpretation, in comparison to for instance stepwise deductive inductive method in a qualitative design, is held to a minimum (Bratberg, 2014). As the interviewing of the profilers would generate extensive text materials, I found content analysis usable because of its systematic analytical approach to texts with its purpose to reproduce the gist of the actual material of texts (Bratberg, 2014). As this approach is usable for both traditional texts and analysing qualitative interview (Robson & McCartan, 2016) it appears to match the aim of this study.

2.4 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were applied and enabled a balanced approach by asking all informants the same delimited open questions. Further, follow-up questions were given, depending on the informants' answers. As such, the interview situation had both a common and a more individual approach to the informants. This combination was aimed to enable a focused but also broad information gathering.

Presumably, using semi-structured interviews asking the informants open-ended SWOT-questions would give, not only data about profiler's reflections of their own work, but also a comprehensive understanding of their work content. Together with follow-up questions, this methodological approach would probably bring forward a diversity of factors for the Norwegian Police Service to consider. Further, combining SWOT and IGLO both in the questions of interest and the systematisation of the collected data would also reflect the informant's experience of different levels of the organisation and give a more holistic perspective of the informant's own evaluation of their work.

Before the interviews were performed in Stockholm and London, three colleagues at the Norwegian Cold Case section were interviewed to test the SWOT-questions. The test

persons represented both genders, two were police officers, one of them a Senior Investigative Officer and one had a non-police educational background with a law degree. They were interviewed about Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats in conjunction with the sections way of working with cold cases. Follow-up questions were given based on the interviewee's answers to the common questions. All test interviews were recorded due to procedures for the upcoming interviews. Following a short introduction to the purpose of the interview, the semi-structured interview was conducted with no time limits and recorded as a whole. The test interviews were completed successfully and indicated no need for adjustments.

The interviews in UK and Sweden followed the semi-structure interview guides (appendix 2), recorded in its entirety and completed with no time limit. All informants were interviewed individually. In Stockholm the interviews were performed in Swedish and Norwegian language. In London the interviews were performed in English. All informants in both groups were first asked two open questions: "Please give a brief introduction of yourself and your background for working within the profiling group" and "Please give a brief introduction of the unit you are working in". The informants were successively asked four questions:

- 1) Can you tell me what kind of Strengths you think your unit's profiling work has?
- 2) Can you tell me what kind of Weaknesses you think your unit's profiling work has?
- 3) Can you tell me what kind of Opportunities you think your unit's profiling work has?
- 4) Can you tell me what kind of Threats you think your unit's profiling work has?

It was specified that the SWOT-questions were related to their opinion about the work of the profiling group. The first five interviews were conducted at the participant's workplace, at the National Operative Section at Stockholm Police station and The National Crime Agency at Spring Garden in London, respectively. The last interview was also scheduled to my visit in London but postponed and therefore conducted by facetimeing on telephone using WhatsApp. The Swedish group were interviewed first. The UK informants were interviewed four days later. The telephone interview was conducted 12 weeks thereafter. The duration of the interviews varied from 43 minutes to 1 hour and 43 minutes. The average duration of the interviews was 1 hour and 9 minutes. The total duration of the interviews of the Swedish informants was 4 hours and 12 minutes, while the total duration of the interviews of the UK group was 2 hours and 42 minutes.

2.5 Informants

Approaching several profiler's evaluation of their own work in two different countries was done to get a diverse and representative sample for the study, and to examine whether there were any differences between the countries.

One compulsory feature in the selection of informants was their hand-on experience in performing profiling in major crimes while working within the Police Service. Due to the aim of this study, it was of relevance that their profiling was conducted within the Police Service and with the purpose of supporting decision making in ongoing major crime investigation. Balance in gender distribution and a minimum of five years of experience as a profiler within the Police Service was desirable. It was also of relevance that the sample encompassed different educational backgrounds.

Both Sweden and UK have had profiling groups in their investigative Police Service for decades. Sweden started their profiling group within the police force in 1995. In UK, the first full time profiler was employed within the force in 1999, but even earlier the UK Police service used consultative profiling assistance, though seldom employed within the Police Service. Sweden and UK were contacted due to their extensive experience and additionally having a good relation and cooperation with the Norwegian Police Service. Permissions to conduct the interviews was obtained by counselling the leaders of the two profiling groups. Participation in the study was based on informed and written individual consent (appendix 1).

The profilers were informed and prepared to talk about their views on their group's Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. The total sample included six informants (Sweden $n=3$ / UK $n=3$). The Swedish group consisted of two women and one man, while the UK group consisted of one woman and two men. The Swedish group was recruited from a collegium of six full time profilers and two persons working part time (20%). Most full-time profilers had police educational background. One profiler working full time, but not participating in the study, had academic background (PhD in behavioural science). The part time working profilers in the Swedish group had other academic education, one forensic psychiatrist and one forensic medical doctor. The Swedish informants participating in the study all had police educational background. The leader of the group selected the informants. In the UK group, all three informants had academical background with master's degree in psychology, worked full time and were accredited Behavioural Investigative Advisors within the UK Police service.

The average experience working with profiling within the police services was high in both groups. The years of profiling experience within the Police Service ranged from 9-24

years within the Swedish group, and approximately 10-20 years respectively for the UK group. Both groups were represented by profilers who was part of the group when it first started more than 20 years ago.

2.6 Transcription and coding

The interviews were transcribed into respectively Swedish and English within 6 weeks after they were conducted. Number of words and coded statements produced are shown in

Table 1:

Table 1. Number of words and statements

	Sweden	UK	Total
Number of words	26856	23523	50379
Number of statements	1822	1689	3511

Note. Total sample.

The Swedish group produced 3333 more words than the UK group when taking all interviews in the respective groups into account. The Swedish group produced 133 more coded statements than the UK group. The total duration of all interviews in the Swedish group exceeded the UK group by approximately one and a half hour, explaining the difference in number of produced words and statements.

Following transcription, the documents were locked, and a review of the recordings was conducted. Misunderstandings or wrong transcriptions were directed and logged on three different types of error. Type 1, omission, was noted when one word was missing in the transcription. Type 2, commission, was noted when a wrong word was in the transcription. Type 3, error of principal, was noted when words were transcribed in wrong order. Following errors were found:

Table 2. Transcription errors

	Sweden	UK	Total
Omissions	516	239	755
Commissions	6	109	115
Errors of principal	1	2	3

Note. Omission is noted when one word is missing in the transcription. Commission is noted when a wrong word is in the transcription. Error of principal is noted when words are transcribed in wrong order.

After transcription all interviews were unitized, meaning that each statement was broken down to its smallest level of meaning. The six interviews amounted a total of 3511 units. All units were coded on both SWOT and IGLO scales. This was considered helpful when evaluating both how profiling was used and how the informants evaluated their own work as profilers on different levels within their organisation. SWOT was coded as Strengths = 1, Weaknesses = 2, Opportunities = 3 and Threats = 4. IGLO was coded as Individual = 1, Group = 2, Leadership = 3 and Organisation = 4. Breaking down the interviews into quantitative data enabled quantitative statistical analyses.

Box 1. Examples of coding on the SWOT scale⁸

Strength

"I don't know..., it is hard to articulate...but experience is quite important" (Inf. 1, statement 288).

"We are coming in from the outside and to a certain degree we have more time to focus on the investigations compared to when you are in an investigation group as an investigator, as an SIO, or whatever. And it is always things, always decision to be made, meetings to be

⁸ My translation of the Swedish informants' quotations

held and so on. But for us it is possible to stop, look closer and just focus on the investigation its selves" (Inf. 1, statement 17-26).

Weakness

"Sometimes we strive a bit to completely see our mission...sometimes..." (Inf. 2, statement 741).

"I would prefer if we co-worked on jobs and then you have, I mean, better quality insurance because you will have someone to kind of bounce off all the way thru the process rather than when you have already done all your deliberations you have written your report only on that stage can somebody question and then they questioning on the bases of limited knowledge" (Inf. 5, statement 2403-2408).

Opportunity

"I think for the first time there is an opportunity to apply some profiling" (Inf. 6, statement 3383).

"I think the opportunities are very much in the online space. I do not think anyone is really profiling, whatever that means, online offenders. I think there are reasons for that. I think traditionally, it is about value act. Traditionally in an online investigation it is a technical investigation of tracking the IP-address. Whereas there is no psychology in that, it is a technical issue. But I think we now have started to see offenders who are so good of operational security that the best minds in the UK cannot break their IP-addresses. So, for the first time we are now looking at an unidentified offender" (Inf. 6, statement 3374-3380).

Threat

"And rape and murder are not the sexy buzz words of UK crime these days" (Inf. 5, statement 2897).

"We would be lost if one of us is lost. So that is a real problem that we have" (Inf. 4, statement 2227).

"You know, in the history of profiling in UK we had a very high-profile case, the murder of Rachel Nickell in Wimbledon Common, which was not well handled by the profiler of the time, but again that is historical, things happen in a development in a new discipline. My

fear though is that if a... like another mistake of that level could not happen. But if it did and particularly if we relate to those people who are wanting to be profilers, I am not sure whether the discipline will survive another catastrophic error" (Inf. 6, statement 3461-3466).

2.7 Inter-coder reliability

Neuendorf comments on "several key threats to reliability that should be taken into account" and mentions, amongst several, poor executed coding scheme and inadequate coder training as examples where coding can go wrong (Neuendorf, 2002) (p.145). Further, she points to intercoder reliability (coding performed by humans on content analysis) and underlines "in content analysis, reliability is paramount" (p.19). The inter-coder reliability for this study was respectively 83% and 96%, considered to be a good result (Cicchetti et al., 1985).

2.8 Ethical guidelines

The government anchored Committee for scientific ethics gives good guidelines for academic research (NSD ref.no 849618). Essential to my study has been necessary consideration to the informant's dignity, their requirements for privacy and anonymity. This is reflected in several ways such as presenting the consent form underlining their right to confidentiality and option to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to explain the reason (NESH, 2016). Securing full anonymity was difficult due to small sample size, and the small number of persons conducting profiling in the Police Service. Therefore, it was important to keep links between informants and statements masked, to facilitate as high anonymity as possible. Gender and age of participant is not reported when citing statements in the text.

In general, academic freedom is necessary for good science. Transparency is another centrepiece to scientific research, both to participants and to recipients of research. All informants taking part in this study have been informed about how this study would be completed and how their data would be used and stored. Transparency in work and writing of the thesis reflects scientific probity for instance avoiding plagiarism and correct referrals. An important factor to consider in all research, and perhaps especially when doing research within own organisation or within groups having similar occupation or educational background as the researcher, is the balance between closeness and distance to the informants

and subject of interests. There is no such as absolute objectivity in collecting and treating data. Therefore, one need to have a reflective awareness of the phenomena of influencing the data.

Both description of the research project and the consent form was approved pre-study by the NSD, Norwegian Centre for Research Data. Data in this study was not considered sensitive, and all informants are recruited voluntary. The informants were presented open ended questions about their work experience within their respective Police Service. No confidential information about policing was revealed. Weeks before entering the interview situation the informants were informed about theme and questions that would be central in the interview. Their anonymity was retained all through the study. Personal information such as name and gender, and coding keys were stored separately.

2.9 Descriptive statistics

After coding the statements into scales of SWOT and IGLO the data was quantitatively analysed in Statistical Packed for the Social Sciences (SPSS) using cross tables and descriptive statistics.

Descriptive analyses were made to get an overview of all informants' statements. Crosstables with the variables SWOT and IGLO gave an overview of frequencies of statements in the whole sample. Crosstables with the variables SWOT and IGLO were also made for each country separately (Sweden $n=3$ / UK $n=3$), and gave an overview of the frequencies of each group`s statements. The sample and the database were considered too small to perform inferential statistical analysis of the material.

3. Results


3.1 Descriptive statistics

The total number of statements coded on both SWAT and IGLO were 3511.

3.1.1 SWOT

Distribution of the total number of statements on the SWOT variables showed that the informants most frequently reported Strengths (59.2%). The analysis showed 16.8% reports of Weaknesses, 7.0% reports of Opportunities and 17.0% reports of Threats. See **Figure 1** for counts.

Figure 1. The total number of statements on the SWOT variables




Note. Count is number of statements

3.1.2 IGLO


Distribution of the total number of statements on the IGLO variables showed that the informants reported least at the Individual level (6,9%) as opposed to the Group level (60,0%) which was the most frequently reported level. Analysis showed 12.7% reports on Leader level and 20.4% on the Organisation level. See **Figure 2** for counts.

Figure 2. The total number of statements on the IGLO variables




Note. Count is number of statements

The following figures (**Figure 3** and **Figure 4**) graphs the count for SWOT and IGLO for each country separately (Sweden $n=3$ / UK $n=3$).

Figure 3. SWOT variables for Sweden and UK

Note. UK is labelled England in the figure. Count is number of statements

Figure 4. IGLO variables for Sweden and UK

Note. UK is labelled England in the figure. Count is number of statements

Table 4 and **Table 5** show crosstables with counts for SWOT and IGLO for the two countries separately.

Table 4. Crosstable of SWOT and IGLO for Sweden (n=3)

		SWOT				
		Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats	Total
IGLO	Individual	46	13	0	5	64
	Group	889	151	23	180	1243
	Leadership	187	49	11	79	326
	Organisation	111	41	6	31	189
Total		1233	254	40	295	1822

Note. Country = Sweden. Count is number of statements

Table 5. Crosstable of SWOT and IGLO for UK (n=3)

		SWOT				
		Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats	Total
IGLO	Individual	134	10	8	25	177
	Group	522	130	106	105	863
	Leadership	66	44	10	1	121
	Organisation	122	152	82	172	528
Total		844	336	206	303	1689

Note. Country = UK. Count is number of statements

3.1.3 Combining SWOT and IGLO

Table 6 shows the distributions when combining SWOT and IGLO. The highest frequency of reports when cross-tabling SWOT and IGLO were Strengths on Group level (40,2%).

Table 6. Frequencies of reports, SWOT and IGLO (n=6)

IGLO	SWOT				Total
	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats	
Individual	180	23	8	30	241
Group	1411	281	129	285	2106
Leadership	253	93	21	80	447
Organization	233	193	88	203	717
Total	2077	590	246	598	3511

Note. Total sample. Count is number of statements

3.2 Qualitative results

Different statements from Swedish and UK profilers will be presented descriptively and reflect both similarities and differences between the groups.

3.2.1 Similarities

Statements from both groups reflected the underpinning of experience as important when working with profiling in addition to statistics, literature, and science.

Both groups contribute to the ongoing investigation by analysing the case, bringing new perspectives and investigative advice in written reports. Profilers in both groups underpin that they contribute with probability perspectives and, as a profiler, they rarely or never appear as witnesses in court proceedings.

Both countries describe a lack of sufficient relevant scientific research applicable to profiling. The profilers experience that when their reports do not bring new perspectives or advice to the requesting investigation group, their contributions are received as an important quality check for the actual investigation.

3.2.2 Differences

With reference to **Table 4** and **Table 5** the Swedish group reported more often Strengths on Group level than the UK group. The Swedish profilers underlined the strength of being a group, being colleagues with complementary educational backgrounds working close together, bringing different perspectives to discussions and both challenging and supporting each other in their common work. Although the team ethos was very good amongst the UK profilers too, the profiling work in practise was more of an isolated approach in terms of each BIA having his or her own geographic areas to cover.

The UK group reported more often Opportunities on Group level than the Swedish group. The UK group reported on opportunities on two dimensions, within their own organisation and on an international level. Concerning the latter, they reported cooperating with colleagues in different countries, sharing case studies, working practise and research. Cooperating with their fellow profiling colleagues from abroad was something that they already do but recognise as an opportunity to expand. The UK profilers also perceived opportunities bringing profiling into new areas such as trafficking and child exploitation on the dark net, although the capacity in the BIA group and willingness from their own organisation slows down this development. The Swedish group rarely mentioned their network or interest of expanding into new profiling areas.

The Swedish group reported more often Threats on Leadership than the UK group. Leadership is mostly pointing to the SIO`s, other leaders of the requesting investigation and the requesting investigation group. This different between the two countries is mostly reflected in the Swedes statements about their own advice potentially being a pitfall for the ongoing investigation, leading them into dead ends either by giving wrong advice or that the requesting investigations misunderstood their advice. The UK group did recognise this issue, but considered it being much less a threat than their fellow Swedish profilers.

The UK group reported more often Weaknesses on Organisational level than their Swedish colleagues. Two examples of weaknesses the UK profilers point to is the lack of autonomy, as not being able to decide which case to take or refuse, and not being able to decide which new area for their profiling work to expand into. The organisation`s lack of succession planning and taking care of the profiler`s emotional well-being were other organisational weaknesses reported by the UK profilers. The UK Police Service decision to divide the profiling staff into three different geographic entities instead of one central BIA unit was another reported weakness. An additional weakness reported was the NCA`s focus on serious and organised crime, which is separates from the major crime area profiling traditionally have been applied in. The BIA`s experience of their own organisation not fully understand their profiling work and needs, were sometimes explained by the difference between the two areas of crimes. The Swedes seldomly reported weaknesses on organisational level, but if they did, it was more in a random, more overall way like mentioning for instances that Swedish police is not doing well when it comes to linking different crimes together.

The UK group reported more often Opportunities on Organisational level than the Swedish group. The UK group stated several times the opportunities they saw within their own organisation, as for instance when different sections could and should contact the BIA

for their support. Compared to a decade earlier, different agencies within the NCA were now more willing to share their data. This was considered an opportunity in the organisation for the BIA to put the academic and the investigator in touch. The BIA also mentioned the opportunities for them to coach trainees in profiling to build a robust section of profilers for the future. Additionally, they reported a wish to build an international network of profilers. The UK group expressed the opportunity for creating a Behavioural Science Unit and gave examples of how such a unit could be organised in an effective way, although they could not see this happening soon.

Box 2, 3 and 4 shows statements about group, profiling work and organisational frame.

Box 2. Statements about the group	
SWEDEN	UK
8 employees of which 2 of them are part time (20%)	3 full time employees
Interdisciplinary; consisting of police educated including a forensic practitioner, behavioural scientist, psychiatrist, and a doctor specialised in forensic medicine.	Academic educated (master level) within the field of psychology.
The group covers for all profiling assistance in the whole country	The country is divided into three geographic areas where each profiler in the group covers for their own geographic part.
Profiling, case analysis and investigative advice are worked through and completed as group process.	Profiling, case analysis and investigative advice are worked through and completed mainly on individual bases.

Box 3. Statements about the profiling work

SWEDEN	UK
Every day the group gather at the police station where they have their own workspace including meeting room, white board, screen and other facilities for group work in addition to every profiler having their own office desk in an open landscape.	Working from their home office, having meetings in the BIA group approximately every second month.
Gave no statements concerning worries about profiling work being a potential threat to their emotional well-being.	Gave statements about worries for their own emotional health and psychological well-being caused by working isolated with burdensome materials over a long period of time.
After the group delivered their written report, an oral presentation of the report was always given to the requesting investigation group where the profilers also discussed their findings.	The profiler authors the report alone and only in the big cases an additional oral presentation to the requesting investigation team will be given.
Considering time pressure, the group expressed having time to visit the crime scene, read documents, discuss the case within the profiling group before giving a written report.	Time pressure was expressed in a way that they rarely had time to co-operate with a BIA colleague in case work, or time to grasp the opportunities they eye for expanding profiling into new areas.
The profiling group authors the report to the requested investigation team. No other, neither internal nor external colleague's quality checks the report, just the group members who have authored the report themselves.	A colleague who does not know the details in the case read the written report before sending it to the requested investigation team.
The group did not report on any annual audit or other external systematic quality check.	Annually there is an audit committed by a panel of external experts where the work of the profiling group is examined.

<i>(Box 3 continuous)</i>	
By virtue of being employed in the group you are considered to hold profiling competence, there is no accreditation system.	Being employed in the profiling group, in addition to be accredited Behavioural Investigative Advice, you are considered holding profiling competence
Working in a case the profilers have direct contact with the SIO`s and the members of the investigative group in request.	Working in a case all contact with the SIO and members of investigative group goes thru the Regional Lead.

Box 4. Statements about the organisational frame

SWEDEN	UK
<p>Although not all sections within the Police Service know of them or know what they do, they report being situated within the Police Service in a satisfying way (National Operative Department). In great extent, the group experience freedom to decide which cases they should chose or not.</p>	<p>The group express being well reputable within the Police Service in UK. They also state that being placed within the National Crime Agency (NCA) is not optimal because being a small unit in a wider organisation, who traditionally do not operate in the fields of profiling, for instances homicides, reduces the possibilities to influence their daily and future work.</p>
<p>The group gave mentioned contact with profilers abroad but gave no statements about having regular contact with an international network of profilers.</p>	<p>The group reported annual meetings with colleagues both within and outside Europe.</p>
<p>The group gave statements about their fear of leading the requested investigation into a dead end, but they never uttered statements of any kind about being afraid of their profiling group`s future existence.</p>	<p>The group was not afraid of giving potential wrong advice to the requested investigation. The group uttered statements about their own group existence by referring to NCAs` lack of succession planning, the illegal use of non-accredited profilers from outside the Police services and the potential damage to the BIA group if the use of non-accredited profilers would end up in a new catastrophic case like the Rachell Nickell`s case in the 1990`s.</p>

4. Discussion

This study gathered information from profilers within the Police Services in Sweden and UK, working with offender profiling daily supporting their respective National Police Service in major crime cases, such as murder investigations. The aim of the study was to investigate how the two countries evaluate their own profiling practice, and whether this could point to any future direction when potentially considering an implementation of such practice in the Norwegian Police Service.

The interviewees were asked about what they considered to be the Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats of their profiling work. Data was obtained by using semi-structured interviews in my visit to the National Operation Department, Stockholm, Sweden and the National Crime Agency, Spring Gardens, London, UK. Three informants were recruited from each country. This constitutes the total population of BIAs in UK (3/3) and 3/6 full-time profilers, in a group of 8, in Sweden. All genders were represented, and the interviews lasted between 43 and 103 minutes. The interviews were transcribed and analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively using a SWOT and IGLO paradigm.

The results, a total of 3511 statements, showed that both groups reported most on Strengths (59,5%) and less on Weaknesses (16,9%), Opportunities (7,2%) and Threats (16,4%). This was in accordance with the first question of interest, claiming that the sample would report more Strengths than Weaknesses. In contrast to the second question the sample tended to report more Threats than Opportunities. In accordance with the third question the sample reported more often on Group level than on Individual level. Discordant with the fourth question, the sample reported more on Organisational level than Leader level. The fifth question, concerning comparisons between the group claiming there were no major differences, were not in accordance with the results showing some differences. Of 16 comparisons, 5 results stand out as differences between the two countries. Swedish profilers reported more often on Group Strengths and Leadership Threats. UK profilers reported more often on Group Opportunities, more often on Organisational Weaknesses and more often on Organisational Opportunities.

Discussing this thesis results against other research comparing profiling groups is difficult as, to my knowledge, there are no such research available. Because of this, it is natural to discuss the five differences between Swedish and UK profilers found in this thesis results. The organisational frame has varied factors influencing profilers work on different levels, and as the groups represents two countries, some differences might be explained by

these settings. Therefore, differences and similarities found in this study will be discussed within an IGLO structure, starting with the outer frame, the Organisational level, moving towards the Individual level.

4.1 Level of organisation

4.1.1 Organisational structure

Looking to the respective countries organisation chart the Swedish group is placed in the central unit of Sweden called National Operative Department (NOA). NOA has different national departments, one of them is "Section of special investigative support" dividing into minor sections supporting investigation in different areas such as murder, economical investigations and serious violence. The profiling group is situated within this part of the Swedish Police Service organisation, having direct contact with other groups supporting relevant investigations on a national basis. Divergent to this is the UK profiling group placement in the National Crime Agency. Under National Investigative Capabilities within the Investigations Command, the BIA sit within the Major Crime Investigative Support (MCIS) section. The BIA stands out from others within NCA as they address their productions towards national investigation sections throughout UK Police Service and not towards their own organisation, the NCA.

Most teams are a part of a bigger organisation (Bang, 2008) and since organisations by nature are different from each other, this will affect groups in a plethora of ways. While working through the transcribed interviews, it occurred to me that one major difference between the two profiling teams was the degree of autonomy that the teams had within its own organisation. Differences associated with both the levels of Leadership, Group and Individual might in some degree all be due to differences in organisational placement and further, the possession of autonomy within their Police Service.

4.1.2 Organisational autonomy

It was assumed that profilers in both countries would report more on Leadership level than on Organisational level, but the results showing the opposite as the sample reported more on the Organisational level. This indicates that, at least at the time of the interviews, the Organisational situation were more focused upon than the level within the organisation requesting profiling competency, the level of Leadership. Comparing the group's results on the Organisational level showed that the UK profilers reported more on both Weaknesses and Opportunities.

In line with the purpose of this thesis, two points reflecting the Organisational level

will be outlined; the match between the profiling group and its respective organisation, and the overall organisational awareness of the profiling competency. These aspects will have direct impact on the profiler's judgment of their work, and the two themes are both associated to the degree of autonomy of the profiling group. Both Sweden and UK report on the two points, but in a quite different way. The Swedish profilers had what can be called an "out-house" issue, meaning that their challenge was not within their situated organisation NOA, but in cooperation with the surrounding district Police Services. Unlike Swedish profilers, the UK profilers had more of an "in-house" issue, as their challenge was within their organisation NCA and not in cooperation with the district Police Services. As will be outlined, and associated with the degree of autonomy, the two countries reported with different depth and severity on their challenges.

4.1.3 UK profilers' autonomy within the NCA

One issue all profilers from UK highlighted, was the difficulty of being a profiling group situated in a wider organisation that focuses on organised crime. The organisational frame for the UK profiling group is therefore, at least partly, experienced as a mismatch to the major crime areas where profiling has its impact. This is what one of the UK informants expressed:

The other thing of course is that though...our core business is different to pretty much everyone else's in the NCA. So, The National Crime Agency is predominantly looking at organised crime, and it's investigations are internal...and we are not looking at organised crime and our investigations are external. So, we support UK forces, which nobody else does or very minimally, and we support them in cases that do not really fit with what NCA does. (Inf. 5, statement 2690-2698).

This issue was not mentioned by the Swedish interviewees. We cannot know for certain that this is not an issue in the Swedish group just because they did not mention the theme, but the organisational chart of NOA tells us that the Swedish group is placed within a section of major crime and are surrounded by sections and units that are associated with major crimes. Therefore, this organisational placement itself gives reasons to assume that the Swedish profiles are satisfied with their organisational positioning. For the UK profilers, this

was not the situation as they articulated having difficulties associated with their organisational positioning:

So, I think NCA have a quite robust model now supporting, but I do not know whether that model maximising the ability for the BIA. In fact, I am fairly sure that it does not. What works for the agency does not work very well for us and it is quite difficult for us to change that because we are now part of a bigger structure. So, for example if we sit, as we have done, as we have done actually in recent times, the best model for us will be to be in a Behavioural Analysis Unit, to have that kind of centralised autonomy to be able to work to a whole host of costumers and to come out of the regional model of behavioural investigative support. (Inf. 5, statement 2785-2794).

Central to the difficulties BIA faces associated to its organisational positioning, is the fact that NCA focus on organised crime and not on major crime. The UK profilers stated in different ways many feelings about this, all which I perceived as expressing the feelings of being left in a sort of organisational shadow. Further, according to the profiler`s, their placement in the organisational chart has a variety of consequences, as one profiler stated:

So, it has been a battle over the last four or five years to kind of get the NCA to realise who we are, what we do and the contribution we make, which I think they do realise now. But it is still not a great fit with the NCA, so it is probably not surprising we do not get lot of money thrown our way or developing opportunities or more staff and succession planning. Because historically, we have been this little entity that kind of tagged on the end somewhere, that nobody really understands, and it does not fit with core business and I think that resulted in kind of squeeze on founding and on...head count...so it has been quite difficult (Inf. 5, statement 2699-2714).

The Swedish profilers do not bring up any such in-house issues comparable to what the UK profilers explains having taken much of their focus for a longer period. There is another theme too that seem only to be an issue amongst the UK profilers and not within the

Swedish group, and that is reflected in the results as UK profilers reports more often on Opportunities on Organisational level.

UK profilers all reports that they are eager to take their in-depth competences in homicides and rapes and broaden their remit to new areas such as extortion and online crime. Several of these new areas the profilers look to are areas of crime that NCA already work with. The reasons for the profiler's willingness to broaden their remit is two folded. First, it is a professional interest to bring highly skilled competence into areas where one can contribute with new perspectives. The other reason is merely a struggle to survive caused by worries of being utterly marginalised, within their own organisation, if not doing so. One of the informants describes this as being in a catch-22 situation:

Other than the constant threats of unemployment if...I joke about that...the reality is, because MCIS is so tightly in line to whatever the latest government ...sort of...the big area, the big threat areas...You know we are driven by political forces. If it would be the case that the focus of the MCIS became less and less about the world we deliver in and more and more about areas that we can contribute...in a very limited way, then potentially...you know we would become vulnerable. At the moment it is kind of catch-22 because we are not really allowed or not being facilitated to expand into other areas. But if we do not expand into other areas then we are increasing our own threat because we are the less crime types we are plugged into, the higher the threat that of somebody decide that we are not relevant to the NCA. I think we always be relevant to rape and murder.....but that is not what the NCA does. So, I think we do need to develop, we would like to develop...but our utility in terms of delivering within the NCA is actually quite limited. Virtually all of our advice is to external forces. So, if somebody at a governmental level or the NCA level decided that people, you know, needed to be working exclusively on NCA related business...why would you need three BIA`s that service in name of the UK forces, you know? So...I think we are much less vulnerable now than we were five years ago because I think we have won the battle of who are we, what do we do, are we any good. It took a while, but we got there... But

yes, you are never completely secure in this employment because the focus of our employer is not really the focus that we have. Which is slightly awkward. (Inf. 5, statement 2862-2887).

There is some impatience within the UK profiling group due to the mixture of wanting to expand remits, the feeling of needing to expand remits, and having several interesting areas in one's own organisation, but not being able to use these possibilities. Put metaphorically, the profilers are describing many doors of opportunities within their organisation, but the doors seem to be closed and no one invites them in. This is reflected in the results as UK profilers reports more often on Opportunities at the Organisational level, but at the same time also reports more Weaknesses on the Organisational level compared to their Swedish colleagues. Assorted reasons for this are put forward by the UK profilers such as the different areas in NCA are fragmented organisationally, many different sections are dealing for instance with online sexual abuse, so in one way, it is a matter of where to start.

Further, which obviously is a disadvantage for development, is the fact that BIA have two leaders who is advocating two opposite opinions whether to expand the groups remit or not. Additionally, the NCA is describes as not only being a big organisation, but also a slow organisation in the sense that changes take time. Not that the profilers present themselves as wanting quick fixes when wanting to widen their profiling tools. On the contrary, they give the impression of having a rigorous approach when developing new methods for their work so that quality is thoroughly secured. But the organisational inertia the BIA describe, when trying to move forward as a discipline, appears to be bit more of a hindrance than a quality insurance. The UK profilers all agree to how this fundamental organisational obstacle can be solved. One of the profiles gave this metaphorical picture to the situation in addition to bring on the solution:

Sometimes it feels like swimming in three corks you know if you trying to develop a new method, we have to go thru so many steps, with people who do not really understands it. It would be nice to have a little greater autonomy. For instance, I am sure the other two mentioned this, we are three members of staff within a major crime team. What I would like to have is a behavioural science team recognised in its own rights so we could have that autonomy and we could still support major crime, but we

would be much more in control of our own destiny. So, I think there is a weakness of not recognising a discrete behavioural science unit in its own right, I think that is a weakness. (Inf. 6, statement 3338-3347).

The UK profilers were all clear when stating Weaknesses on the Organisational level within the NCA, as well as they realised that the NCA, on the other hand, had potential to support the group in broadening their remits. For the latter to happen, they all reported an own Behavioural Unit would solve their organisational difficulties.

4.1.4 Swedish profilers` autonomy within NOA

Starting with the issue of the overall organisational awareness of the profiling competency, there is a difference between the two profiling groups. It is pivotal for the profilers that the awareness of their group is as good as possible in the police districts because the districts are the main requesters of profiling competency. The police districts awareness of the profiling group encompasses not only the knowledge of the profiler's existence, but also what kind of cases the profilers work in, how they work and how to establish contact with the group. Now, this might seem basic, but in a large organisation even a special force might be partly ignored. Although, the Swedish profilers are well known to many SIO`s and investigators, they experience every now and then having to inform their district colleagues about their existence. This, they report, is much due to the reform within the Swedish Police Service in 2015. The reform was a setback for the profilers in terms of losing a network of police officers who knew them and how their group could support investigations. One of the Swedish profilers stated⁹:

We started in 2015 when the police had their reform in Sweden. Then we noticed that our influence on cases decreased because the reform had demolished a lot, sadly much well-functioning organisations and within Swedish Police Service Many groups handling serious violence cases within the Swedish Police Service was demolished when cases of serious violence were transferred to local stations instead of being matters that the central Police Service handled. This actually had the consequence that

⁹ My translation of the Swedish informants' quotations

cases we usually worked with now were referred to unexperienced police officers and indeed, they did not know of us. (Inf. 3, statement 831-838).

The UK profilers mentioned the issue of police districts awareness of their profiling group, but apparently this was not a challenge for them:

(.....)... we are well established, we are very credible, we have excellent reputation with forces (Inf. 4, statement 1823-1825).

The Swedish profiling group built their reputation within their Police Service from 1994 to the reform in 2015. Organisational changes due to the reform caused fewer demands for the profiler's support in cases of rape and homicide. Although, several years since the reform, the profiling group has perhaps not regained its full attention. All informants report that not everyone in the district area of major crime in Swedish Police Service are aware of the profiling group, or they may be aware of their existents, but not how they can support. A Swedish profiler explained it this way:

I think they.... I think many think their case is too small. Or...too unappealing, occasionally, to contact the profiling group. That it is an alien bird sitting on NOA and NOA ...well that is pretty special department within the Swedish Police Service. It is not the ordinary region so to say or the local police station.... such you can find everywhere. Perhaps one can be a bit frighten or one might not know whom to contact and such. (Inf. 1, statement 179-187).

To manage the districts lack of knowledge of the profiling group, or potentially refusal to take contact, the profilers themselves take contact with the SIO in the district whenever there is a major crime case the profilers assume they can contribute. Two associating factors make this interesting. First, it shows that the Swedish group have mandate to take actions when they, at any point, have capacity to work in a case. They do not have to wait for assignments to come in but have the autonomy to take direct contact with the SIO in an ongoing case. The profilers cannot claim a case, but they can ask and offer their competence. When doing this they get different answers in return, such as the investigative team were about to contact them, or that the investigation group do not know what support they can

expect from the profiling group and hence they must clarify this.

In this way the Swedish profilers increase their own involvement in several cases, and at the same time enlighten investigators in the Police organisation what a profiler can provide to an ongoing investigation. This dialog between the leaders of the profiling group and the investigative group clarifies the mandate to the profiling group, so it fits well with the need of the investigative group. This dialog is central to the profiler's assignment, as it increases the possibility for the profilers to do a successful job as well as the SIO know what to expect from the profilers. The second associated factor, which is interesting to how the Swedes act to their organisational challenge, is the fact that they themselves administers which cases to implement and which to refuse. Again, the amount of autonomy lies much within the group itselves. These are two quotes from a Swedish profiler illustrating the degree of freedom:

I have a huge degree of freedom to decide on my own, I usually clarify with my section leader, but I have a huge freedom to decide on my own which cases we should work in. (Inf. 3, statement 1365-1367).

Additionally:

Since we are not holding the investigative responsibility, we don't do interviews and so forth, we manage our own time. We can work as fast or as slow we want depending on the type of case. I consider us being like service to the investigative group. (Inf. 3, statement 1561-1567).

These statements are supported by the other profilers and reveals a great deal of autonomy for the Swedish group involving two central aspects of autonomy; deciding which cases to assist and how much time to spend on each case.

As was commented from one of the informants, Swedish Police Service in general often has a lack of enough investigative personnel to stay in a case over time before getting on with the next. The profilers considered this as an opportunity for the SIO's to take advantage of, inviting the profilers into the case, knowing that the profilers very much themselves kept track of time when involved in a case. Other possibilities mentioned by the Swedish profilers was the openness to learn investigative teams more about the approach the profiler uses themselves as they found this to be useful to investigation in general within their Police

Service. The profilers also mentioned having a capacity within their group where they found their own Police Service in general being weak, namely discovering behavioural linkage in seemingly unrelated cases of major crime. In this way the profilers draw a possibility for them out of an organisational weakness.

It is worth noticing that the Swedes did not report any threats on the organisational level. That of course could be due to the random possibility that they did not think of it at the time of the interview. On the other hand, it might be due to having autonomy within the profiling group, to such a degree that there are few or no threats worth reporting on.

4.1.5 Different degrees of autonomy between Sweden and UK

What is reflected in the results of UK profilers reporting more often on both Weaknesses and Opportunities than Swedish profilers, is the UK profilers' experiences of not fitting optimal with its own organisation. At the same time the UK profiling group also reports seeing the same organisation having several opportunities for developing profiling for future possibilities, broadening their work into new areas already incorporated within the NCA.

The UK profilers all states that a good solution to most of their challenges is to become a Behavioural Unit. When describing such a unit it has several parallels to the Swedish profiling group, for instance number of personnel as well as the personnel having interdisciplinary profession. Through different statements the Swedish group gives an impression of already having the autonomy the UK profilers want. The Swedish profilers faces challenges which is not as fundamental and comprehensive as the challenges faced by the UK profilers. Perhaps not so surprising, because when facing an obstacle, and at the same time having the autonomy to manage it, turns what might be a problem into manageable challenges. The degree of autonomy is a rudimentary diversity between the profiling groups in Sweden and UK and should be kept in mind as it might lead to or have impact on other differences as well.

4.2 Level of Leadership

In this study leadership is defined as those who requests the profiling`s groups support, which is the SIO who also are leading the ongoing investigative team. This definition also comprises statements that concerns the cooperation between them and aspects between the profiling group and those who make use of the profiler's competency. The fourth question of interest was whether the sample would report more om Leadership than on Organisation. The results showed the opposite. Further, the results also showed that Swedish profilers reported

more often Leadership Threats than the UK profilers. There was particularly one issue that concerned the Swedes which explains this difference between the two groups.

4.2.1 The caveat of pointing in the wrong direction

Both countries profilers acknowledged the potential of leading the SIO and the ongoing investigation in the wrong direction, into a so-called dead end, when given advises based on their profiling work. Although, the UK profilers hardly mentioned this, it was repeatedly presented by their Swedish colleagues. It must be underlined that this was one of few threats stated by the Swedish profilers in general, and the only threat mentioned on the Leadership level. But as the Swedes repeatedly stated it, it resulted in a clear difference between the two groups. This is one of the statements from the Swedish profilers concerning Threats on Leadership level:

In worst case scenario, we could be leading an investigation in completely wrong direction. That has, that has actually.....Sometimes it does happen that we are wrong.... it's naturally to be wrong sometimes, but we have been more often correct than we have been wrong. (Inf. 2, statement 1246-1248).

The Swedes themselves stated several measures they had implemented to avoid leading ongoing investigations astray, and often they underlined that the advises given was probability calculations. As the next UK profiler's statement shows, they too are aware of this caveat:

That is a threat we will always have. I think it should not be an issue in the sense of,.. if people are fully cognisant of what it is, what they getting from us...it is a piece of advice. It is intelligence, not evidence. It is to support decision making, it is probability based, I think if people really understand that it should not really be a threat because you should anticipate that some of those advice would be wrong. (Inf. 4, statement 2733-2740).

It appears that both profiling groups are aware of this potential caveat pointing the ongoing investigation in a wrong direction, as the groups underlines that it something that

naturally goes along with giving advice. It is worth reminding of this study`s small sample, as this result, where the Swedish profilers reported more often Threats on Leadership level than UK profilers, is an example where caution is needed. Both groups were aware of the caveat. All Swedish profilers reported this, some also several times. Only one profiler in UK reported this, and only one time.

As the aforementioned parallel to the Birgitte Tengs case, the SIO`s may sometimes find themselves being in a vulnerable situation of an increased risk for misinterpreting advices or statements from profilers to support their own hunch in the absence of good leads. That the SIO approaches the profiling report like clutching at straws. We cannot conclude whether the difference between the two groups reflects the knowledge or the fear of the SIO being in such a situation when requesting for profiling assistance. Perhaps the Swedish profilers have experienced profiling advices being given too much weight, or twisted in a wrong direction, and therefore make this group more concerned about this issue compared to their UK colleagues. Further, we must be aware of the possibility that the difference between Sweden and UK might be due to the mere number of statements just reflecting what was in focus at the time of the interview. That the issue happens to be more present in the minds of the Swedish profilers this day compared to the UK profilers. We cannot be sure of this, as it potentially reflects the number of worries between the two groups, and therefor reflecting an actual difference. Regardless of the conclusion, this is an example that constitutes the need to think that differences might reflect mere tendencies or trends, rather than actual differences between the two groups due to the small sample and the use of SWOT questions.

4.2.2 Not merely profiling

As profiling is trying to reveal something about the perpetrator (age, profession, interests, characteristics) based on information from the crime scene and general information about similar crimes, it is evident that both profilers in Sweden and UK provide more than

this when giving the ongoing investigation their support. This is how an UK profiler explained their work content:

Again, just again, navigating our way through a much more balanced, more objective, systematic way of analysing information and then providing some pragmatic evidence based rational to support decision making and I think that is a huge grow. We write a profile, we write a linking report...I think they are extremely valuable products in their own right but I think the underline philosophy of that objective evidence base decision support is probably our biggest strengths, and our methodological rigor and expertise. So, sometimes our force will have a way of doing something and I think one of our key strengths is not necessary as a profiler, say who did it, what do they look like, but actually putting some robustness and rigorousness around that methodology. (Inf. 6, statement 3053-3070).

This is a statement which also is representative for the Swedish profiler's work, as they too are gave the impression that most of all they are giving case analysis which is something more than or different from profiling. This appears to be a broadening of the work included in profiling groups when compared to the early days of profiling. This UK profiler summons today`s profiling work in a way that is also supported by the Swedish colleagues' statements:

Again, I think a big strength of what we do is just that value and anticipation making, we are providing empirical support, research, theoretical considerations but basically, I guess, reframing the SIO`s decision making. (Inf. 6, statement 3039-3044).

My impression of Swedish and UK profilers' essential content of their work is precisely described and summoned in the quote "reframing the SIO`s decision making". This quote reveals what all profilers are working towards; being a catalyst for the ongoing investigation. By that I mean bringing in perspectives that will bring the investigation forward. Further, the profilers also make it clear that what they now do more than just traditionally profiling work. This is also reflected in the UK change of name as the group now contains Behavioural Investigative Advisors. The Swedes have maintained their group title

since their foundation in 1995 (Gärningsmannaprofilgruppen = Perpetrator profiling group¹⁰) but based on the interviews they would probably find the name Case Analyst reflecting even better their actual work.

4.2.3 *Not merely catalysing*

The heuristics and biases are naturally processes taking place within an investigation group, which all profilers from both countries state their awareness of. An ongoing investigation are always under a certain time pressure and very often in the media's headline news. This is always a serious test for everyone working in or cooperating with an investigation group, including profilers. Caveats such as tunnel vision, biasing ambiguous information (Barnum effect) and the investigators potential Need for Cognitive Closure are all real threats for investigators and profilers. An UK profiler addresses the awareness this way:

I also think it is about identifying as a psychologist, the biases and the heuristics there are within a major crime investigation. (Inf. 6, statement 3050-3052).

Also, the multidisciplinary profiling groups of Sweden states they are very much aware of this. By representing a case view from the outside, the profilers have the opportunity of bringing a more objective and balanced perspective to the case materials. Not that caveats of heuristics and confirmation biases never compromises profiling groups as they too need to be aware of this as will be outlined later. But, coming in from the outside, being aware of investigative caveats, the profilers do have a good starting point to bring balance and objectivity into ongoing investigations. In this way the profiling groups bring in, not only their expertise in behavioural psychology, methodology and alike, but adds a securing perspective to the ongoing investigations. This is so because both groups claim that when giving statements the investigative group already have thought of or worked through, the investigative group are equally satisfied because they have had someone from outside evaluating their work. This is a statement from an UK profiler:

Even if we are agreeing with what their initial belief is, they have an external person who understands behaviour and coming in saying "I agree with that for all these reasons" and it is still helpful to them even if we do not tell them anything new or

¹⁰ Directly translated word by word, my translation

different...it is still very helpful...things to have in the investigation so it does not matter if we agree or disagree with them. They still find it useful. (Inf. 4, statement 2018-2023).

Further, this is a statement from a Swedish profiler when they are going thru the case documents:

... do this complimenting interview, do this research.... because they do not have the time themselves. So, I think this is received very well. And, all in all, they think our case analysis is valuable even if we end up in the same track as the investigative team, they still find it safe that we have gone thru the case details without hurry, that we have tested our hypothesis and that we end up with the same perception as they.....they feel this is safe....that it has been evaluated...that we evaluate the existing case materials. And that will be the same even if we end up with another perception than they have, they find this interesting and good. All in all, I found that whatever we end up with, they are positive to our work. (Inf. 3, statement 1768-1784).

This is a part of the profiling work I found much interesting since it points to the fact that the profiling group function not only as facilitators (catalysts), but also may function as a controller to the ongoing investigation. Although, profiling originally had the function of bringing new perspectives into the investigative team hopefully catalysing the search for the perpetrator, we now see an additional function. This is probably due to several reasons, such as profilers being evaluated as solid investigators holding competency beyond mere profiling. It is reason to believe that this development is a result of the last decades professionalising of the Police Services, bringing the qualities of academic research and standards into investigation. As the profilers having been part of the academic and scientific development they are rightly considered as trustworthy colleagues to evaluate ongoing investigations, evaluating from a potentially more distant and objective perspective.

4.2.4 *Communicating with the investigative team*

As the Leadership level also includes the co-work between the profilers and those who request for their support, some perspectives on communication will be mentioned. Overall,

there are several similarities between the two profiling groups when communicating with the ongoing investigation. Both Swedish and UK profilers visit the crime scene, talk to different persons within the investigative team and get access to the case documents. All profilers will have an "open access" to the information in the case as this is considered relevant for the quality of the product the profilers deliver. This also includes contact with relevant personal in the investigation. Although, at this point there is a difference between the two countries as the Swedish profilers contact directly whomever they need to talk to, such as the SIO of the case. Earlier this was practiced in UK too, but some years ago this changed due to the idea of sparing the SIO for too many inquiries, trying to protect the SIO from time thefts. This entailed that profilers needing to contact the SIO must go thru a regional lead, which the UK profilers understandably reports as a bit of a detour.

Profilers in both Sweden and UK produce a report to the SIO and the ongoing investigation group, a written communication in line with their request. This is an important document as it is not only representing the thoughts of the profilers, but also the arguments of why they think as they do in addition to highlight all potential hypothesis that needs to be evaluated.

There is one major practical difference between Sweden and UK when it comes to communicating with the ongoing investigative team. After delivering the profiling report, Swedish profilers always go back to the investigative team and present their report in oral, including a following discussions with the investigators and SIO about their findings. UK profilers happen to do this too, but rarely. This is a statement from one of the UK profilers about the frequency of returning to the investigation presenting their finding in oral:

We do not tend to do that other on the really big jobs we might do that, but day to day we do not. (Inf. 5, 2541-2544).

Note that the UK profilers very much wanted to present their report orally and to discuss findings with the SIO and investigative team, but due to time pressure, this was only done "on the really big jobs". Additionally, when the Swedish profilers worked in a case a suspect sometimes was apprehended. The profilers could then remain in the case as they supported the investigation group to clear out their suspect. The UK profilers reported working alongside other experts within the Police Service such as interview advisers, indicating that the profilers never gave advises when the investigation prepared for interviews of witnesses or suspects.

4.2.5 *Content of profiling report*

As the report is an essential product from the profiling groups, some aspect of the content will be highlighted. During the earlier days of profiling, for instance in the profiling report from the Norwegian major crime cases in the 1990`s, one will notice that some of the advice and inferential logics is partly not very applicable to the investigation. Interestingly, as none of the profilers from the two groups were directly asked about these issues, the profilers from both countries gave statements which gave the impression that this has changed. It appears that profilers nowadays are more concerned about their claims and suggestions being applicable to the ongoing investigative group. Two examples will illustrate these issues. First, a statement from a Swedish profiler challenging a stereotype which in the earlier days would have been understood differently:

Sometimes we can say this: This person...has shown signs...of aggression against women or having a way of behaving towards women which makes it less likely that he lives with a woman because she would be capable of living with this person. But we have people.... women, that are living in such destructive relationships because they must do it and that is a fact one needs to keep in mind. (Inf. 1, statement 296-303).

Earlier, the information of an aggressive perpetrator would have led to the conclusion that the investigation was looking for a perpetrator who were single and perhaps never have had a record being in relationship with women. Another example presented by a UK profiler, illustrating the importance of giving advises that is applicable to the investigation, stating this:

(...).. that is no point in talking about"the offender's relationship with his mother", you know that kind of thing. If it does not help the investigation actually understanding the behaviour or setting an investigative strategy down one road or identify potential suspects, then I should not be writing a report about it. It has to have sort of tangible line of inquiry for the investigation". (Inf. 4, statement 1994-1999).

Earlier some approaches to profiling had aspects of psychodynamic orientation which obviously were not very applicable to the investigation, additionally being potentially

misleading. The two examples above illustrates that today`s profiling groups in Sweden and UK no longer convey stereotypes and psychodynamic interpretations into advises for investigations.

4.2.6 Inference of logics in profiling reports

Another important part of the profiling report is the use of logic and inferences. Both the Swedish and the UK profilers makes use of inferences in their work which is also presented in their reports. All profilers underline their need to make reports not too academic but at the same time as being practically oriented they need to argue thoroughly for their claims. The value of this contributions from the profilers are expressed in several ways, such as from this Swedish profiler:

It is where our analysis brings it a bit further. We have good results on this, even the prosecuting authority having expressed their satisfactions about our inferences of the most probable, because it is all about probability assessments. (Inf. 3, statement 1534-1537).

Further, this UK profiler, expressing the tool of logical inferences also points to the importance of mutual understanding:

(...) actually, some of the best reports I have written, some of the best feedback I had from the NPCC panel has been on jobs where I have just gone thru rational logical or kind of deductive process, it is a full mind inference. Yes, I probably mentioned literature and statistical information in there somewhere, but it is driven primarily by the logic...I think that it's really powerful. The difficult...and this is going to sound slightly arrogant, and it is not meant to be, but if you go down the line of saying, you know your logical interpretations is the really important, which I believe that is only as good as the person who is doing the logical deductions so.... (Inf. 5, statement 2415-2425).

This statement is of course not at all arrogant, as it points to an essential part of logical inferences. Not only is it dependent upon the person making the inferences both it also depends on how the counterpart, in this setting the SIO and the investigators, understands the logics as well. Profilers from both countries value transparency and solid argumentations for their claims and inferences, which is a good indicator for quality. The aspect of not being only pedagogical, but also "speaking the same language", is necessary for all communication, including the communication between profilers, investigators, and SIO`s. When profilers building logical inferences to sustain their claims, it is important that the report receiving investigation team are aware of differences between logical argumentative inferences. The reason for this is the fact that dissimilar inferential arguments hold different strengths as pointed out in the murder case of Birgitte Tengs. Measures to secure this is the oral presentation of the profiler's report in the investigation team, which is always done by the Swedes, more seldomly performed by the UK profilers. An oral presentation, including the following discussion, will contribute to secure that the SIO and the investigative team understand and value the weight of the logical argument the correct way.

In prolonging and accordance with this neither Swedish nor UK profiler's get involved in the court process as expert witnesses. As a Swedish profiler said:

If I was to be summoned as a witness, then I could not say I will not come. I would stand there and say that we have done this probability calculation, based upon available information at that time.... we considered, based on this, that this was the most plausible.... but that might be wrong and that this only a tool to help the SIO making decision or to minimise....to focus a bit on a certain direction to start with.

Nothing else! We will never claim that what we state is correct. (Inf. 1, statement 538-549).

All profilers shared this opinion, underlining that probability calculations are useful for decision makings in investigation and not in court. This is supported by the impression of profilers using inductive and abductive approached in supporting their logical inferential arguments. This is important for SIO`s and investigators to be fully conscious about, as profilers reports of this reason cannot be translated into deductive arguments to be used as evidence in court proceedings.

4.2.7 Minor problems at Leadership level

Finally, the two profiling groups sometimes might encounter difficulties in collaboration with the investigative team, but the difficulties mentioned here never took much focus in the interview and consequently must be regarded as minor challenges. Although, as it is a part of the cooperation towards the investigation team and the SIO, it will be shortly mentioned.

The Swedish profilers reports that sometimes they are being looked upon as a controlling group coming in, checking the quality of the investigative team. Although, as pointed out earlier, this is a quality the profiling group holds, this sort “the quality check” is not considered as something positive. When this happens, it is often solved by the profilers through communicating with the SIO and the investigators, which often leads to a continued collaboration. Interestingly, this sort of resistance towards the profiler group happens in cases where the request for the profilers is executed from a level above the SIO. When the request for the profiling team is not in line with the SIO`s wishes or without the SIO`s awareness, the Swedish profilers might encounter some sort of reluctance in the investigation team. Therefore, the Swedes underline the importance of requests for their support being anchored within the investigative team and its respective SIO.

Another challenge the UK profilers occasionally encounters is when they are given assignments where they cannot support very much. According to a profiler's statement this was because the persons evaluating incoming requests did not hold profiling competency themselves and therefore sometimes made wrong decisions when deciding which cases to accept and which cases to refuses. The impression was that this was not very much of a problem for the UK profilers other than having sometimes received a wrongful request or, as a profiler also mentioned, also missed a rightful request. The most problematic part of this is that it touches upon the issue of autonomy as the Swedish profiling group to a larger degree evaluate themselves and choose which requests to implement or not.

Another issue that was brought forward from both profiling groups concerned whether profilers were free to comment or give their opinions to something the investigation team wanted to discuss or ask about. The Swedish group gave the impression of having no or few boundaries on them, they reported feeling free to give statements on whatever topic or issue if they felt having professional backings to do so. Not that it was not very much problematised by the UK group, however, it was mentioned that the NPCC panel put boundaries on the UK profilers, not allowing them to give their option in all issues coming up. An example of such could be if the SIO or investigators wanted the profiler's evaluation of whether a witness or a

suspect was lying during an interview. It must be underlined that boundaries are not always negative, on the contrary, as it prevents potential competency drift. This is another example concerning the issue of autonomy and the differences between the two profiling groups, as the Swedish profiling seems to be allowed to evaluate more on their own in how they use their competence. Whereas the UK profilers must relate more to frames for executing their profession, frames that the profilers have not set themselves.

4.3 Level of Group and Individual

There were few statements by the two profiling groups on the Individual level compared to the Group level. Therefore, both levels will be presented together, focusing mainly on Group level. The overall sample reported more Strengths than Weakness on Group level. There are differences as well as there are similarities between the two countries at this level. The results showed two differences: The Swedish group reported more often Strengths on Group level, and the UK profilers reported more often Opportunities on Group level. Starting with general information about the groups, the focus will be on the group compositions and the way they work as a group.

4.3.1 Relevant aid in profiling work

Both the UK and the Swedish group have considerable experience as profilers and colleagues, several of them more than 15 years. All profilers underline the value of using not only their experience, but also statistics, academic literature, and research, to establish support for their inferences and perspectives. Essential to all their case work is the use of hypothesis and their objective effort to confirm or refute them. Although using research to support their claims, they also agree that much of the major crime research is not very applicable to their profiling work. Connected to this lack of relevant research it is interesting to note that for several years the BIA have had an arrangement with universities. In this collaboration the BIA provide relevant research questions in addition to relevant data, and the master students effectuates their master thesis in accordance with this frame set by the BIA. This has already resulted in interesting thesis from students applying the BIA with relevant research materials, applicable in their profiling work.

All profiles in both countries have access to valuable information through their VICLAS system. VICLAS contains systematically collected information about major crimes through decades, meaning that, for instance all murders committed, are recorded using fixed parameters when gathering information. This is an important source to statistics as it helps seeing similarities and differences, and sometimes linkage, between major crime cases in the

country.

Both groups express solid skills in investigative knowledge, including caveats of heuristics and biases as well as good academic and methodological schooling. Therefore, the groups represent a significant capacity within their respective Police District assisting ongoing investigations. But even a highly skilled profiler group must seek assistance from others, and both Sweden and UK reports having the opportunity to access internal or external expert assistance whenever needed. The awareness and possibilities for accessing help from other experts is not only preventing competency drifts but is also a quality securing step for their professional practice.

Although UK profilers' statements indicating them being more active, both groups mentioned having an international network established through the years. Neither Sweden nor UK gave statements indicating that they had any contact with each other.

4.3.2 Different degrees of group working

Considering working processes, both groups', as already mentioned, visit the ongoing investigation team and the crime scene. They all speak with different personnel connected to the case, such as forensic experts. At this stage, both profilers in UK and Sweden is part of a multidisciplinary investigative team consisting of different experts representing a range of competence useful in major crime investigation. Following this initial briefing, both the Swedish and the UK profilers will withdraw to produce their written report. At this point, when the profilers withdraw from the investigation team, differences between Sweden and UK profilers becomes visible.

Remember that the UK profiling team, consisting of three persons with educational background in psychology, are responsible for their own geographical region. The Swedish team, on the other hand, consists of eight members with multidisciplinary educational background working together in a group regardless of geographical placement of the case. The UK profilers belong organisationally in the NCA, but they do not have their own office facilities at the NCA. In fact, they all work at home. This means that when the UK profiler have been to their briefings, they return with case documents and information to work in solitude, in their homes, preparing their profiling report. This differs from the Swedish group. When withdrawing from the ongoing investigation group and the briefings, they return to their office at NOA, reading all necessary documents. Having done this, they all participate working closely in the group discussing facts, information and hypothesis. This is one of the central steps towards forming a report based on everybody's participation and knowledge.

The Swedish profilers all have their own office desk in an open landscape where they also have a table for meetings with whiteboard and TV-screen, in addition to kitchen facilities. All the Swedish profilers will go together to the crime scene, get their briefings together from the investigative group, read the same case documents in their open landscape office facilitates for discussions within the group as they are working together preparing their report. This noteworthy difference in working processes between the two profiling groups is derived from other differences, such as organisational placement and degree of autonomy. As will be outlined when presenting the two different results on Group level, the difference in working processes may also lead to other dissimilarities.

4.3.3 Swedish Group Strengths

Both profiling groups prepare their report to the SIO and the investigative group after the initial case briefing, but the way they solve this constitutes a distinct difference between Sweden and UK. Further, there are reasons to believe that this different process of work towards the final report, enhances dissimilarities in certain areas such as well-being and health. This statement is from an UK profiler:

I think another weakness is around welfare if I am honest. I think...we all work independently, you know I am sitting at home, this is my office. I go to a crime scene, and I see some colleagues at the crime scene, as part of this multi-disciplinary team. I then come home, and I sit on my own in front of a computer with lots of material, most of which is quite unpleasant. It could be, depending on my diary, anyway my next appointment it could be a week till I see anybody. And I think, I think that is a potential weakness around welfare and psychological well-being and resilience though. I am not sure we got that quite right. (Inf. 6, statement 3296-3309).

This problem is not mentioned by any of the Swedish profilers. We cannot know for sure whether this is an issue or not amongst the Swedish profilers, but there are some plausible reasons for why this might reflect a actual difference between the two countries. The Swedish profilers are organised as one group, and all working processes is as a group where all members deliver their service to one geographic area. The UK profilers, being a group less than half seized their Swedish colleagues, dividing a bigger geographical area of UK to each of the profilers alone. This, in addition to comprehensive request for profiling competency in

each geographic region, makes co-working difficult. A statement from one of the UK profilers is worth notifying as I believe it can be argued that it highlights several aspects all woven together:

So, we can work smarter if our remit...if we had the autonomy, we do things differently. But we do not, we are employed by the NCA, and our work is part of a broader team and there are some positives for that but there are also some negatives. And I think around threat, when you talk about doing more cases, working on our own, but not just in the sense of that we do not have people to bounce the case off, but working as alone worker, driving hundreds of miles on your own, working in an office on your own, producing reports on your own, you know, psychological well-being...you would never design that, it is stressful environment at times. The nature of the work that we do can be pretty taxing to do that in a structure which is basically or certainly feel like it is you on your own...I think it cannot be positive. And it's driven by a desire to kind of service the needs of as many cases rather than service the needs of the most important cases to the maximum of our ability. We are rarely given the opportunities to deliver everything that we would want to deliver because the expectations are that we need to be supporting more and more cases. We have managing staff every month about how many cases, they would never say how long have you spent writing a report, how much reading have you done on this case, they never say how difficult has this been. It is just, you know...three cases in GMP, four cases in West Yorkshire, it is meaningless for us. (Inf. 5, statement 2813-2841).

Summarised, this profiler points to lack of opportunity to discuss cases with colleagues, and various negative aspects of working alone, in addition to the time pressure because the next case is already waiting and the management focus on number of cases carried out every month. Early in the statement the profiler utters what can solve this woven intermezzo of challenges, by explicitly stating a need for increased degree of autonomy to the profiling group.

The Swedish profilers report none of these issues, and we cannot say for sure that threats to welfare do not exist. Although, we do know that the Swedes have the autonomy to say which cases they should implement, they have the possibility to decide how much time they want to spend on a particular case, and they have several colleagues to discuss with when authoring the report. Meeting colleagues every day, working together to solve difficult major crime cases, will probably balance the group members emotional well-being, their emotional health, when their work containing unpleasant material. The above-mentioned facts diverging the Swedish profilers as a group from the UK profilers, are probable reasons for why the Swedish profilers do not bring forward the health issue. All UK profilers work under the same conditions, and they all bring forward the mentioned health issue. All Swedish profilers' reports experiencing the strength of working, through all parts of the process, closely together in major crime cases. Adding the fact that UK profilers, unlike the Swedes, do not decide themselves how much time they can spend on one case. So, when experiencing time-pressure, the UK profilers also needs to manage this individually. They are not three profilers managing the time-pressure in the same case together. At the time of the interviews the UK profilers only meet every second month. This is what one of the UK profilers said:

So, we were talking earlier about the fact that we work in isolation...and I think that is a real weakness actually. We do not have that sort of ability to cross reference ideas with each other's and share what we think. On occasionally we do it...so we have a BIA meeting, an internal meeting every two months. Off the case we might have a high-profile case, the most difficult case one of us is working on and we will discuss that in our meeting, but that is only one case in every two months. Sometimes again it might be that I work in a case, and I say I really need to share this with someone else, can we talk about it...and again we will do that but is very isolated events. And we just need to be doing that more but we do not have the capacity to do it so that is a real weakness I think that we got...in terms of the way that we work. (Inf. 4, statement 2024-2035).

As shown in the statements from UK profilers, their situation makes co-working within the profiling group difficult in addition to constitute a threat to their health. The

Swedish profiling group consist of 8 persons working closely together in different parts of the processes, which in many ways are different from the UK group, hence explaining the Swedes reporting more Strengths on Group level. This section ends with a short statement from a Swedish profiler which very much sums up the gist of Swedish profiling work:

Alone is never strong. (Inf. 1, statement 8).

4.3.4 UK Group Opportunities

There might be several reasons for the fact that the UK group reported more often Opportunities on Group level than their Swedish colleagues. Although the study did not reveal information about this, it might be that the Swedish profilers already use their competency in a broader case spectre compared to the UK profilers. If this is the case, it can explain why Swedish profilers reports less on opportunities. Hypothetically, a possible explanation of this difference might also be due to a divergent amount of creativity and curiosity between the groups, meaning that the UK profilers are more creative and more curious to new areas of profiling than their Swedish colleagues. The UK profilers are probably both creative and curious, and they are well experienced, which makes up a natural search for broadening their remits, but measuring the two groups on these aspects, they are not very dissimilar. Therefore, another issue presented by the UK profilers, not mentioned by the Swedish group, might better explain some of the differences between the groups reported on the level of Opportunities; the struggle for future existence.

This issue will be outlined further later, but the UK profilers' states, in diverse ways, worries about the group's future. Taking this matter into concern and adding the experience of being situated in a wider organisation focusing on organised crimes, all together this might force the UK profilers to be more oriented towards expanding their remits. This is perhaps so, because if they can achieve a more advanced stand within the NCA, for instance expanding profiling into the area of online child sex-offending, this will give the BIA unit more resources and thereby securing future profiling in the UK. It is difficult to know to what degree, if any, this aspect influences the eager and ability for the UK profilers to see future opportunities. One thing is for sure; they experience their profiling services are applicable to new areas of crime.

4.4 Securing quality of the profiling advise

Both teams of course focus on delivering good advice back to the SIO and the investigation group, but the way they secure the quality is different. As pointed out earlier the UK profilers have their annual audit meetings with the NPCC panel to secure quality of their work. The Swedish profilers do not report having such a quality securing procedure on an Organisational level. Quality securing measures at Group level is also different between the two groups. When an UK profiler is about to finish the requested report, they send the report to the other BIA members of the group for a read thru. As the two colleagues do not know the case details in beforehand, their main task is to check whether the report follows the stringency of the NPCC panel such as the validity and robustness of inferences.

The forming of the Swedish profiling report is all based on teamwork, from the first step to the product. As the profiler's states, their co-work to answer What-Why-Who questions, so discussions and further reporting to the SIO and the ongoing investigation group is based on this approach. There are several strengths associated to the Swedish profiling approach. They receive the case briefings from the investigative team as a group, then reading thru all case documents before discussing the case details and their understanding within the group. This is an important possibility to sort out facts from indications, to challenges one owns view and together perhaps reach a better understanding of the case and what the best next investigative step would be. The Swedish group members, with their multidisciplinary educational background, bring different perspectives to the discussion. This unique combination of member is s strength for co-working. Having pointed out this, it is obvious that the Swedish profilers do not have a colleague that is distant to the group and can read thru for quality check. This is what one of the Swedish profilers stated:

We do not have someone to read thru our work to secure the quality, that would be difficult...then it would be necessary for that person having read all the case materials... So, having someone from outside to secure quality we do not have that.... We try to weight the importance of being pedagogical in our writing, it should be easy to understand, and at all times it is grounded in facts and findings, one shall understand how we have resonated. We usually also clarify with those who have requested our opinions if they have fetched our message. (Inf. 3, statement 1678-1686).

The Swedish profilers therefore constitute each other's quality securing guards, which obviously is both difficult and potentially has its drawbacks. This is how a Swedish member of the profiling group describes the group:

You get very tight in such a group as ourswhen working in the way we do. We are tight in the group, and that is indeed cool. It is important that we are having fun as well in the group. I think it is necessary that you are a bit of an extrovert person to manage this,one should perhaps not be so introvert...., I think. One ought to function like a group member the dynamics of the group is very important. (Inf. 2, statement 1278-1284).

4.5 Group caveat

For decades profiling support has been delivered into ongoing investigations as advises based on groupwork of those holding such competency. According to statements from both Sweden and UK all profilers prefer working in groups with other profilers, but there are differences between them when it comes to the actual performance of group working. The awareness for biases due to group work will also be relevant to the UK profilers, but as the group work is very tight amongst the Swedish profilers, they need to be especially aware of the potential caveats of such co-working.

Janis outlines nine recommendations for groups to obtain balanced cohesiveness within the group, making rooms for different perspectives; 1) each member of the group must be a critical evaluator, 2) leaders must be impartial and refrain from personal preferences, 3) establish multi groups led by different leaders, 4) split groups into subgroups, 5) member of the group should discuss issues and options privately outside the group, 6) bring in outside experts, 7) point out one or more devil`s advocate, 8) if conflicts, use extra time to identifying warning signals, 9) apply second chance meetings to reconsider decisions (Janis, 1971). The Swedish profilers conveys awareness about the possibilities of biases in their group work, and implements countermeasures in line with Janis`s theory to prevent groupthink:

A weakness might that we will be exposed to confirmations biases, which is a human behaviour. We try to prevent that; we are aware of its existence. At all times we are working with testing our hypothesis when doing our analyses. We assume...the first

step is to illuminate what has happened, and we interpret facts and findings. And then it is important...that we agree that we have a devil's advocate.... that we do everything we can to prevent confirmations bias, thinking in the same direction. So, we use a lot of time to test our hypothesis about what has happened just to try to reconstruct the sequences of events. (Inf. 3, statement 1379-1391).

And further, the awareness of that even strengths of a group can turn into weakness or threats:

I think it is all about that every one of us when given facts and findings, have an opinion of what that might means. And then perhaps might have difficulties listening to others or one tries to push forward one owns explanation and that different perspectives are due to dissimilar educational background and experience. So, this is a way that the multidisciplinary composition perhaps might turn into a disadvantage...that we...we interpret in terms of different starting points. (Inf. 3, statement 1410-1417).

The Swedish and the UK teams are slightly different when it comes to number of members of the group and their educational background. Some of the main difference though, lies within the working processes after the case briefings, including the time spent on each case, and when preparing for their reports. As pointed out, these differences also lead to different challenges within the groups.

4.6 Future perspectives for the profiling teams

Naturally, both teams' express wishes for their respective futures. Although, the Swedish profiling group already being a multidisciplinary team, they gave statements wanting additional colleagues representing other disciplines, colleagues representing different ethical backgrounds in addition to colleagues lowering the average age. Shortly summarised, the UK profilers wishes for their future are in several ways what the Swedish group already have; more colleagues composing a multidisciplinary team were co-working easily can be obtained. The UK profilers, as their Swedish colleagues, are aware of the need to recruit younger colleagues to secure future profiling competence within their Police Service. The UK

profilers' states more concern to this issue because they do not see any response in their own organisation to accommodate this. This is what one of the profilers stated:

Certainly, in my organisation, a huge weakness is succession planning. We have three highly capable extremely experienced pioneers of profiling in the UK, and we have nothing behind that. We have literally nothing behind it. If either of us, if any of us chose to leave tomorrow, I do not know where the next person comes from, not seeing any huge training in preparation. More importantly if the three of us decided to leave tomorrow, I have literally no idea in what happens to profiling in the UK. (Inf. 6, statement 3323-3329).

The Swedish group never stated being anywhere near the same fear for future profiling in their country. This might reflect the fact that the Swedish group is much larger than the UK group, which again makes them more robust if one of the members left the group. The vulnerability of the UK group also becomes evident as they practice a geographically division, which the Swedish group do not. Not only does this geographically division complicates co-working, but it also means that an already small vulnerable group of three profilers are divided in a way that add to the vulnerability.

Both groups reported having taken their part of their respective Polices Services austerity cuts through the years, including reducing the number of profilers within their group. Apart from the number of group members, the main differences between the groups seem very much to be the due to dissimilarities in organisational placement and autonomy. The Swedish profiling group appears to be placed amongst equal sections in their organisation focusing om major crime. They also have more freedom to take their own decisions in a spectrum of issues concerning the group and their work, compared to their UK colleagues. Furthermore, the UK profilers reports little support from their organisation on what is called Continued Professional Development (CPD), which was another factor the Swedes did not mention notably. It is understandable that both lack of succession planning and weak CPD altogether constitutes the experience of threat to the UK profiling team. There are two other threats to the future mentioned by then UK team that their Swedish colleagues did not report. This comprises the threat of amateurs taking over profiling in UK at the expense of the BIAs` and, related, that the UK Police Service again will experience a major crime scandal where

profiling has contributed as to the murder case of Rachel Nickell. This is a statement from an UK profiler:

I still think we face of threat from the wannabe profiler, the person who has got a degree in psychology like me, got a master's degree in psychology like me, but then starts counting them self to UK policing as a qualified expert. I think that is a huge threat. I think in the UK we made great strikes to mitigate that threat by the way we set things up, but that threat exists, it is no two ways about it. And there is a number of psychologists in UK who will happily tell policemen that they can do anything they want them to do and happily charge them a lot of sums of money for that and are ill equipped for the task is probably the best way. And I think that remains a huge threat, the amateurs taking over the profession. (Inf. 6, statement 3444-3454).

Another threat is stated, a threat partly connected to the potential taking over by the amateurs:

You know, in the history of profiling in UK we had a very high-profile case, the murder of Rachel Nickell, in Wimbledon Common, which was not well handled by the profiler of the time. But again, that is historical, things happen in a development in a new discipline. My fear though is that if a..., like another mistake of that level could not happen. But if it did, and particularly if we relate to those people who are wanting to be profilers, I am not sure whether the discipline will survive another catastrophic error. I think you know you could do a hundred good jobs, but I think if we had one disaster, then maybe questions asked about whether we should continue with this discipline. I think that is a huge threat. (Inf. 6, statement 3461-3469).

In UK, the SIO`s shall use an accredited BIA within their Police Service if profiling is requested. Still, the BIA experiencing that ongoing investigations are using psychologist that is not accredited status as BIA (profiler). This is reported being a bigger threat if the SIO requests assistance from a non-accredited amateur profiler. The UK Police Service having done several measures to secure quality such as recommending the use of accredited BIA

profilers, employ profilers in the Police Services and having implemented annually audits by the NPCC panel. Still the potential threat of making another scandal equivalent to the Rachel Nickell case is stated as present and further, that another mistake at this level will be potentially devastating for their profession. The magnitude of this threat is difficult to estimate, as one profiler expresses it:

I think it is an unknown problem because we do not know what we do not know. I think it is significantly reduced from twenty years ago when I first started. I think one of the greatest successes we had is put into place the mechanism to mitigate against that. By having this approved BIA status, by having the peer reviews, by having the independent panel that accessing our work, by having guidance that officers should only use experts from the NCA. I think it is dramatically reduced to a point of being far less an issue in the UK now that it is in many countries. But I think it still exist on the margins as a potential threat. (Inf. 6, statement 3502-3511).

This statement brings forward an issue that points to a historical diversity between the two countries that have impact on the groups even today. In the aftermath of the 1980`s and 1990`s pioneering use of profilers, including the murder case of Rachell Nickell and its consequential injustice, a change in several aspects of profiling as a profession became necessary within the UK Police Service. The historical need for taking more control of profiling as an investigative tool, as well as optimising its applicability, is brought forward by Rainbow, addressing three major factors; working conditions for the BIA`s, annual audit evaluating BIA`s work and strategic development for future profiling (Rainbow, 2008). Without going into details this addresses professionalising of profiling in UK, by securing who can be accredited a BIA, how the BIA shall work, and the quality securing measures to make sure these demands are being fulfilled. To my knowledge a similar development has not taken place in Sweden.

The Swedish profilers and respective Police Service are, of course, also focused on quality parameters. But, given the statements of the profiler's, Swedish Police Service has not put this systematically into their organisational system the same way as their UK colleagues have done. None of the Swedish profilers mentioned anything of being accredited as a profiler or that they have an independent panel annually quality securing their work, which makes this

a difference between Sweden and UK.

Associated to this issue, there seems to be an immediate contradiction, or to some extent perhaps a paradox. The Swedish profilers do not state concern to their future existence despite giving no statements of having an organisational quality securing system. On the contrary, the UK profilers express concern to their future existence due to several factors, including the awareness of another scandal might strike the profiling profession again triggered by amateurs acting as if they had the competency of an accredited profiler. However, it is not only the comparison to the Swedes that makes this a paradox, but it has also to do with the UK group itself. My impression is clearly that the UK profilers are very professional, very structured, experienced, and true to their scientific principles well bonded to research and statistics. In short, they appear as a strong group with solid professionalism, so how come this insecurity for future perspectives have taken place?

The reason for this, I believe, is not, at least not only, because of the awareness of a historical scandal twenty years ago, thinking what has happened before might happen again. What potentially enlarges this historical awareness is the fact that working with profiling in UK is very much working isolated and handling time-pressure on your own, two major aspects differentiating the UK profilers from their Swedish colleagues. There is a historical backdrop, but the steps taken to prohibit another scandal is indeed already put into system, which should have made the UK profilers more secure. The vulnerability the UK profiler's express concerning their future seems associated with the overall consequences of being situated without like-minded and without enough autonomy. Although being a strong professional group, their worries for future profiling in UK are understandable.

As shown through the levels of Organisation and Leadership, as well as in both Group and Individual level, there are similarities and differences between the Swedish and UK groups. The tool for designing reports seems quite alike, but the process of how this is done is different. The groups' dissimilarities are connected to such factors as the size of the groups, the amount of time to spend on a case and their historical reframing of the profession, but perhaps most of all to the different degrees of autonomy. In sum, both groups have distinct benefits that are unique to their group, and both groups also meet challenges in exercising their profiling professions.

Overall, and very interesting, there are two functions the groups seem to share when supporting ongoing major crime investigations; they both function as catalysts in producing applicable investigative advice, and they both constitute, perhaps unintentionally, sort of controllers when given feedback on the quality of the investigation already carried out.

4.7 Two overall central functions of the profiling groups

Profiling groups bring professional perspectives to the ongoing investigation representing a knowledge or a perspective the investigators do not hold. As both Sweden and UK have had their profiling groups for decades this should be interpreted as a confirmation of their contribution to major crime investigation. These contributions are meant to have a catalysing effect on the investigation, leading the investigation forward as the advice intend to reframe the SIO`s decision makings. In addition, as the interviews of Swedish and UK profilers clarifies, the profilers do seem to have acquired an additional role as securing quality of the ongoing investigation to a certain extent. Not that this necessarily is a role being defined by the Police Service, the SIO, or the profilers themselves, it may be due to an extended cooperation between SIO`s and profilers evolved over time. One must be careful interpreting scarce data concerning this issue, but it is noteworthy that both Swedish and UK profiling teams experience satisfied SIO`s when the profiler`s are bringing in perspectives the investigative team had in beforehand. As one of the UK profilers` states:

(...) and it may well be that actually all we do is write a report back and confirms what they already thought... but what we find in those cases is that because the investigators or the SIO`s have to have a policy log, so they have to write down reasons they thing various stains. Even if we are agreeing with what their initial belief is, they have an external person who understands behaviour and coming in saying "I agree with that for all these reasons" and it is still helpful to them even if we do not tell them anything new or different...it is still very helpful...things to have in the investigation so it does not matter if we agree or disagree with them. They still find it useful. (Inf. 4, statement 2015-2023).

This gives support to the interpretation of the profiling groups also having a controller function, although secondary, when they engage in an ongoing investigation. This role of course may vary between the groups, and vary from case to case, but it is reason to believe this role is represented in each profiler although not formalised. The Swedish profilers pinpoint that they decide how much time they will spend in a case, and they read all documents in all the cases they participate in. This is what a Swedish profiler states:

We have better possibilities to read thru documents peacefully and study the case in quiet. Often, we..., well, many times we are more up to date on the case than the requesting team when we sit down with them to have case meetings. (Inf. 2, statement 615-617).

Being surrounded by less stress and less time pressure than the investigative group is of course a benefit for the Swedish profilers. Further, by having a better overview of the case than the SIO and the investigators, the profilers are positioned in a unique way to point out if there are any existing biases or missing perspectives in the investigation.

Compared to profilers in the 1980`s and 1990`s it is reasonable to assume that profilers nowadays, in both Sweden and UK, are more educated in the profession of investigation and the various aspects of such police work. This is because modern policing has been more professionalised the last decades, bringing research and scientific practises into policing in general and investigation specifically. The fact that profilers from Sweden and UK also educate SIO`s and investigators in heuristics and biases indeed support this understanding of profilers being knowledgeable in investigative principals. Additionally, the profilers have the advantage of coming from the outside, looking into the ongoing investigation and by this they represent another, potentially more objective, perspective than the members of the ongoing investigation group.

Having mainly a catalyst role, but additionally supporting the investigation by offering a quality securing focus, the profiling groups today replace themselves differently in the investigative circle than profilers in the earlier days did. The controller function is a supplement to the catalyst function and exercising of both is possible because of having well educated and experienced profilers. Perhaps profilers never intended to have other tasks than being a catalyst, but requesting the profiling team`s services, the investigation group might accommodate several of Janis` nine recommendations for preventing groupthink; the ability of speaking to others outside the group, bringing in outside experts and using the possibility pointing out the profilers to act as the devil`s advocate. These are all important controlling functions in ongoing investigations.

4.8 Replacing the profiling groups in the investigative circle

The Investigative Cycle is a process categorising investigative strives to answer six essential questions (the 6. W`s); "Who did What to whom, Why, hoW, Where and When did

it happen?". There is a cyclic relation between the different steps of Collect, Check, Connect, Construct, Consider and Consult meaning that solid investigations will return to either of these as the investigation progress (Ask & Fahsing, 2018; Fahsing, 2013). As revealed in the introduction my impression is that profiling in the earlier days placed itself in the Investigative Circle in the procedural steps of Connect and Construct. This is so as existing information was put together bringing forward a new understanding along with their expert knowledge, usually psychology.

There are reasons to believe that today`s profilers in both Sweden and UK represent themselves in other procedural steps as well. As the investigators gives their oral briefings to the profilers in addition to case documents to read, I presume profilers nowadays have a more critical view regarding the information they receive, whether that information is valid and has been obtained in an objective way. In such a way the profilers also representing the step of Check in the Investigative Circle. This check-perspective is due to the notion of profilers being more inserted into modern investigation and having an academic background.

Both profiling groups underline the importance of working with competing hypothesis and the testing of these hypotheses. This alone have strengthened their role in the investigative step named Consider where profilers give their opinion on what information is necessary for testing an actual hypothesis the best way.

The interviews of profilers from both countries reveals that profilers do have a function in the last procedural step of the Investigative Circle, namely Consult. Taking their professional outside-perspective to the ongoing investigative team brings objectivity and reasonable scepticism to major crime investigations. This leaves the profilers in the position of contributing to nearly all the steps mentioned in the Investigative Circle except from Collect, referring to collection of information. However, even here, with their multidisciplinary backgrounds it is plausible that they directly give information to the investigation by using expert knowledge which can be interpreted as they are involved even in this part if necessary. Nevertheless, the overall point here is that modern profiling constitutes much more than just formulating hypothesis about the characteristics of an unknown predator based on the interpretation of a crime scene.

4.9 Review teams

As all profilers from both Sweden and UK highlights continuously is that they support the SIO and the investigative team`s decision makings. When the SIOs` request for profiling support they want input from others having a special competence, looking at the case from a

more objective distance, and a different angle. All to facilitate future decisions in the ongoing investigation. The complexity of investigating murders and the need for a more scientific foundation in this matter is pointed out many times (Donnelly & West, 2019) and so are the need for "audit approach" to assure investigative quality (Carson, 2012). Review teams are examples of such a measurement.

For many years, UK Police Service have had their review teams. In 2010 the Swedish Police Service created their review team inspired by the UK Police Service. The Swedish team supported SIO`s in major crime cases for several years but due to both having a major reform in the Police Service in 2015, with a following significantly increase of deadly shootouts, the work of the review team was put to rest. A project group has launched a review team with certain adjustments in the spring of 2022 (Isaksson, 2022), yet not decided, but indicating that the Swedish Police Service will resume their review team.

UK Police Service have established different systems for reviewing ongoing major crime investigations, for instance Serious Case Review (SCR) and Domestic Homicide Review (DHR). SCR concerns cases of child victim under 18 years old, whereas DHR is actualised when the victim is over 16 years old (Fox, 2011). Reviews are initiated to ensure that the investigation holds approved standards, is thoroughly executed with objectivity and integrity for good practice and that no investigative opportunity is overlooked. In sum its primary function is to assist the SIO (Sawers, 2008) as well as the investigators, in addition to the learning perspectives (Jones et al., 2008). Perhaps some SIO`s might be somewhat reluctant having a parallel investigation to the ongoing inquiry, but Jones et al. expresses "the emphasis of the review is a rigorous, competent and ethical process in support of the SIO as opposed to a destructive criticism of the inquiry" (Jones et al., 2010) (p.10), because overall reviewing homicide cases is about avoiding repetitions of earlier investigative mistakes. It is interesting to notice that one of the profilers bring forward the issue of suspicions or reluctance when visiting a requesting SIO and investigation team:

(...) there is a risk that they may perhaps see us as a judging group which is coming to.....pointing finger and talking about how to do this and not that... (Inf. 2, statement 680-681).

The UK Police Service have routine management interventions such as assessment within 24 to 72 hours (Initial Assessment), assessment after the initial phase when facts are

clear (Mature Assessment), assessment around the 7th day of investigation (Peer Assessment), a 28-Day Review if status of the case is not detected, and a Cold Case assessment when cases are long-term undetected homicides (Sawers, 2008). A full review is recommended, but occasionally a critical and specific issue of the investigation is the only part reviewed if it is judged to be potential harmful. Undetected stranger rapes and homicides are some of the cases recommended to be reviewed. The timing of the review is essential, and some reviews takes place after just 7 days, although they will take place in an undetected case after 28 days, 12 months and after that every year.

These are all systematic organisational approaches to major crime investigations which is not reflected in the Norwegian Police Service, except from sections for investigation sometimes create an ad hoc review team with members from their own staff. The nearest Norwegian Police Service is to have a review team is the NCIS`s Cold Case Section, but as the name reveals this review takes on after active investigations being discontinued. Despite the last decade`s extensive work professionalising crime investigation (Politidirektoratet, 2013, 2016), the Norwegian Police Service seems far from the systematic organisational review team approach seen in UK Police Service. This appears somewhat incomprehensible as we are aware of the investigators often being surrounded by "ambiguous, uncertain, and unpredictable environments" when making difficult decisions, not to forget that investigators sense-making takes place within a context where the perpetrator has an intent to deceive (Ormerod et al., 2005) (p.52). Since experience alone can`t prevent all potential threats in decision-making (Ask & Alison, 2010) major crime investigative need support through systematic operations on organisational level to secure and maintain the importance of investigative meta reflections (Ask & Fahsing, 2019).

It is affirmed that the Norwegian Police Service shall strive to be a learning organisation (NOU, 2017:5; Politidirektoratet, 2019). A learning organisation is "said to learn to the extent that it identifies and correct errors" (Argyris, 1992) (p.115). As other countries, Norway have had their miscarriages of justice. The knowledge of the vulnerability of the investigative brain and the impact of contextual factors on investigations such as time-pressure is by now well recognised. Scrutiny of several major crime cases revealing miscarriages of justice support this, which in turn gives the impression of the Norwegian Police Service in 2022 being too optimistic as they are not in the possession of having established a national review team.

4.10 Modern profiling

As brought forward in this thesis, offender profiling has changed through the decades, visualised in UK through the reforms in the Police Service focusing on professionalising and securing quality of profilers through accreditation as Behavioural Investigative Advisors and annual audits. The way the Swedish group are compounded is in line with the essential idea that interdisciplinary working groups gives a greater contribution to major crime investigation than homogenous groups (Ask & Fahsing, 2018), having an immense opportunity approaching from the outside, working and discussing cases as a profiling group.

Both Sweden and UK communicate a change in investigative focus through increased focus on competing hypothesis, indeed supported by solid experience both also leaning on statistics, academic research and interdisciplinary approaches in their profiling work. Further, an important development is that offender profiling is now placed in the investigative line where it belongs, as a support for making decisions and not as a part of the judicial proceedings. Neither Swedish or UK profilers bring their expertise into the court, as their statements and reasoning is not evaluated as evidence, but as intelligence to support decision making.

Although probably not originally meant to be, modern profiling also gives an additional spin off effect as the profilers, whom all are skilled investigators, give their feedback to the quality of work performed by the investigative group. The results of this study therefore support the perception of profiling has taken extensive steps towards professionalism. As profiling in the early days essentially was devoted to three aspects; reducing the pool of suspects, linking crimes together and reduce the geographical area where the perpetrator lives (geographic profiling, not focused on in this thesis), modern profiling seems to have expanded to a broader agenda.

4.11 Personal experiences from major crime cases

The last two and a half years I have been working in a huge and complex major crime case. I have taking part in different project groups within the investigation such as preparing, and being back office, in witness and suspect interviews and working with the merging of information from both forensic investigation and tactical investigation. But, for most of the time, I have been a so-called libero, positioned in a free role, as the SIO`s wanted me to take on the case the way I wanted to. This means that I have read things of my interest and I have spent the time on each part as I felt was necessary. I have work alone and I have co-work. The feedback from the SIO`s tells me they are satisfied. The reason for bringing this forward is

because during this period I have asked myself what differs the work I do from my police educated colleagues and whether my work, with all respect, is anything like the work of a profiler?

One of the obvious differences between me and my colleagues is that they are not chartered psychologists with additional education as specialist in clinical psychology as I am. Their education as police officers is fundamental different to mine, which is of course is good for co-working contributing with different perspectives. One of the main differences coming out of this is that I put together information differently than they do. We also weight some of the information differently in the sense that we notice different information as interesting. Since I do not have a police education, I have followed a master class education in investigation, including theme such "Murder and serious violence", "Leading investigation" and "Methods of investigation" to mention some. This I experience important as it is bridging our different educational backgrounds, giving us a common language, and understanding, which obviously is good for teamwork.

Another crucial factor is that both the SIO and the colleagues I work close with are open minded, although not in a non-critical way. I asked the SIO and investigator colleagues to express how they perceive my role and work. In short, they experience me giving advice and perspectives, case analysis, from a different point of view and by such also function as a securer of quality in various parts of the investigation. They also experience me being a devil's advocate counteracting confirmations biases including challenging the SIO`s perceptions and statements, additionally developing new hypothesis and associated investigative steps.

My colleagues feedback turns out to both include the catalysing and the controller functions as modern profilers seems to have, and I think both profilers in Sweden and UK will recognise themselves in several parts of the work I do. But, important to note, this does not make me a profiler. I lack the experience as the profilers I interviewed had, and I am not trained to make profiles. Although, on the other hand, I am not sure there is other training possibilities than on the job, being supervised by someone that has comprehensive experience. Mentioning this, I touch up on an issue that this thesis will not comment further, but it is not always easy to understand where profiling support starts and ends, where is the dividing line between profiling support and more general psychological based contributions in investigations? This issue is also reflected in some of the statements from the profilers themselves. If becoming a profiler is done by training on the job supervised by an experienced profiler, the border line between profiling and other psychological based support will

sometimes be difficult to separate. My libero role first contains general psychological based approach but perhaps touching the field of a profiler when I comment more specifically on behaviour. Further, and the reason for bringing this forward, is that my colleagues, as well as my own experiences indicates that "an additional different role" is welcome in major crime investigations in Norway.

Bringing forward the question whether my work at NCIS has anything in common with profiling work in Sweden and UK, also brings forward the importance of me being a researcher with sustainable distance to the subject of matter, and further, treating the collected data as objectively as possible. One of the most important measures is to implement intercoder reliability as this is an important check of similar understanding of the coded data. The issue of doing research within one own organisation brings forward different and important reservations (Rachlew, 2010). This issue is present in this thesis, although the geographical distance might be helpful in keeping a balanced distance. Further, my experience as a clinical psychologist regularly taking meta perspective in my work is probably helping me in my case work, for instance to avoid tunnel vision when investigating interesting leads. I believe this competence also helps me in giving me distance when collecting and reflecting about the data. This is of course no warranty for the objectivity we seek as researchers, but it keeps the reflections about the phenomena of influencing the research process. The sceptical side of me towards the profiling work might influence the data interpreting them in one way. Meeting people with partly the same education or sometimes sharing the same work tasks as me might influence my research in another way. Both examples might influence the research and make it less objective. Being reflexively aware of these different research issues is alone helpful. Discussing different aspects of the research process in beforehand and during the process will also be of importance. Although keeping in mind the importance of striving towards an objectively research as possible, one must not forget that my experience and today's work tasks in NCIS might be helpful in understanding the profilers even better than other researchers perhaps would.

4.12 Expanding the investigative toolbox in Norwegian Police Service

Although the sample of this thesis being small, it encompasses most full-time working profilers within the Police Service in Sweden and UK, representing two profiling groups existing for more than 20 years. Thru the informant's disclosure we have learned the following:

- Working in multidisciplinary groups is considering a strength for profiling.

- Experience, expert knowledge, research, statistics, and inferential logics makes up the key words for forming profiles.
- Coming from the outside bringing expert knowledge of human behaviour, weighting other information, and putting information together in a new way, is considered positive from the perspectives of the SIO and ongoing investigative group.
- Even if not bringing new perspectives or hypothesis into the investigative group, the fact that well merited investigators (profilers) reviewing the case is considered a quality check.
- Although profiling competency traditionally have been used in murder cases, serial rape cases and equivocal deaths, perspectives from well reputable profilers' states that the competency is suitable for new areas of crimes such as for instance online sexual abuse of minors.

There are different possibilities for the Norwegian Police Service to incorporate this competency in its organisation:

- A cold case group may acquire profiling competency for use both in cold case investigations (Almond et al., 2015), but also being available to ongoing cases where profiling competency are considered necessary.
- A homicide group with profiling competency will be available for major crime incidents, but also available for other groups such as those investigating rapes and cold cases.

Not all Police Districts have cold case groups and homicide groups, but the National Crime Investigative Service (NCIS) holds both and their function is to support all Police District in these matters. Further:

- Norwegian Police Service do not have a constituted review team, neither in the Police Districts nor at the national level represented by NCIS. The reason for bringing in review teams in this thesis is both to point out some of the functional parallel to profiling groups, but also to visualise the possibilities for bringing profiling competency into a future review team.
- Obviously, there is a possibility to create a group of profilers like the groups in Sweden and UK. If the domain of profiling is murder, serial rape, equivocal deaths and online sexual abuse, there will be enough cases for the group to work with. This is

mentioned as the prevalence of murder with unknown perpetrator is relatively low in Norway.

4.13 Strengths

A major strength of this study was that 100% of the full time employed accredited Behavioural Investigative Advisors were interviewed and approximately 75 % of the profilers employed full time in the Swedish police service. Although, the informant in total is six (n=6), this is a representative sample and facilitates the generalisation of the findings. There was no drop out and all interviews were conducted as planned except from one interviewed using video. All genders and the leaders of the group represented the countries. The use of semi-structured interview makes both Swedish and UK profilers answering the same questions. Further, using open ended questions this makes it possible for individual emphasis although answering the same questions. The use of semi-structured interviews both gives structure, and an aspect of individualism, as it opens the possibility for different following up questions.

4.14 Limitations

Although a high percentage of the total numbers of full-time profilers within the Police service in both countries were present, the sample of this study is small (n=6) with each group respectively small (n=3). This means that every participant's statements have a potent effect on the results. If a participant, at the time of the interview, was particularly focused on an issue, this might reflect their statements. Further, when the samples are so small, such a focus of the participants may have noteworthy impact on the results.

The context of the group when accomplishing the interviews might also have influenced the statements of the informants. For instance, if one of the groups ahead of the interviews were particularly focused on a matter (positive or negative) this would probably be reflected in the interview. The main point is that context in a small sample will potentially have a larger effect on the results compared to interviews of a large sample, and as contextual factors are situational, the context may not reflect the more general status of the group.

Another aspect that might affect the results is the coding. When coding on the SWOT and IGLO level the repeated points will all count. So, when stating one point about the group and doing so in three separate ways, will achieve more coding on the level than if the point was just said once. People are different, some are more talkative than others, and this will influence the countable statements on actual levels. My following up question may or may not facilitate further answers from the informant. In small samples all these varied factors might

influence the results to a greater extent than if the samples were bigger.

Further, a deficiency to this study is that SIO's has not been interviewed. Interviewing both SIO's requesting profiling assistance and those who do not, or perhaps has stopped requesting this competency, would have given strength to the study as it would have given balance to the profilers' point of view.

4.15 Conclusion

For many years the Norwegian Police Service have focused on developing its investigative quality to the better for the organisation and the population they represent. The Norwegian Police Service have learned from mistakes. In the development of structured interview protocols, the PEACE model has been applied in adapted versions and used as an overarching interview model in Norway and several other countries (Myklebust & Walsh, 2016; Walsh et al., 2017). Following unfortunate miscarriages of justice, the focus was directed to the quality of investigation and the caveat of investigative biases. Although working systematically with heightening investigative quality over time, we cannot rest as this is an ever-ongoing development.

Learning from mistakes is necessary but learning thru observations of Police Services' successes is equally important. Sweden and UK Police Service have had their review teams for years. Both countries have had profiling groups for more than 20 years. It is time that we look to these countries with curiosity, learning from their experiences thru decades. The content and application of profiling has change during the last decades and these changes have challenged the sceptical side of me, realising that these groups hold competency we do not have in our Police Service. This competency is requested for in the Police Services in Sweden and UK, and it is difficult to see that this competency would be worthless in the Norwegian Police Service or that our Police Service holds equivalent competence in other ways.

Modern profiling is more anchored in professionalism and academic scholarship, it is transparent in the use of expert knowledge giving advice in line of inquiry for the investigation, having both catalysing and controlling functions. Implementing and systemising these functions will, in all probability, add a prolific competency for investigation within the Norwegian Police Service.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Definition
ACPO	The Association of Chief Police Officers
BIA	Behavioural Investigative Advice
CAP	Crime Action Profiling
CIA	Criminal Investigative Analysis
CPD	Continued Professional Development
DHR	Domestic Homicide Review
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IGLO	Individual (I), Group (G), Leadership (L), Organisation (O)
Inf.	Informant (participant)
IP	Investigative Psychology
MCIS	Major Crime Investigative Support
NCA	National Crime Agency
NCIS	Norwegian Criminal Investigation Service
NESH	The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities
NFCC	Need For Cognitive Closure
NPCC	The National Police Chief Council
NSD	The Norwegian Centre for Research Data AS
SCR	Serious Case Review
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SWOT	Strength (S), Weaknesses (W), Opportunities (O), Threats (T)
UK	United Kingdom
VICLASS	Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System

Appendix 1

Letters to the informants/participant and consent form

INFORMASJON TIL INFORMANTENE

Informasjon til intervjuobjekter om forskningsprosjektet:

«Kan gjerningsmannsprofilering utgjøre et supplerende beslutningsverktøy i norsk politi?».

Mitt navn er Clas Fredric Andersen og jeg jobber på KRIPOS ved seksjon for Alvorlige uopplarte saker (cold cases). Jeg er utdannet psykologspesialist, men har jobbet i politiet siden 2013 i all hovedsak med etterforskning (drap, forsvinninger, mistenkelige dødsfall). Jeg er student ved Politihøgskolen og tar utdanningen «Erfaringsbasert master i ettforskning». Som masteroppgave ønsker jeg å undersøke hvorvidt vi i Norge bør ha en egen gruppe/seksjon som kan bidra i drapssaker, i tillegg til etterforskningsgruppen. Som et utgangspunkt ønsker jeg å undersøke dette fra et gjerningsmannsprofil-perspektiv da både Sverige og England (UK) har hatt denne kompetansen over flere tiår.

Mine veiledere er Trond Myklebust, politiinspektør Politihøgskolen (hovedveileder) og Laurence Allison, professor ved Universitet i Liverpool (biveileder).

Din deltakelse i prosjektet innebærer å delta i et intervju som vil antas å ha en varighet på 45-60 minutter. For å sikre mest mulig nøyaktig data vil det bli benyttet lydopptak dersom du samtykker til dette. Deltakelsen er frivillig og du kan trekke deg fra prosjektet når som helst og uten å måtte oppgi grunn. Dersom du trekker deg har du rett til å kreve at opplysninger om deg som person slettes. Du kan når som helst få innsyn i ditt intervju.

Jeg og mine veiledere har tilgang på innhentede data og alle har taushetsplikt. Opplysningene om deg vil anonymiseres og lydopptak vil slettes når prosjektet ferdigstilles, tentativ sommer 2020.

Ved behov for ytterligere avklaringer kan jeg kontaktes på telefon eller epost.

Vennlig hilsen

Clas Fredric Andersen

TLF: 0047 91805859

EPOST: clas.fredric.andersen@politiet.no

Information to participants

Are you interested in taking part in the research project?

“Criminal profiling in knowledge based policing”?

This is an inquiry about participation in a research project where the main purpose is to understand whether criminal profiling can support decision making in the Norwegian police murder investigation. In this letter we will give you information about the purpose of the project and what your participation will involve.

I, Clas Fredric Andersen, work at the Norwegian Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS)/ (Norwegian: KRIPOS), at the section for cold cases. I am a chartered psychologist and has worked as a clinical psychologist for 15 years. Since 2013 I have worked in the police force mostly with investigating murders, but also disappearances that might be murder and cases with equivocal deaths. I am a student at the Norwegian Police Academy in Oslo, where I am completing my master study. The purpose of my master thesis is to find out whether criminal profiling can be a supportive tool in murder investigations and if the Norwegian Police needs a special group/section to give support in major crime investigations as for instance murder investigations.

I want to interview Swedish and English criminal profilers because both Sweden and English have had criminal profiling groups or used criminal profiling to support murder investigations for several decades.

My supervisors are police inspector Dr. Trond Myklebust at the Police Academy, Oslo, and Professor Laurence Alison, at the University of Liverpool. The Norwegian Police Academy, Oslo, is the institution responsible for the project.

If you decide to participate in this project you will be interviewed for approximately 60 minutes. It will be a semi-structured interview. To secure data obtained the interview will be sound recorded.

Participation in the project is voluntary. If you chose to participate, you can withdraw your consent at any time without giving a reason. All information about you will then be made anonymous. There will be no negative consequences for you if you chose not to participate or later decide to withdraw.

Participation in the project gives you the right to access the personal data that is being processed about you, request that your personal data is deleted, request that incorrect personal data about you is corrected/rectified, receive a copy of your personal data (data portability), and send a complaint to the Data Protection Officer or The Norwegian Data Protection Authority regarding the processing of your personal data

We will only use your personal data for the purpose specified in this information letter. We will process your personal data confidentially and in accordance with data protection legislation (the General Data Protection Regulation and Personal Data Act). Apart from me, only the supervisors will have access to the data. I will replace your name and contact details with a code and the data will be stored on a research server at the Police Academy, Oslo. Participation in the project gives you right to

The project is scheduled to end within august 2020. Data obtained in the project will then be erased, including data obtained by soundtrack.

We will process your personal data based on your consent. Based on an agreement with Norwegian Police Academy, NSD – The Norwegian Centre for Research Data AS has assessed that the processing of personal data in this project is in accordance with data protection legislation.

If you have questions about the project, or want to exercise your rights, contact:

- Clas Fredric Andersen, by email: clas.fredric.andersen@politiet.no, by telephone +47 91805859 or Dr.Trond Myklebust, by email: trond.myklebust@phs.no, by telephone +47 93033392
- NSD – The Norwegian Centre for Research Data AS, by email: (personverntjenester@nsd.no) or by telephone: +47 55 58 21 17.

Yours sincerely,

Clas Fredric Andersen

Consent form

I have received and understood information about the project *Criminal profiling in knowledge-based policing* and have been given the opportunity to ask questions. I give consent:

- to participate in the interview in the research project: *Criminal profiling in knowledge-based policing*

I give consent for my personal data to be processed until the end date of the project, approx. July 2021.

_____ of December 2019, _____ (Date & Signed by participant)

Appendix 2

Interview guide

INTERVJUGUIDE SWOT, SVERIGE

Kan du vennligst gi en kort introduksjon av deg og din bakgrunn for å jobbe med profilering i politiet?

SVAR:

Kan du vennligst si noe kort om den enheten, Gärningsmannaprofilgruppen, du arbeider ved?

SVAR:

Jeg vil nå spørre deg om Styrker, Svakheter, Muligheter og Trusler knyttet til profilering slik din enhet, Gärningsmannaprofilgruppen, utfører. Det er din oppfatning om profilingsarbeidet enheten din utøver som jeg er interessert i.

1: STYRKER (STRENGTHS)

Hvilke styrker vil du mene at Gärningsmannaprofilgruppens profilering arbeid har?

SVAR:

2: SVAKHETER (WEAKNESSES)

Hvilke svakheter vil du mene at Gärningsmannaprofilgruppens profilering arbeid har?

SVAR:

3: MULIGHETER (OPPORTUNITIES)

Hvilke muligheter mener du ditt Gärningsmannaprofilgruppens arbeid har?

SVAR:

4: TRUSLER (THREATS)

Hvilke trusler mener du kan være knyttet til Gärningsmannaprofilgruppens arbeid?

SVAR:

INTERVJUGUIDE SWOT, UK

Can you please give a brief introduction of yourself and your background for working with criminal profiling/behavioural investigative advice?

ANSWER:

Can you please give a brief introduction of the unit you are working in?

ANSWER:

I will now ask you about Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats of the profiling work/behavioural investigative advice your unit perform. It is your opinion about the work of your unit that I am interested in.

1: STRENGTHS

What kind of Strengths do you think your unit`s profiling work has?

ANSWER:

2: WEAKNESSES

What kind of Weaknesses do you think your unit`s profiling work has?

ANSWER:

3: OPPORTUNITIES

What kind of Opportunities do you think your unit`s profiling work has?

ANSWER:

4: THREATS

What kind of Threats do you think your unit`s profiling work has?

ANSWER:

Appendix 3

Approvals NSD

Meldeskjema / Gjerningsmannsprofilering i et kunnskapsbasert politi / Vurdering

Vurdering

Dato	Type
24.07.2019	Med vilkår

Referansenummer
849618


Prosjektittel
Gjerningsmannsprofilering i et kunnskapsbasert politi

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon
Politihøgskolen

Prosjektansvarlig
Trond Myklebust

Student
Clas Fredric Andersen

Prosjektperiode
15.08.2019 - 31.08.2020

Meldeskjema 

Kommentar
FORENKLET VURDERING MED VILKÅR
Etter gjennomgang av opplysningene i meldeskjemaet med vedlegg, vurderer vi at prosjektet har lav personvernulempe fordi det ikke behandler særlige kategorier eller personopplysninger om straffedommer og lovovertrедelser, eller inkluderer sårbare grupper. Prosjektet har rimelig varighet og er basert på samtykke. Vi gir derfor prosjektet en forenklet vurdering med vilkår.

Du har et selvstendig ansvar for å følge vilkårene og sette deg inn i veiledningen i denne vurderingen. Dersom du følger vilkårene og prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med det som er dokumentert i meldeskjemaet, vil behandlingen av personopplysninger være i samsvar med personverngivningen.

VILKÅR
Vår vurdering forutsetter:

1. At du gjennomfører prosjektet i tråd med kravene til informert samtykke
2. At du ikke innhenter særlige kategorier eller personopplysninger om straffedommer og lovovertrедelser
3. At du følger behandlingsansvarlig institusjon (institusjonen du studerer/forsker ved) sine retningslinjer for datasikkerhet
4. At du laster opp revidert(e) informasjonsskriv på utvalgsiden(e) i meldeskjemaet og trykker «bekreft innsending», slik at du og behandlingsansvarlig institusjon får korrekt dokumentasjon. NSD foretar ikke en ny vurdering av det reviderte informasjonsskrivet.

1. KRAV TIL INFORMERT SAMTYKKE
De registrerte skal få skriftlig og/eller muntlig informasjon om prosjektet og samtykke til deltakelse. Selv om de registrerte i foreliggende prosjekt vil være svensk og engelsk, gjelder informasjonskravet tilsvarende for denne gruppen. Du må påse at informasjonen minst omfatter:

- Prosjektets formål og hva opplysningene skal brukes til
- Hvilken institusjon som er behandlingsansvarlig
- Hvilke opplysninger som innhentes og hvordan opplysningene innhentes
- At det er frivillig å delta og at man kan trekke seg så lenge studien pågår uten at man må oppgi grunn
- Når prosjektet skal avsluttes og hva som skal skje med personopplysningene da: sletting, anonymisering eller videre lagring
- At du/dere behandler opplysninger om den registrerte basert på deres samtykke
- Retten til å be om innsyn, retting, sletting, begrensning og dataportabilitet (kopi)
- Retten til å klage til Datatilsynet
- Kontaktopplysninger til prosjektleder (evt. student og veileder)
- Kontaktopplysninger til institusjonens personvernombud

På nettsidene våre finner du mer informasjon og en veiledende mal for informasjonsskriv:
http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvernombud/hjelp/informasjon_samtykke/informere_om.html

Det er ditt ansvar at informasjonen du gir i informasjonsskrivet samsvarer med dokumentasjonen i meldeskjemaet.

2. TYPE OPPLYSNINGER OG VARIGHET

Prosjektet vil behandle alminnelige kategorier av personopplysninger frem til 31.08.2020.

3. FØLG DIN INSTITUSJONS RETNINGSLINJER

NSD legger til grunn at behandlingen oppfyller kravene i personvernforordningen om riktighet (art. 5.1 d), integritet og konfidensialitet (art. 5.1 f) og sikkerhet (art. 32).

Dersom du benytter en databehandler i prosjektet, må behandlingen oppfylle kravene til bruk av databehandler, jf. art. 28 og 29.

For å forsikre dere om at kravene oppfylles, må dere følge interne retningslinjer og/eller rådføre dere med behandlingsansvarlig institusjon.

NSD SIN VURDERING

NSDs vurdering av lovlig grunnlag, personvernprinsipper og de registrertes rettigheter følger under, men forutsetter at vilkårene nevnt over følges.

LOVLIG GRUNNLAG

Prosjektet vil innhente samtykke fra de registrerte til behandlingen av personopplysninger. Forutsatt at vilkår 1 og 4 følges, er det NSD sin vurdering at prosjektet legger opp til et samtykke i samsvar med kravene i art. 4 og 7, ved at det er en frivillig, spesifikk, informert og utvetydig bekreftelse som kan dokumenteres og som den registrerte kan trekke tilbake. Lovlig grunnlag for behandlingen vil dermed være den registrertes samtykke, jf. personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav a.

PERSONVERNPRINSIPPER

Forutsatt at vilkår 1 til 4 følges, vurderer NSD at den planlagte behandlingen av personopplysninger vil følge prinsippene i personvernforordningen om:

- lovlighet, rettferdighet og åpenhet (art. 5.1 a), ved at de registrerte får tilfredsstillende informasjon om og samtykker til behandlingen
- formålsbegrensning (art. 5.1 b), ved at personopplysninger samles inn for spesifikke, uttrykkelig angitte og berettigede formål, og ikke behandles til nye, uforenlige formål
- dataminimering (art. 5.1 c), ved at det kun behandles opplysninger som er adekvate, relevante og nødvendige for formålet med prosjektet
- lagringsbegrensning (art. 5.1 e), ved at personopplysningene ikke lagres lengre enn nødvendig for å oppfylle formålet

DE REGISTRERTES RETTIGHETER

Så lenge de registrerte kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, vil de ha følgende rettigheter: åpenhet (art. 12), informasjon (art. 13), innsyn (art. 15), retting (art. 16), sletting (art. 17), begrensning (art. 18), underretning (art. 19) og dataportabilitet (art. 20).

Forutsatt at informasjonen oppfyller kravene i vilkår 1, vurderer NSD at informasjonen om behandlingen som de registrerte vil motta oppfyller lovens krav til form og innhold, jf. art. 12.1 og art. 13.

Vi minner om at hvis en registrert tar kontakt om sine rettigheter, har behandlingsansvarlig institusjon plikt til å svare innen en måned.

MELD ENDRINGER

Dersom den planlagte behandlingen av personopplysninger endrer seg, kan det være nødvendig å melde dette til NSD ved å oppdatere meldesjemaet. På våre nettsider informerer vi om hvilke endringer som må meldes. Vent på svar før endringer gjennomføres.

OPPFØLGING AV PROSJEKTET

NSD vil følge opp ved planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.

Lykke til med prosjektet!

Kontaktperson hos NSD: Elizabeth Blomstervik
Tlf. Personverntjenester: 55 58 21 17 (bast 1)

Meldeskjema / Gjerningsmannsprofilering i et kunnskapsbasert politi / Vurdering

Vurdering

Dato

29.07.2019

Type

Med vilkår

Referansenummer

849618

Prosjekttittel

Gjerningsmannsprofilering i et kunnskapsbasert politi

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon

Politihøgskolen

Prosjektansvarlig

Trond Myklebust

Student

Clas Fredric Andersen

Prosjektperiode

15.08.2019 - 31.08.2020

[Meldeskjema](#) 

Kommentar

NSD bekrefter å ha mottatt et revidert informasjonsskriv/endret dokument. Vi gjør oppmerksom på at vi ikke foretar en vurdering av skrevet/dokumentet, og vi forutsetter at du har foretatt de endringene vi ba om. Dokumentasjonen legges ut i Meldingsarkivet og er tilgjengelig for din institusjon sammen med øvrig prosjektdokumentasjon. Vurderingen med vilkår gjelder fortsatt.

[Meldeskjema](#) / [Gjerningsmannsprofilering i et kunnskapsbasert politi](#) / Vurdering

Vurdering

Dato	Type
23.05.2022	Standard

Referansenummer
849618

Prosjekttittel
Gjerningsmannsprofilering i et kunnskapsbasert politi

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon
Politihøgskolen

Prosjektansvarlig
Trond Myklebust

Student
Clas Fredric Andersen

Prosjektperiode
15.08.2019 - 30.10.2022

[Meldeskjema](#) 

Kommentar
Bekreftelse på status

Personverntjenester har vurdert endringen i prosjektslutt dato.

Vi har nå registrert 30.10.22 som ny slutt dato for behandling av personopplysninger.

Hvis det blir nødvendig å behandle personopplysninger enda lengre, så kan det være nødvendig å informere prosjektdeltakerne.

Vi vil følge opp ved ny planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet/pågår i tråd med den behandlingen som er dokumentert.

Kontaktperson: Anne Marie Try Laundal
Lykke til videre med prosjektet!

Appendix 4

Code book

SWOT levels:

- related to the informant's organisation and work

1. Strengths (helpful in trying to achieve an object) (Flakke, 2008).
 2. Weakness (harmful in trying to achieve an object) (Flakke, 2008).
 3. Opportunities (harmful in trying to achieve an object) (Flakke, 2008).
 4. Threats (harmful in trying to achieve an object) (Flakke, 2008).
- Here and now versus future (SW vs. OT) (Hoff et al., 2009).
 - Internal versus external (Internal SW vs. external OT) (Hoff et al., 2009).

IGLO levels:

1. Individual – (my translation) Individual is a person or another unit which cannot be divided without losing its uniqueness" (Bøhn, 2022).
2. Group – (my translation) Two or more persons having an interaction, meaning social contact with each other, sharing some goals, interests and norms, having a common identity to a certain degree (Rolfsen & Einarsen, 2017).
3. Leadership – (my translation) Leadership consists of an individual's ability and skills to influence, motivate and make others contribute to efficiency and success in which organisation one is a member of (Skogstad, 2017).
4. Organisation – (my translation) A social unit of humans whom having one or several goals where they, over time thru a conscious coordination of effort and activities, are trying to reach one or several common goals (Skogstad, 2017).

Rules of coding:

- "I" surpass "we" and are coded as 1 and not 2
- When a person speaks positively about him or herself it will be scored as 1 and 1, meaning Strengths on Individual level.

- When a leader speaks positively about him or herself this also will be scored as 1 and 1, Strengths on Individual level, therefore not a Strengths on Leadership.
- Leadership dictates to those within the organisation who requests for the profiling group`s support or the those who are in the lead of the ongoing investigation team. This is the person or group the profiling group relates to which most often is the Senior Investigative Officer (SIO) or someone in rank above within the organisation. Leadership, number 3, is also scored where the ongoing investigative group and the SIO is an issue such as the interaction between the profiling group and the requesting SIO or his or her ongoing investigation team.
- Organisational level dictates to any part of the organisation without those who (person or section) request for profiling support. For instance, when audit hearings are mentioned as a strength, this is coded as 1 and 4, Strength on Organisational level.

Unitizing:

- (p.100) Descriptive units are defined as the smallest units that contain all the information needed for analysis (Krippendorff, 2004b).
- (p. 52, Carney, 1971, cited in Neuendorf, 2002) Units can be words, characters, themes, time periods, interactions, or any other results of "breaking up a communication into bits" (Neuendorf, 2002).
- (p. 97) "Generally, units are wholes that analysts distinguish and treat as independent elements. For example, in the operation of counting, the objects that are counted must be distinct- conceptually or logically, if not physically- otherwise the numerical outcome would not make sense. The counting of meanings is problematic unless it is possible to distinguish among meanings and ensure that one does not depend on another, also called categorical distinctions" (Krippendorff, 2004a).
- (p.71) In the content analysis, a unit is an identifiable message or message-component (Neuendorf, 2002).

Citations:

- The symbol "Inf." following by a number 1-6 refers to the informant in the study.

- The number connected to "statement" is unitized number given to the informant statements
- For example, "Inf. 4, statement 1838-1841" is the anonymised participant number 4 and his or her statement number from the unitization of all statements in the study.

Appendix 5

Table of interrater reliability

- Omission (type 1) = word missing in the transcription
- Commission (type 2) = wrong word noted in the transcription
- Error of principal (type 3) = words transcribed in wrong order

Interrater reliability test was executed on 2 out of 6 interviews showing interrater consensus on 83% the first time and on 96% the last time. After clarification on "Groups" and "Organisations" the interrater reliability increased.