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‘Where’s the ‘intelligence’ in The National Intelligence Model?’

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Submitted by…….

Declaration:
I confirm that, except where indicated through the proper use of citations and references, this is my own original work. I confirm that, subject to final approval by the Board of Examiners of the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, a copy of this Dissertation may be placed upon the shelves of the library of the University of Portsmouth and may be circulated as required.

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Abstract

This dissertation will investigate the status of community intelligence within The National Intelligence Model (NIM) in order to explore the interrelationship between intelligence-led policing being adopted throughout the United Kingdom, together with the drive to improve the relationship between the police and the public. The aim of this work has been to research how *intelligence* is being defined within NIM, how *community intelligence* is both perceived and used by practitioners, and to draw conclusions from the tensions between these two competing constructs. The study included focused interviews with 23 practitioners working within analysis and intelligence throughout the UK police service. This was combined with open-ended interviews with academics and persons working to implement NIM, and the use of secondary data to ensure reliability and validity.

The results suggest that although there is a written statement within the NIM manual to focus on community issues within a NIM structure, this is not how it is working in practice. The study found that police officers and informants were the most trusted and the most used sources of intelligence, and that the use of community intelligence was marginal. A combination of police culture, lack of knowledge amongst police managers and officers, the absence of a general definition of 'intelligence', a lack of guidance around community intelligence and the secrecy surrounding intelligence, stand out as factors that may explain the minor use of community intelligence, the latter being essential if the intention is to prioritise issues like community safety and quality of life within NIM.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

The use of intelligence in both policing and other contexts has an international resonance whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, the United Kingdom or in Australia. This paper will explore some of the implications of its usage and its failings in the police in one country, the United Kingdom, but will keep in mind the international context of intelligence.

> '…to the police, intelligence often means nothing more than information by a covert source...' (Robertson, 1992 cited by Hebenton and Thomas, p. 170)

In making this comment, Robertson wanted to emphasise that to most police officers intelligence equals information from covert technical sources or covert human sources (from here on referred to as *informants*), or information from under-cover officers. This implies that information from other sources such as the public and partner organisations, are not commonly perceived as intelligence by police officers. Though written in 1992, Robertson's comment remains contemporary as research indicates that little has changed in 13 years. Intelligence is still by many police officers looked upon as information from criminals about criminal activity. However, the implementation of *The National Intelligence Model* (NIM) in the British police service in 2000 (NCIS, 2000; Grieve, 2004) has resulted in an increased focus on how intelligence is used and where it is sourced. John and Maguire (2004a, p.8) state that NIM 'provides…a cohesive intelligence framework across the full range of levels of criminality and disorder'. NCIS (2000) describes several tasks that should be especially focused on within NIM; and amongst these are community safety and quality of life issues.

In Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary's (HMIC) (1997) report *Winning the Race* it was found that those districts that had the most successful relationship with the communities were those which involved the public in their policy making process. Grieve (2004, p. 31) states that one of the tasks of intelligence is to support policy making. This is a view that coincides with that of the Butler Inquiry *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction* (2004, p.16) which focused on the way in which intelligence is used to inform government policy. However, this research found several reports highlighting that the NIM has difficulties with involving the community, both the public and partners. (Ratcliffe, 2003; Cope, 2004; John and Maguire, 2003; Sheptycki, 2004). For example, in *Diversity Matters* HMIC (2003) noted that not all forces in England and Wales are currently developing community intelligence in the same way as criminal intelligence. This is disturbing, especially in the light of current events in Britain, where community impact and tension indicators are important factors. Despite these apparent concerns, this author could not find any work that had tested the level of community intelligence being used within NIM.

Aims

There has been an initial evaluation of the implementation of NIM by the Home Office (John and Maguire 2003), but no work has been identified to test if the community is being used actively as a source of intelligence. This work is intended to establish the level of integration currently held by community intelligence into NIM.

Therefore, the aims of this research investigation are:

- To identify what intelligence practitioners understand by 'intelligence' within the context of NIM.
- To identify the level of understanding and importance put on community intelligence within NIM.
- To identify the level of community intelligence used as a main source in the creation of 'target profiles' and 'problem profiles' (see literature review).

To examine these aims the following hypothesis will be tested during the course of the research:

There is confusion about what constitutes intelligence and community intelligence within NIM, and therefore community intelligence is not prioritised as a source of intelligence within NIM.

Further, the research will examine if community intelligence is being *used* as an intelligence source and, if not, seek to understand why it is not being prioritised within current NIM working practices. Current literature on intelligence-led policing and NIM will be examined and research gaps identified. The methodology chosen for the study will then be presented, followed by a chapter summarizing the research findings. The findings will then be discussed in a separate chapter, followed by a conclusion.

To give the reader an understanding of all the different definitions and concepts surrounding intelligence-led policing, and especially NIM, the literature review begins with an examination of a range of contemporary literature around this topic. Within the same chapter there will be a discussion around notable issues concerning NIM, particularly those

that may influence the use of community intelligence, such as various interpretations of the term 'intelligence', uneducated customers and an insufficient use of analysts. This will confirm the lack of adequate research on NIM and community issues.

Following the literature review the research design and methodology will provide an insight into the different research designs that were possible for this kind of study. It explains why a case study was chosen, subsequently describing the research methods that were used to gather data around NIM and community intelligence, namely 'open-ended' questions, 'focused' questions (Yin, 2003), and secondary data. It also gives an account of the sample selected for these interviews together with ethical considerations.

The chapter on research findings gives an account for the results of the 'focused' interviews with practitioners and 'open-ended' interviews with experts in the field (Yin, 2003) together with secondary data that support the primary data. Following the research findings there will be a separate chapter discussing reasons for the priority accorded to community intelligence within NIM, and also set out possible consequences of this prioritisation. The final part will critically review the apparent blame culture within the British police service.

The conclusion will review the lack of guidance on how to handle community intelligence within a NIM structure. The dissonance between the presentation of NIM, what it actually does, and how it is used is noted. The key to understanding this may lie in how NIM was developed – from the preliminary intentions of NIM focussing on efficiency and heightening detections rates, and the retrofitted NIM aiming to *also* focus on community issues. These issues naturally demand community intelligence. The bombings in London

on the 7th of July have made the latter particularly relevant and this will be highlighted in the final part of the conclusion.

Chapter 2 - Literature review

This chapter will examine the terms 'intelligence', intelligence-led policing (ILP) and The National Intelligence Model (NIM), and highlight issues concerning that model. Initially it gives a brief summary of the history of intelligence and ILP, before looking into some definitions of intelligence. Subsequently, it provides a short description of the intelligence process. NIM will then be described, followed by a discussion on the different aspects of that model, with a special focus on analysts, management, and organisational difficulties. Finally, the review will be narrowed down to community issues and partnerships within NIM as a major effort for NIM to have optimum effect, concluding with the lack of research around the integration of community intelligence within NIM.

Intelligence-led policing and the term 'intelligence'

Intelligence has been a part of policing in the UK ever since Sir Charles Rowan, one of the two original commissioners of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), brought the art of gathering intelligence with him from the military (Grieve 2004, pp. 26-27; Metropolitan Police Service, 2005). Intelligence was for over a century looked upon as something that *added* to the investigative picture (Ratcliffe, 2004) or *supported* the operational capability of the organisation (Nicholl, 2004, p. 55). It was not until the mid-1990's that was developed and organised into a model called 'Intelligence-led Policing' (ILP). The background for the development of ILP was concerns around an increase in recorded crime rates and declining detection rates. Questions were raised about the efficiency of police investigative practices and random patrolling (Cope, Fielding and Innes, 2005, p. 41). In 1993, The Audit Commission published a significant report *Helping with*

Inquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively where they recommended that instead of the police focusing their resources on reactive policing, they should target high-risk groups. 'The core of the police work is the linking of evidence from the scene with information about likely offenders' (Audit Commission, 1993, ph. 73). The report argued that a small number of offenders were responsible for most of the crimes committed, making 'targeting the criminal not the crime' (Tilley, 2003b, p. 313) the most cost-effective way of policing. The report encouraged covert investigative techniques such as surveillance and the use of paid informants and undercover officers (Hobbs, 2001). Relatedly, four years after, another influential report *Policing with Intelligence* (HMIC, 1997) identified a number of key factors regarded as essential in implementing ILP, such as an integrated intelligence structure, key performance indicators, and *co-operation with partners*. Common for both reports is the focus on intelligence gathering and analysis.

Despite this growing focus on intelligence there remained various definitions of intelligence, even in more contemporary accounts. For example, Sheptycki (2004, p. 310) defines intelligence by citing Willmer (1970); 'the intelligence function essentially consists in the acquisition of knowledge and the processing of that knowledge into meaningful and digestible packages that lead to action'. Alternatively, Butler defines in his report intelligence as a 'technique for improving the basis of knowledge' (Butler, 2004, p. 14). Others define it as 'information designed for action' (Sims, 1993 cited by Grieve 2004, p. 25), whereas the Metropolitan Police Service states in their Intelligence Unit Manual that 'Intelligence is the product of information which has been taken from its raw state, processed, refined, and evaluated' (HMIC, 2002, p. 46).

The above shows that there remains a mixed interpretation of 'intelligence' and the terms data, information and knowledge, leading to some confusion. Bellinger, Castro and Mills

(2004) gives concrete definitions of the different terms. Data consists of symbols. Information is data given meaning. Knowledge is the collection of information to make it useful (*Ibid*). But Ratcliffe (2004, p. 5) stresses that intelligence can both be a process and a product. Intelligence products can be tactical products which assist operational commanders deploying resources, and strategic products, aiming to provide insight and understanding when creating strategies and policies. Following there will be a brief account of the intelligence process.

The intelligence process

The process is described by Butler (2004, p. 7) who sets out the traditional transformation from turning information into intelligence as a four-step process, namely collection, validation, analysis and assessment. He underlines the need for a high degree of excellence around each of these steps to assure credibility (Butler, 2004, pp. 9-11).

Intelligence can be *collected* from a range of sources, but there are discussions around what constitutes valid sources of intelligence (Dunninghan and Norris, 1999). Traditional sources can be fingerprints or information from witnesses or informants (Butler 2004; Grieve, 2004). Cope, Fielding and Innes (2005, p. 43) refer to the use of 'open' sources (for example newspapers and the public) and 'closed' sources (for example informants). Grieve (2004, p. 28) includes the community as an important intelligence source. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary's (HMIC) defines community intelligence as 'local information, direct or indirect, that when assessed provides intelligence on the quality of life experienced by individuals and groups, that informs both the strategic and operational perspectives of local communities' (HMIC, 1999, ph. 7.13.2).

Butler points to the risk of *relying on only one source of intelligence* and in doing so missing the real picture. The use of a confined set of data can hinder the police from identifying new criminal threats (Butler, 2004; Ratcliffe and Sheptycki, 2004, p. 205). To avoid this, it is vital to look outside the police force and to cooperate with non-police agencies to 'expand both the scope and range of intelligence' (Ratcliffe and Sheptycki, 2004, p. 205). Butler (2004, p.9) stresses the limitations around the use of intelligence and the importance of *validating* intelligence, stating that 'for human intelligence the validation process is vital'.

After the process of collecting and validating intelligence comes the function point of *analysis*. Analysis produces meaningful 'pictures' out of individual intelligence reports and facilitates the development of preventative strategies (Ekblom, 1988; Tilley, 2003; Butler, 2004). Crime analysis supports models like Intelligence-led Policing (ILP) by examining a large amount of information to identify problems. Cope refers to analysts as 'information translators' which role is to provide trustworthy intelligence (Cope, 2004, p. 188). Analysis and *assessment* may be conducted separately or in parallel. Assessment identifies options and alternatives that arise, and it is therefore important to examine every source carefully from closed, secret sources to open, published sources. As Butler states 'intelligence cannot be checked too often' (2004, p. 11).

Cope, Fielding and Innes (2005, p. 44) divides the intelligence products into four types:

1) *Criminal Intelligence* – data on known offenders
2) *Crime Intelligence* – data on specific crime or series of crime
3) *Community Intelligence* – based upon data from 'ordinary' members of the public about inter-community risk and threats
4) *Contextual Intelligence* – social, cultural and economic factors that may have an impact on crime and offending

According to Scott (personal communication, December, 2004) there can be many purposes of intelligence gathering in a policing context; to identify individual offenders; to identify networks of offenders; to apprehend individual offenders; to disrupt networks; to understand the methods of operation; to design prevention schemes; to predict future crime; and to enhance community safety. These are extensive tasks, and though the police are aware of the other layers of intelligence, the day to day policing rarely gets past the top two intelligence products – criminal, and crime intelligence. If the intelligence process is to deliver good intelligence products, i.e. the tasks accounted for above; there is a demand for an efficient organisational structure. This has been sought in the UK through the National Intelligence Model (NIM).

The National Intelligence Model

Inspired by the recommendations given in the Audit Commissions report *Helping with Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively* (1993), Kent Constabulary and Sir David Phillips, the then Chief Constable of Kent Constabulary, began to conduct intelligence-led policing (John and Maguire, 2003, p. 40). This change in policing strategy meant moving resources from the criminal investigation department (CID) over to intelligence units to coordinate

management and to obtain a more effective use of the intelligence gathered. This model spread to other police forces, but in the absence of any national guidance or policy, there was a vast variation in the interpretation and usage of intelligence (*Ibid*). Furthermore, the 1990's brought on a significant increase in the use of electronic data systems. At the end of the decade, a strong need to formalise intelligence-led policing came about from several concerned organisations such as ACPO and HMIC (Grieve, 2003; John and Maguire, 2003). NCIS answered to these concerns by launching the NIM in three pilot areas in 2000. By the end of 2004, NIM had been implemented in all the 43 police forces in the United Kingdom (Fox, 2004, p. 3).

Supporters of NIM claims it is a 'business model' that aims to professionalize the police practices and to secure a more effective gathering, sharing, and use of intelligence (NCIS, 2000; John and Maguire, 2003; Grieve, 2004; PSU, 2004). Though the aim is to share intelligence transverse different policing areas, the IT platform is still based on the use of the Police National Computer (PNC) and though it is a linked IT system, there is no nationally linked *intelligence* system (Bichard, 2004, p.6; Rogerson, 2004). The NIM model structures intelligence into 3 levels, where 'Level 1' involves local issues; 'Level 2' handles regional issues and 'Level 3' national and international matters (NCIS, 2000). NIM defines several tasks that should be especially prioritised and focused upon on 'Level 1', such as managing volume crime, *disorder and community issues, and cooperation with partners and outside agencies* (John and Maguire, 2003, p. 43; NCIS, 2000).

A vital part of NIM is the 'Tasking and Co-ordination Group' (TCG). The TCG's holds frequent tactical meetings (approximately every fortnight) to determine what intelligence to gather, to make tactical assessments, and to decide how to allocate the resources most effectively. The Tactical T&CG is on a local level usually chaired by the BCU commander,

and present is a group of senior managers who can deploy resources (Home Office, 2004a). 'Strategic' TCG's are held more seldom (approximately every six months). It is chaired by the Chief Superintendent/Commander and present is a group of senior managers *and* business managers who control the BCU resources (*Ibid*). These strategic meetings set priorities both locally and nationally (Tilley, 2003). Intelligence fuels the tasking and co-ordinating process of the NIM at each level and it is informed by four intelligence products (Tilley, 2003, pp. 321-324):

1) Strategic Assessments – long-term planning, strategies and policies
2) Tactical Assessments – short-term and operational planning
3) Target Profiles – profiles of offenders
4) Problem Profiles – profiles of series of offences or offenders

Tilley (2003, p. 323) states that 'what comprises intelligence to feed into these products is not discussed in detail but can evidently be wide ranging and is often obtained by covert means'.

Discussion

Intelligence as an important driver for decision making is a fairly new concept within policing, the consequence being that there are issues that need to be addressed (Ratcliffe, 2004b, pp. 2-3). Many researchers have identified these issues as the need for a *better understanding of the whole intelligence process, a better training of analysts, more co-operation in the field of crime analysis and more focus on community issues* (Ratcliffe, 2003; Tilley, 2003b; Cope, 2004; John and Maguire, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Sheptycki, 2004; Savona, 2004).

However, the guidance to implementing NIM, which was designed to formalise the use of the model, does not give a definition of 'intelligence'. Given the diversity of interpretations highlighted above within the UK, *this is the central irony of NIM that having set out to establish a common language of intelligence it fails to provide but a common definition.* As this paper will show, this presents NIM with a series of further problems.

The problems with this were emphasised in part by Bichard (2004) in his report on the child protection procedures of the Humberside Police. He states that though NIM was created as a management tool for the police to address the way intelligence is being used, there is 'a lack of clear, national guidance for the police about information management – the way in which information is recorded (and reviewed, retained or deleted)' (Bichard, 2004, ph. 3.66). Bichard quotes the Director of Intelligence at Humberside Police who stated in evidence that 'there is an alarming ignorance of what constitutes intelligence, how it should be recorded, then how it should be graded, stored, disseminated and weeded' (Bichard, 2004, p. 3). John and Maguire similarly discovered shortcomings in that some forces recorded all they knew about known offenders, whilst others were much more selective (1995, cited by Ratcliffe, 2002a, p. 56).

Another serious impediment for NIM and the sharing of information is the lack of a national IT-strategy and linkage (Rogerson, 2004). There is no common IT system for managing criminal intelligence (Bichard, 2004, ph. 3.61), and though originally intended, the implementation of a national IT-system was taken out of the national police IT strategy in 2000 because of lack of funds (Rogerson, 2004, p. 1). This deficiency has resulted in a variety of IT-systems and no contact between systems throughout the different forces in England and Wales (Bichard, 2004). John and Maguire (2003) found the same thing, and states in their report that one of the gravest problems within NIM is the lack of systematic

co-operation between forces to share intelligence and to develop joint operations against 'travelling offenders' (*Ibid*, p. 42). Sheptycki (2004, p. 309) stresses that there is too much focus on the formal model of intelligence-led policing and that the organisational flaws, especially around processing the information trough the IT-systems, are neglected in this discussion. The findings of Cope, Fielding, and Innes (2005, p. 43) support the view of Sheptycki, being that one of the organisational flaws within models like NIM is the potential for 'information overload'. Analysts use to much time on evaluating and processing the data rather than developing analytical products (*Ibid*).

Many regard the use of analysts as a necessity within an intelligence-led approach, but the use of analysts has also been exposed to critical examination. Cope (2003) studied the use of analysts within the UK police forces. In her report on crime analysis she found that the status, the quality, and the number of crime analysts varied a great deal between the different police forces (p. 340). This is because police forces in UK have implemented NIM in various manners mainly due to the absence of early clear national guidance (John and Maguire, 2003, p. 54). Cope (2004, p. 196) studied analysis within two specific police forces that both had developed processes to support intelligence-led policing, and she revealed several problems. She found that especially the forecasting of future issues was lacking from the analysis. Also, some of the analytical products suffered from an absence of theory incorporated into the products. As Pease and Townsley (2003, p. 35) argue, analysts need to give the police officers an 'understanding of the plethora of crime situations'. But most analysts only manage to *describe* data, and many have problems with drawing *conclusions* (Weisel, 2003, cited by Pease and Townsley, 2003, p. 35). Inference drawn from crime data provides guidance to the police about how to respond to a problem effectively. Cope found that analytical products were described as 'wallpaper' by not only the police officers but also the analysts (Cope, 2004, p. 194). This worryingly led to the

products being ignored when planning operations and instead used to summarise the outcomes at the end of an operation (*Ibid*).) This may be because a mere descriptive analysis does not contribute in the same way (Pease and Townsley, 2003, pp. 35-36), and charts and maps do not show the dynamics of crime and they actually tend to '"de-contextualize" incidents, lifting them out of their settings, stripping away local details and thus understanding' (Cope, Fielding and Innes, 2005, p. 52). The part about local details is of significance and will be returned to at the end of this chapter.

It is not only the material that the analyst produces which is of importance, but also the role of the analyst. Sheptycki (2004, p. 316) found a common misuse of their expertise, such as allocating tasks that were more of an investigative nature than analysis per se. Butler (2004, p. 10) stresses in his report that 'analysis can be conducted only by people expert in the subject matter', which may be why so many civilian analysts struggle within the police force (Cope, 2004). Ratcliffe (2004b, p. 9) focuses on the considerable weight that lies on the shoulders of the analyst. A capable analyst can give recommendations to the decision-makers on *crime reduction strategies and the quality of life issues in communities*. It is therefore a necessity that they have in-depth knowledge of a vast area within policing and that they conduct thorough research using a *range of sources* (*Ibid*). However, analysis is often constrained by police organisational culture, preconceptions and prejudice and can suppress the open-minded thinking that analysts can bring to intelligence processing (Cope, 2004; Manning, 2001).

Though analysis and intelligence are important parts of NIM, it is also very much about a more modern, organisational structure, focusing on a cost-effective way of conducting policing. Maguire (2003, p. 387) discusses the fundamental change from case-based approaches to criminal investigation to the emerging focus on risk management as an

organisational principle of all criminal justice agencies. He states that NIM is a move away from 'rounding up the usual suspects' (Gill, 2000) and that NIM allows for 'solutions to be sought outside the criminal justice system' (Maguire, 2003, p. 387). But Manning (2001) claims that the new information-based policing which centre on risk management and security is both too early and full of shortcomings. He states that there is 'a basic contradiction in the mandate';

> 'that policing can control crime, reduce the fear of crime, and yet be an entirely responsive, demand-driven, situational force dispensing just in time and just enough, order maintenance'.
>
> (Manning, 2001, p. 101)

Dupont adds to this picture by expressing a concern about 'the new paradigm of the information age' (1999, p. 1, ph. 1) and states that where private companies have used information technology to modernise their organisation in order to be cost-effective, the police have claimed that they could use them to reduce crime and to serve the community better, or in other words 'to affect complex socio-political phenomena' (*Ibid)*. He goes on stating that these claims have never been 'empirically and scientifically corroborated' (*Ibid*). Dupont follows with criticising how modern police evaluate their successes, something he calls 'the fallacy of quantification', where *outputs are more important than outcomes*. Byrne and Pease (2003, p. 306) agrees and states that;

> '…one of the major tragedies of policing is that somehow actions have become divorced from their underlying purpose, to remain justified only by minimum standards of performance bureaucratically expressed. Arresting and imprisoning an

> offender is a "good result" only so far as it precludes the commission of further crime by the same person' (*Ibid*).

Byrne and Pease underlines how important it is within the service of crime reduction to 'reassert the purpose over the process' and Byrne and Pease refer to the police manager's in this aspect as 'climate-setters' (*Ibid*).

Police managers are a vital part of the NIM process with its intelligence products feeding the tactical and strategic TCGs to inform chief officers and operational commanders in their decision making (PSU, 2004, p. 20). Ratcliffe (2004b, p. 3) states that a common problem within an intelligence-led approach is that many of those senior managers are former detectives with an expertise within investigation but not intelligence. This inexperience within the field of strategic intelligence is unfortunate since the managers are the 'clients' (*Ibid*, p. 7); the decision-makers. He sees a need to educate these 'clients':

> 'Senior managers can be given a strategic intelligence report, but the bottom line is that they often don't have a clue what to do with it….Few police managers are trained in the art of interpreting criminal intelligence and crime analysis, and fewer have the necessary training to convert that intelligence into practical and effective long-term crime reduction policies' (Ratcliffe, 2004b, p. 7).

Nicholl agrees with Ratcliffe, and claims that many intelligence reports do not answer what is asked (2004, p. 53). Nicholl argues that the main reason for this is poor management, but also that an important part of the intelligence process is not understood, namely the importance of identifying what the client wants.

This lack of knowledge is a concern, and Ratcliffe (2002a, p. 55) suggests that adopting the terminology intelligence-led policing may be simpler than implementing the model itself. He is critical towards the rapid implementations of NIM and stresses that a short term achievement may be a poor indicator for a long term success (Ratcliffe, 2002a, p. 61). John and Maguire (2003, p. 66) see a gap between the theoretical logic of the model and the process of turning that theory into the practical world of policing. Savage et al (2002a, p. 89 and 133 cited by Hale, Heaton and Uglow, 2004, p. 308) argues that Chief Constables are more willing to adopt models like NIM when the recommendations are given by government's agencies such as the Audit Commission. Hale, Heaton and Uglow (2004) find it to be ironic that these recommendations are founded on expectations rather than evidence. They go to suggest that it is possible to find isolated evidence of success in any policing model, but there is very little proof as to the effectiveness of reductions in volume crime rates within NIM (Hale, Heaton and Uglow, 2004, p. 308). Lancashire Constabulary spent £ 1 million in the implementation of NIM (James, 2003, p. 49 cited by Hale, Heaton and Uglow, 2004) but though John and Maguire have carried out an evaluation of the *implementation* process of NIM (2003), almost no *cost-benefit analyses* have been conducted (Hale, Heaton and Uglow, 2004). This is an area worthy of further research.

Dunninghan and Norris in their report from 1999 *The Snout, The Detective, and the Audit Commission: The Real Costs in Using Informants* are critical towards the claimed cost-effectiveness using informants expressed in the Audit Commissions report (1993). They claim that the Audit Commission has underestimated the cost of using informers by a 'conservative estimate of 13:1' (Dunninghan and Norris, 1999, p. 76). Furthermore, Dunninghan and Norris also discuss issues around recruitment and the informant's motivations for passing over information. Morgan and Newburn (1997, pp. 114-115 cited by Hale, Heaton and Uglow) agree and also point out that for every patrolling officer there

are a minimum of 100 offenders, making targeting offenders difficult and not cost-effective.

The above criticism towards NIM has inspired several researchers to compare and contrast intelligence-led policing and NIM with Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) (Mockford, Oakensen and Pascoe, 2002; Tilley, 2003; Kirby and McPherson, 2004). POP is a model which evolves around analysis and on the cooperation with partners/problem owners outside the police service. The fundamental idea is to make the problem owners address crime problems together with the police (Goldstein, 1990). Campbell (2004, p. 696) identifies the role of the police to be that of 'risk-knowledge-brokers':

> '…the police occupy a pivotal role in making risks visible, and advising and instructing their management' (*Ibid*).

Researchers suggest combining the two approaches and by that getting the better of two worlds, i.e. the use of intelligence combined with the involvement of the community (Mockford, Oakensen and Pascoe, 2002; Tilley, 2003; Kirby and McPherson, 2004). Hale, Heaton and Uglow (2004) are opposed to this idea and states that it is a problem that police forces combine different techniques into NIM. They exemplify with comparing geographic policing which demands for *decentralisation* of resources, and intelligence-led policing which claims for a *centralisation* of resources in order to create specialist teams to respond to different policing tasks. Police forces which try to take the best out of various policing models will loose the distinctive characteristics of each model, characteristics that can be vital for its success (*Ibid).*

While Tilley (2003b, p. 335) argues that 'most benefits would accrue from problem-oriented policing', he acknowledge that intelligence-led policing under the wings of NIM may be more easier implemented than either POP or Community Policing. He supports this assertion by the fact that NIM is endorsed by Home Office, HMIC and ACPO, and that NIM's assumptions, priorities and ways of working fits well with traditional policing (*Ibid*). Tilley claims that there are two directions NIM can take; a 'POP-focused' NIM (Tilley, 2003a, p. 4) with a broad focus on all kinds of police-relevant problems or an 'ILP-focused' (*Ibid*) NIM focusing on law enforcement, targeting offenders and the use of informants (*Ibid*).

Community intelligence

The NCIS claims that NIM is a model that focuses on all law enforcement needs and that it is not just about crime and criminals (NCIS, 2000). It specifically states that it delivers intelligence and analysis, 'based on the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998' (*Ibid*, p. 7). The Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, Chapter 1, Sections 5-6, requires local agencies to establish partnerships and through this form strategies to reduce crime and disorder. The partners are required to review 'levels and patterns of crime and disorder in the area (taking due account of the knowledge and experience of persons in the area)' (*Ibid*, 6.2.a), and then analyse the review. This analysis should be viewed by all involved parties.

NCIS also highlights that NIM can 'serve the community intelligence requirements of "Winning the Race"' (*Ibid*, p. 7). In the thematic inspection report *Winning the Race* (HMIC, 1997) the inspection showed that those districts that had the most *successful relationship with the community* were those which involved the public in their policy-making processes (HMIC 1997, p. 1). Two of several recommendations from the HMIC inspector were that:

> ‘Forces should publicly reaffirm their commitment to investing in good community and race relations as a core function of policing (reflected in the production of sound policies and strategies)’.

[and]

> ‘Forces should give higher priority to dealing with neighbourhood incidents and anti-social behaviour (i.e. quality of life issues)’. (HMIC, 1997, p. 6).

In the *ACPO National Intelligence Model Manual of Guidance 2004* community intelligence is defined as:

> ‘local information which when assessed provides intelligence on issues that affect neighbourhoods and informs both strategic and operational perspectives in the policing of local communities. Information may be direct or indirect and come from a diverse range of sources including the community and partner agencies’ (ACPO, 2004).

The *Business Plan* within NIM describes the model’s potential outcomes, and has here specifically emphasised *community safety and the quality of life issues* (NCIS, 2000, p.7). Other commentators agree that though most practitioners view NIM as a tool for the CID, the law enforcement and for conducting intelligence-led policing, it is in fact also designed for managing disorder, community issues and safety, and to facilitate cooperation with partners (John and Maguire, 2003; Tilley, 2003). The HMIC Thematic Report on Police Community and Race Relations states that ‘community intelligence is as important as criminal intelligence’ (HMIC, 1997, p. 2). In connection with fighting terrorism, Home

Secretary Charles Clarke highlighted the importance of community intelligence, stating that:

> '… in many of these issues intelligence is brought not through intercept, not through phone tapping, but by the existence of individuals within organisations we are talking about who are giving information about what is taking place'
> (Evidence to Parliamentary Committee, January 2005, cited by Gregory, 2005)

Despite this, criticism has been directed towards the lack of community involvement and cooperation with partners within the NIM process (Ratcliffe, 2003; Cope, 2004; John and Maguire, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004). Williamson (2005) discuss the problem with delivering community policing when there is a pressure to deliver results, and he especially highlights England with its new 'top down command and control' management system (*Ibid*, p. 1, ph 5). NCIS (2000) states in the NIM implementation manual that '"the need to know"' is widely recognised as the backbone of the intelligence doctrine….and is restricted to those who have authorised access'. Dunninghan and Norris (1999, p. 84) expresses concern in their report for the possible loss of control and accountability within an intelligence-led approach since most of the information is hidden away because of 'sensitivity' issues. It is best expressed by Michel Foucault (1970, cited by Elliot, 2001) who discuss a prison design by Jeremy Bentham, called the Panoptican, where the guards in a tower could see into every cell but the inmates could not see the guards. This meant that the prisoners never knew when they were being watched, and Foucault describes this as 'the ultimate power of authority' (*Ibid*).

Several reports have highlighted the concern around the secrecy profile often associated with intelligence-led policing *and the failure to integrate the community as a source of*

intelligence (HMIC, 1997; 1999; 2001; 2003). In *Diversity Matters* (2003) the HMIC comments that not all forces in England and Wales are currently developing and spreading community intelligence as they do with criminal intelligence. The report sees the need for including community information like 'local geographic profiles, community contacts and resources, community profiles and multi agency provided information' (*Ibid*).

An example of the gravity of not gathering intelligence from the community is mentioned in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, (McPherson, 1999), which examined the police in connection with the murder of Stephen Lawrence. It was discovered that pivotal information from the community regarding the suspects was not picked up by the police. The Stephen Lawrence report described a lack of understanding from the police around factors such as community impact assessment, institutional racism and family liaison failures as hindrance to intelligence flow; criticism which resembles those arising in both the Scarman report and the Bichard Inquiry (2004). The Bichard report (2004) revealed a lack of cooperation between partners, as did the Victoria Climbié Inquiry (Laming, 2003), which examined the abuse leading to the death of Victoria Climbié. The report unveiled serial negligence including a disturbing absence of co-operation between partners. Because of poor sharing of information between the social services, the police and the health agencies, there was a failure to analyse and assess risks and missed opportunities in identifying and solving them (*Ibid*). Bichard's inquiry found that a greater level of standard practice is urgently required and suggests creating a new national 'Code of Practice' covering the sharing of information between the police forces and with partner agencies (Bichard, 2004, p. 119).

To conclude, it is claimed that the NIM provides for a systematic focus on crime prevention, community safety and quality of life issues (NCIS, 2000). NCIS asserts how it ought to work but this literature review found no research that tests whether the community

is being included as a source of intelligence within the daily use of NIM. This is the research gap which this dissertation seeks to fill, and the next chapter will outline the research design and methodology adopted for this purpose.

Chapter 3 - Methodology:

As seen in the previous chapter, NCIS (2000) states that the National Intelligence Model (NIM) delivers intelligence and analysis based on the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 and that sources of information include community intelligence. But how is this actually working in practice? In order to test this and having identified the research gaps through the literature review, the following methodology was adopted: a research programme was designed which involved open-ended interviews with persons having in-depth knowledge within this particular field, and focused interviews with practitioners working within analysis and intelligence in the UK police service.

The design

Several options were considered when deciding what design would be most appropriate for this study, but since NIM is a current phenomenon, a case study was chosen as the method that would ensure the most reliable result. Yin (2003) recommends the case study as the preferred strategy when "how" or "why" questions are asked, when the researcher cannot control events and when it is a 'contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context' (Yin 2003, p. 1). All of the above fits into the questions being posed in this dissertation.

The case study is one out of many strategies within social science research, which includes surveys, experiments, archival analysis, and histories. Each method has advantages and disadvantages (Yin, 2003, p. 1).

Figure 1

Strategy	*Form of research question*	*Requires Control of Behavioural events?*	*Focuses on Contemporary events?*
Experiment	How, why?	Yes	Yes
Survey	Who, what, where, how many, how much?	No	Yes
Archival analysis	Who, what, where, how many, how much?	No	Yes/No
History	How, why?	No	No
Case Study	How, why?	No	Yes

Figure 1: Relevant strategies for different research strategies
(Source: COSMOS Corporation, cited by Yin, 2003, p. 5)

Figure 1 illustrates five research strategies; experiments, surveys, archival analyses, histories and case studies. When these are combined with three significant conditions; form of research question, control of behavioural event and contemporary event, the most suitable strategy will appear.

It can be argued that case studies offer insufficient basis for generalisation if compared to another design, the survey. Although the survey is the best method for giving a statistical generalisation, an appropriate case study *can* give a good analytical generalisation (Yin 2003, p. 37). A case study seeks to give an in-depth understanding of a subject compared to the survey which aims to be 'representative' (Hayden and Shawyer, 2004, p. 45). Herein lies the disadvantage of the case-study; it relies strongly on the interpretation of the researcher and the aims that underlies the selection of the case for a study *(Ibid*). A survey

was considered but was disregarded for several reasons. Initially the researcher planned to send out a questionnaire to a selective sample of police districts. The postal questionnaire has the advantage of being relatively easy to administer, as the respondents have the completed document and can finish it in their own time. However the author decided against this instrument after considering the response-rates which can be as low as 10 % (Swetnam, 2000, p. 54). Another reason for not choosing a survey was the lack of time to gather and examine the results before conducting follow-up interviews. Instead the researcher chose to design it as a case study with a number of open-ended and focused interviews to ensure a better response rate (Hayden and Shawyer, 2004, p. 107). Within case study research there are both single case designs and multiple case designs. Since NIM is **one** case but an organisational model implemented in **many** police forces in the UK, an 'Embedded, Single Case Design' was chosen (Yin, 2003, p. 42). This occurs when 'within a single case, attention is also given to a subunit or subunits' (*Ibid*).

To ensure both reliability and validity the case study involved the gathering of several sources of data – triangulation (Yin, 2003, p. 97; Hayden and Shawyer, 2004, p. 51-52). Thus the author decided to rely on four sources of data, namely interviews with intelligence experts, interviews with practitioners, the use of secondary documentation such as official research reports and observations. The reason for using more than one method is to produce a result that does not solely depend upon how one, single method is conducted or used (*Ibid*). Collecting case study data in this manner promote the advantageous possibility that the findings and conclusions will be more accurate as they are based on many different sources of information, using a 'corroboratory mode' (Yin, 2003, p. 98).

Some of the data described in this dissertation is derived from interviews with researchers within this field of expertise. These '*open-ended*' (Yin, 2003, p. 90) interviews were held

early in the research and the respondents were academics studying this particular field, and people working with the implementation of NIM. Case study interviews are normally open-ended interviews during where not only factual questions are asked but also respondent's opinions are explored (*Ibid*). The candidates may also suggest that the researcher talks to other people or indicate where to find more information, i.e. 'snowballing'.

> 'The more that a respondent assists in this manner, the more that the role may be considered one of an "informant" rather than a respondent. Key informants are often critical to the success of a case study'. (Yin 2003, p. 90)

The open-ended interviews were run in the form of a personal conversation with prepared questions to back up the researcher (see Appendix A). The reason for these early open-ended interviews was to give the researcher a broad background and an insight into this field of expertise, and to get more information and a confirmation from key players for the need for further research on this particular topic. These interviews also helped in deciding the focus of the work. To ensure that the questions for the interviews were methodologically sound and designed to elicit data required, a pilot was tested on a researcher who has published a book on this topic.

'*Focused interviews*' (Merton, Fiske and Kendall, 1990 cited by Yin, 2003, p. 9) were conducted with practitioners working within the field of intelligence at Basic Command Units (BCU) or at Head Quarters (HQ) in the British Police force. According to Merton, Fiske and Kendall (*Ibid)*) focused interviews can be open-ended in form of a conversation but are likely to follow a certain set of questions to corroborate certain facts that the researcher feels have been settled (Yin, 2003, p. 90). In practice the interviews were conducted with *open-ended* questions designed to find out how practitioners within NIM

defined ‘intelligence’ and ‘community intelligence’. The interview then moved onto more *focused* questions seeking more specific answers in terms of whether community intelligence was being used to inform the interviewees work and what sources of intelligence that was actually most used. The final question of the interview was designed to get an impression of how the interviewees themselves had reflected on NIM and what they would have done differently if they were to start all over again. As with the ‘open-ended ‘ interview, to ensure that the interviews were methodologically sound and designed to elicit data required, a pilot on the contents of the questions for the focused interviews was tested on an analyst working with NIM, and the questions were adjusted after her pre-delivery feedback (see Appendix C).

To ensure validity this case study used documentary sources to cross-check interview data (Yin, 2003, pp. 85-88). The secondary data used has foremost been data collected by John and Maguire (2003; 2004a; 2004b) who have undertaken an evaluation of the implementation of NIM. Other secondary data used was the research on the use of informants in the UK police service by Dunninghan and Norris (1999) and research done by Tilley (2003a; 2003b) comparing NIM with Problem-oriented Policing.

To obtain insight and to see NIM ‘in practice’, the researcher also participated passively as an *observer* at one Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG) meeting (ref. Literature review) and one ‘Intelligence briefing’. The latter is a meeting conducted at this particular BCU every morning with the Operational leader and the Intelligence Manager present to go through incidents that has happened during the previous twenty four hours. There are many forms of observations, but they can mainly be divided into two categories; participant observation and non-participant observation (Hayden and Shawyer, 2004, p. 115). The researcher was not participating, only observing, and the observation was used as a part of

'the triangulation strategy' to see whether what was observed corroborated with the findings from the interviews and the secondary data (*Ibid).*

As seen from the figure below of 'convergence of evidence' this researcher has used four out of six methods; open-ended interviews, focused interviews, documents, and observations to collect evidence and establish fact (see Figure 2);

Figure 2 (Single study)



Figure 2: Convergence of evidence
(Source: Yin, 2003, p. 100)

Figure 2 illustrates how the use of multiple sources of evidence ensures a proper triangulation of the data.

The sample for the focused interviews

The 'non-probability' (Hayden and Shawyer, 2004, p. 92) sample of areas to visit for the focused interviews resulted from a consideration of several factors such as; police forces where NIM was piloted, police forces the experts advised the researcher to look at (ref. the open-ended interviews), and forces which for practical/transport reasons were manageable to reach within a certain time frame. Another important factor was to cover both city and rural areas, together with both the South and the Northern part of England and the Northern Ireland, to get a representative sample (see also Appendix D).The interviews were conducted at **18** different BCU's and HQ's in **eight** different police forces. This covers approximately a fifth of the 43 police forces in the United Kingdom. The total number of practitioners interviewed was **23** (see also Appendix D).

In terms of the sample of candidates for these focused interviews there were only a few criteria beforehand. This researcher wanted to talk to several groups within the police force and these included intelligence managers/coordinators, civilian analysts and operational leaders working with intelligence. The author aimed for interviews with the above groups from all three levels of NIM, as outlined in the Literature review (see Chapter 2). The end-result was interviews with ten intelligence managers/coordinators, seven civilian analysts, and six operational leaders. In terms of levels, interviews were conducted with practitioners from all three levels of NIM, but the majority worked at 'Level 1'. .

Within the focused interviews the main question concentrated on the *source/origin* of the intelligence being used to produce target packages and target profiles (hereon referred to as intelligence packages) within NIM (see Appendix C). This naturally needed to be handled with sensitivity. For this reason the researcher did not ask about any details; only the derivation of the intelligence collected, such as for example informants, witnesses and

communities, was recorded (see Appendix C). Both the candidates, the dates of the interviews and the sites have been kept anonymous.

In terms of analysis methods of the data collected, *'coding'* (Hayden and Shawyer, 2004, p. 150) was chosen as a proper method for analysing the gathered data. Coding means organising the information and reducing it, and then labelling the set of data with word or phrases. The author analysed the results from the 'focused interviews' by categorising all the answers from each question, and from that material revealing patterns, and similarities and differences. These 'units of meaning' (Hayden and Shawyer, 2004, p. 150) were then compared with the findings from the interviews with experts and with the findings from the secondary data to ensure a valid conclusion.

Ethics

> 'It is worth standing back for a moment and considering what effect your actions might have on others as the result can be quite damaging to yourself'.
>
> (Hack, 1997, p. 1 cited by Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 2001, p. 157)

Ethical issues are particularly important to consider when one is conducting social research with qualitative methods of data collection. Research ethics can be handled professionally by informing the candidates fully about the nature of the research and getting informed consent from the participants (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 2001, p. 158). This was done in this research by giving a short introduction to the researcher's background and a briefing on the purpose of the research before the interviews began.

Due to the nature of this research, which involved police intelligence and thereby sensitive data and personnel, some key ethical principles around this research were followed

(Hayden and Shawyer, 2004, p. 65). Official access was sought through senior police officers. All participation was voluntary and the candidates were asked in advance to participate. Some of the interviews were arranged through the interviewee's leaders and it is therefore important to recognise that this may have influenced their willingness to volunteer. Due to the nature of the topic the candidates were not questioned about personal information and all the data obtained has been kept anonymous and confidential. For this reason alone, there is no categorisation of gender or age under the chapter 'Research Findings'. The sites selected are also anonymous. Finally, the interviews did not contain any questions that can reveal any sensitive intelligence material.

During the research, two observations where conducted. Though they both were in form of passive observation, the researcher is aware that having an observer present may have influenced the behaviour of those being observed.

This chapter has described the methods chosen to obtain information about NIM and community intelligence, mainly through focused and open-ended interviews. The next chapter will attend to the findings of these interviews.

Chapter 4 - Research Findings

This chapter sets out the findings of the research phase of the dissertation. The aim of the research has been to examine what constitutes intelligence within The National Intelligence Model (NIM). The researcher wanted particularly to focus on the level of community intelligence being used in comparison with other sources of intelligence, based on the hypothesis that community issues are downgraded within NIM .The findings presented here are primarily based on the 'focused' interviews with 23 practitioners, conducted between February 2005 and May 2005. Those findings are supported by 'open-ended' interviews with four persons with an in-depth knowledge of the topic at hand, conducted in November 2004. Finally, material from secondary data, i.e. previous studies within this area, were drawn on to secure a proper 'triangulation' as discussed in the chapter methodology. The issues raised by these findings will be considered in the Discussion chapter.

Intelligence in practice?

Having identified that there is no official definition of 'intelligence' within NIM, the researcher sought to explore the impact of this on operational practice, and interviewees were asked to give their personal definitions of intelligence as users of the NIM. The responses showed a variety of interpretations of the term intelligence and it was found that there was no clear consensus of what the term constitutes in practice. Some defined intelligence merely as *information*. For example, interviewee K states that it is 'intelligence from primarily any source'. Part of the sample saw intelligence as information that had gone through a *process*. For example, interviewee Q stated that it is 'information that has been given some added value after being collated and assessed'. Further, close to half of

the interviewee's defined intelligence as a *product*, something they could use to act upon with; as interviewee C sees it: 'It is anything we can use which allows us to take action'. Finally a range of other respondents, primarily intelligence managers, perceived intelligence as '*evidence*':

> *Interviewee V*: 'It is the classic question between intelligence and evidence. These days there is very little difference. Some would say action, some would say evidential. Intelligence is evidence'.
>
> *Interviewee G*: 'You as the investigation officer should be at the scene looking for nothing – it should all be there'.
>
> *Interviewee I*: 'Without exceptions what the customers want is evidence to arrest and charge. The detectives want the intelligence unit to do the investigation for them'.

Nick Tilley, an academic undertaking research on Problem-Oriented Policing and The National Intelligence Model, identified one problem as being the tendency of practitioners to use 'as synonyms terms that have different meanings, such as 'data', 'information' and 'intelligence" (see Appendix B). Steve Richardson, positioned within the ACPO NIM Team to provide manuals for practitioners working within the NIM, stated in another interview; 'the lack of a clear, national guidance on the term "intelligence" has lead to a different understanding of the concept throughout the country' (see Appendix B).

These various definitions of the term 'intelligence' suggest different perceptions about how to conduct the business. If intelligence is thought of as actionable or evidential products,

how would that steer the officers in terms of their choice of sources? And what are these products used for? The findings indicates that it is to a great extent the result of, or ending up with, surveillance and arrests, and that community intelligence is possibly given a lower priority. This is supported by Robertson (1992, cited by Hebenton and Thomas, p. 170) who states that intelligence mostly is used for tactical purposes like a specific investigation.

In order to explore this hypothesis further, the interviewees were asked to give their personal interpretation of 'community intelligence'. Although NIM *does* contain a definition of 'community intelligence', the interviewees were asked specifically for their own definition of the term. 49 % saw it as information *from* the community; intelligence obtained through engagement with the community. For example, one stated:

> 'It is intelligence we receive from a wide range of sources, not only agencies but special members of the community like imams in the Muslim communities'.
> (Interviewee O)

Whereas, a few interviewees saw community intelligence as information that has an *impact* on the community:

> 'It is actionable intelligence provided by individuals or bodies of individuals or members of a group who have interest in directing the police to encounter crime that is affecting their lives' (Interviewee M).

Further, a minority understood community intelligence as information *about* the community, for example Interviewee J stated that it is 'Intelligence which informs us of what actually is happening in the neighbourhood'. One interviewee even perceived

community intelligence to be 'open-source' material 'like things on the web, local newspapers, and such' (Interviewee D). Another suggested that intelligence was information from the police *to* the community, looking upon the police as 'risk-knowledge-brokers' (Campbell, 2004, p. 696). One last interpretation of the term community intelligence was the communities *understanding* of their own problems (Interviewee E).

These various interpretations of what community intelligence is, suggest different ways of perceiving and using this source of intelligence. What one police force sees as community intelligence may be different from another. Furthermore, there is a risk within the same police station that what one police officer understands as community intelligence is different from the views of other officers.

The interviewees were asked to state which source of intelligence they looked upon as most *important*. Two groups stood out: Informants (43 %) and police officers (43 %) (See Figure 3).

Figure 3



Figure 3: Reported 'important sources' of intelligence. (Data gathered from focused interviews with 23 practitioners as listed in Appendix D).

It can be seen in Figure 2 that informants and police officers are viewed as the most important source of intelligence followed by police data (30 %) closely followed by community intelligence (26 %). Crimes, witnesses, and victims were mentioned by only a few, but it is important to recognise that police data can contain all of the above.

Only 25 % of the interviewees saw community intelligence as an important source of intelligence, and a fundamental issue raised by the data gathered was that 11 out of 23

interviewees *did not feel that community intelligence informed the work that they did*. A majority of the civilian analysts answered this, but many of them pointed out that they would not know if they dealt with community intelligence because of the sanitisation process inherent within the intelligence process of the NIM:

> 'The difficulty is how we manage community intelligence. It is lost in the process. It needs to be stored in some way' (Interviewee J).

> 'Community intelligence would inform the final package but it would not be recognised in the final report' (Interviewee K).

> 'The intelligence from the community is sanitised; the analysts are not to know where the intelligence derives from. We should probably flag the community intelligence to give it an audit trail' (Interviewee V).

In an interview with Tim John, who has evaluated the implementation of NIM in three police forces (2003), the loss of community intelligence through the intelligence process was raised as a concern. John's view coincides with the above statements from the practitioners; there is a need for giving community intelligence an audit trail to make it more visible in the system (see Appendix B). Although some interviewees indicated that analysts see only sanitised (and processed) intelligence, the researcher is aware of police districts where analysts have full access to unsanitised intelligence.

The other half of the practitioners stated that community intelligence *did* inform the work they did, but a majority of the answers revealed a focus on *criminal activities*. Community

intelligence was seen as information that added to the picture, and very few declared that they were using community intelligence to improve the community itself. It mostly added to the qualitative side of the data or the qualitative side of the intelligence packages. For most it was not used as the main source of intelligence, it just '…gives you a complete picture' (Interviewee S) and 'the more intelligence you get access to the clearer the picture gets' (Interviewee D).

The interviewees were then asked to state the main source of their last five intelligence packages. In relation to this, they were interviewed about their personal understanding of intelligence packages to assure that the question was understood correctly. All the interviewees knew the term and were familiar with the new terms for intelligence packages within NIM, namely 'target' and 'problem' profiles. The term 'intelligence package' in the findings below includes both 'target profiles' and 'problem profiles'.

Figure 4



Figure 4: Reported 'main source' of intelligence in last five intelligence packages. (Data gathered from focused interviews with 23 practitioners as listed in Appendix D).

The data presented in Figure 4 demonstrate that in 44 % of the cases, police data/computers/information systems were the main source of intelligence in their last five intelligence packages. More than one third came from informants (38%). This means that out of the 88 packages that were produced at the time of the research (February to May 2005), 82 % of the intelligence was derived from informants and the police data, with only 15 % *registered* as community intelligence.

This supports the findings of the Cope, Fielding and Innes study which found that closed sources of information like informants and data bases were used more often than intelligence from open sources such as the public (2005, p. 43).

One can deduce from this that the intelligence being used in the majority of the packages is the 'user friendly' intelligence that leads directly to an intervention, for example an arrest or a warrant. Intelligence which does not have a ready-made course of action is being avoided, for example community intelligence about quality of life issues. One of the interviewees stated: 'We know what we want from our informants – it's more readily actioned upon [sic]' (Interviewee V). Over 25 % of the interviewees spontaneously added that the use of informants was all about drugs. With Interviewee P stating: 'We use informants, but it's all about drugs' and Interviewee I adding that 'they would talk forever about drugs dealings. Informants intelligence, dubious though it is, offers quick-hits for cops, particularly if it's drugs-related'. These opinions support the findings of John and Maguire (2004a; 2004b) which through two case studies aims to give some 'indications of effectiveness' as a result of the implementation of NIM (2004a, p. 4) One of the case studies describes a force which had a 46% increase in arrests for supplying drugs. In the other case study, which describes an anti-burglary project in one town, half of the targeted burglars had been arrested (*Ibid*).

The findings show an extensive trust in and use of informants as a source of intelligence and that community intelligence is not prioritised. This corroborates Dunninghan and Norris which found that:

> ….'as the reality of using informers raises profound ethical problems there is a danger that an increase in their use could further undermine police legitimacy… In this context we want to consider here the motivational aspects of informant based policing strategies which suggests that rather than increasing public confidence in the police and turning the 'vicious circle' into a 'virtuous one', they may actually have the opposite effect' (1999, p. 77)

As Steve Richardson (see Appendix B) observed ‘‘Drugees’ [sic] will tell you anything about anything. We must understand that they have agendas’.

This raises the question that if the use of informants can cause a decrease in public confidence as suggested by Dunninghan and Norris, why isn’t community intelligence used as a source more frequently. Is it because, as discussed earlier, that sources such as police data and informants are more readily actionable? The data from this research suggests that there may be other explanations as well. These will now be examined.

From the sample it was found that only one of the seven civilian analysts interviewed actively went out and sought community intelligence; the remainder did not, for several reasons. One analyst said they were not covered by the insurance, another that the police officers didn’t like it. Two said they were afraid to reveal sensitive information when interacting with the community:

> *Interviewee F*: ‘I would not actively look for information outside the police force because of security access and the fear of revealing concern you have about an area. But I certainly think it would be helpful if I could do that’.

The above statement indicates that some practitioners within NIM have problems communication with the public because of sensitivity issues.

Three of the interviewees expressed scepticism around certain aspects of community intelligence. As two of the interviewees noted: ‘It is important to look at the motives for community intelligence’ (Interviewee M) and ‘within community intelligence there is a risk of anecdotal information’ (Interviewee N). Supporting this view, Peter Manning states

that the 'channel by which the message is sent' is of importance to the police officer and that to the police 'a mediated communication is suspect...the more abstract and distant from the officer's experience, the less it is trusted' (2001, p. 99).

Some of the practitioners interviewed claimed that police officers were the reason for why they did not use community intelligence more. 30 % of the interviewees, both civilian analysts and police officers, pointed specifically to the fact that it was difficult to obtain such information from the police officers. One of the interviewees stated; 'the problem is to get the information from inside the person's head into the intelligence system' (Interviewee G). Two of the interviewees expressed the opinion that:

> 'Police officers go to community meetings and never come back with information. Probably want to deal with it themselves – it's theirs – they are missing the big picture. You have to report a crime, but intelligence; you can choose to report that'
> (Interviewee A)

> 'It all falls down if the PO's [Police Officer] don't feed intelligence into the system. It is difficult to change police culture. You can drag a horse down to the water but you cannot make it drink'.
> (Interviewee J)

This position is further supported by John and Maguire (2003). They found that a lot of the community intelligence remains inside the community police officer's head. Nina Cope found similar issues in her research *Intelligence led policing or Policing led intelligence*, namely that information was not being passed on by the officer and hardly ever recorded or written down (2004, p. 199).

This leads us to the questions why the utility of community intelligence is rated so low. In other words, do officers get any credit for it, or is it that many of the officers are not familiar with NIM, and lack recognition of how they can contribute to the product? John and Maguire found that "only 36% [were]…. familiar with the operation of NIM, and 45% of the operation of the TCG" (2003, p. 52). Four interviewees supported this view, one of them stating that:

> '….new police officers don't know anything about NIM. The intelligence managers are the only ones who understand it. The officers do not have time to learn it. All the officers need to know is the outcome'. (Interviewee I)

Cope also found cultural issues amongst the police officers. The police worked on 'constructed experiential knowledge', this being in principal to target the usual suspects (2004, p. 199). This is something Cope calls 'policing led intelligence' (*Ibid*). As expressed by Interviewee U:

> 'You should target offenders before they commit crimes. The purist will say; 'but you haven't got any intelligence'. I would say; it's his lifestyle to commit crime'.

This reveals a level of cultural preconception that supports the findings of Cope (2004).
It should be noted that not all the interviewees criticised the police officers for not using community intelligence more. 25 % of the practitioners (all but one of them police officers; chiefs of operations and intelligence managers) mentioned performance indicators as a reason for not making more use of community intelligence. Many of them stated the same thing, expressed by Interviewee P: 'I am not being measured by the fall in anti-social

behaviour…I don't have any targets on that'. Not all felt that the performance indicators in themselves were a bad thing: 'I do support performance indicators – the work gets done. The question is; do we have the right performance indicators?' (Interviewee U).

John and Maguire claim in their study that NIM is 'a business model designed to be applied more widely, for example to facilitate multi-agency crime prevention' (2003, p. 2003). However, in the interview with Tim John (see Appendix B) he stated:

> 'NIM should be creative. We found very little evidence that this was done. Everything is measured against performance indicators. Police managers are very concerned with performance indicators and will always prioritize actions that will have an affect on the charts'.

It is of some importance to add that the Home Office in the *National Policing Plan 2005-08* expresses awareness of this problem. One of the 'Statutory Performance Indicators' for 2005-06 is to use the British Crime Survey to measure public confidence and quality of life issues (Home Office, 2004b, pp. 32-33).

John Grieve, a former Deputy Assistant Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police, stated in an interview with this researcher that the problem with NIM and community intelligence was the lack of 'educated customers' and that 'we have to stop blaming the analysts'. Police managers are not educated enough within intelligence (see Appendix B). One of the 23 practitioners supported the view of Grieve and expressed that 'one of the problems with analysis is that the senior managers doesn't know what they want or what to ask for' (Interviewee O). Grieve added in the interview that it is vital to 'make intelligence non-

threatening to communities', and that community intelligence can be used for community impact assessments (see Appendix B).

All the interviewees were given an opportunity to give their personal opinion as to what they would have done differently if NIM were implemented all over again. Strikingly, the one issue that most agreed on was that they would have *named* it differently: 'I would have named it differently so it does what it says on the tin; 'The National Policing Model' (Interviewee H). Another view worth noticing when discussing what the NIM is seeking to achieve is that of Interviewee T: 'I would *NOT* have called it NIM – I wouldn't have had intelligence anywhere near it because it defines the outcome'. Tim John is of the same opinion:

> 'NIM isn't about Intelligence-led Policing. It is a business model. It is a misleading title' (see Appendix B).

Professor Nick Tilley has an opposite view in his article *Community Policing, Problem-oriented Policing and Intelligence-led Policing* where he states that NIM is a 'major vehicle for conducting intelligence-led policing' (Tilley, 2003, p.321). In the open-ended interview with this researcher, Tilley stated 'Community intelligence about what comprise priorities and means of dealing with problems is often neglected within the NIM, because it has focused almost exclusively on law enforcement and crime' (see Appendix B). Tilley compared two 'polar' police forces in their approach to crime detection and enforcement, 'One is strongly NIM compliant. It does not have a very good relationship with the community but has good IT-structures through which it identifies hot spots, linkages between offences, and offenders to target. The other is non-compliant with NIM,

but has close contacts with the community through which it identifies suspects, relationships between suspects and known trouble-makers' (*Ibid*).

To conclude, this research first established that there are many interpretations of both 'intelligence' and 'community intelligence' amongst the interviewees, indicating different ways in conducting the 'business' of policing. The findings also indicate that there are many different perceptions about the primary purpose of policing – crime control or community safety. Furthermore, the findings established that community intelligence is not a prioritised source of intelligence. The findings indicated many reasons why more use is not made of community intelligence. The findings also indicated that there is a difference in opinion as to what NIM is; an intelligence model or a business model, and many of the interviewees, both the practitioners and the academics suggested that they should have named the NIM differently. The following chapter 'Discussion' will explore these issues.

Limitations

It is important to emphasise that there are some limitations to this research. The findings from the interviews with 23 practitioners in this case study may not be representative of how NIM is working in all the police forces in the UK. This issue was taken into account in the formal selection of the sample (ref. of all regions of the UK) and the selection of officers within the practical constraints of the researcher (see Chapter 3).

Chapter 5 – Discussion

The research study found that community intelligence was only being registered as a main source in 15 % of the cases within the sample (Chapter 4, Figure 4). There are two possible reasons for this; one being that it is in fact ***not*** being used as a source of intelligence. The other reason may be that community intelligence ***is*** being used, but that it is lost in the system.

The findings indicate that community intelligence is *not* used as a source of intelligence. Specifically that:

1) Community intelligence was looked upon as an important source of intelligence by only 25 % of the interviewees.
2) Half of the interviewees did not feel that community intelligence informed the work that they did.

If the answer is simply that it is not being used, then it is necessary to explore what the reasons for this may be. This study suggests that there are many causes, some of them directly linked, others indirectly being factors that adds to the problem. One finding in this research is that many analysts criticise the police officers for not feeding community intelligence into the system. The research findings also suggest that community intelligence is not being prioritised by the operational leaders because of performance indicators and a lack of skill – i.e. they don't know what to ask for (Nicholl, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2004). Findings also suggest that the problem may lie within the work of the analysts, either the wrong use of the analyst or a lack of the proper skills. In the report by Cope (2004), police

officers and analysts described the analyst's work as 'wallpaper', used afterwards and not beforehand. Another reason that stands out as a result of this research is that there are cultural issues involved; the police do **not trust** the public (see Chapter 4). This is worth reflecting on, particularly in the light of the extensive use of informants and the obvious trust the police display in them. Grieve (see Chapter 4) states that it is the other way around; the public do not trust the police. The latter is according to Dunninghan and Norris (1999) exacerbated by the secrecy surrounding intelligence in general.

All the above findings indicate that there is a tendency to blame each other within this system - either blaming the community (they are risky with dubious motives) or blaming poor old police officers (they do not feed intelligence in) or blaming the analysts (they do not do their work properly) or blaming the managers (they are only interested in meeting their targets). The intelligence fuels the tasking, so as long as the public do not trust the police, the managers are steered by performance indicators and police officers by culture, community intelligence will always be a low priority. Consequently, even if there is a stated intention within NIM to prioritise community safety and quality of life, *when no community intelligence is coming in, how can there be action upon community issues*?

The study identified another possible reason for why so little community intelligence is being **registered**; it may in fact be used but it is ***lost in the system***. There is a risk that community intelligence is coming in, but that these sources are sanitised and therefore 'disappears'. The lack of visibility may be a reason why police officers do not prioritise feeding the system with it. The findings suggest that community intelligence should be flagged to make it 'visible' in the system and to give it an audit trail. This is vital to give police officers credit when they feed the system with community intelligence.

This research study also found different interpretations of intelligence, community intelligence, and even the model itself (see Chapter 4). The various definitions suggest different ways of conducting the 'business' of policing. Some argued that NIM's business is about 'law enforcement and crime' (Tilley, 2003), whilst others claimed it also was about serving the public, i.e. creating safer communities (John and Maguire, 2003). These dissensions indicate that NIM's 'business' is an area that is worthy of further research.

The research study revealed diminutive use of community intelligence. This may have consequences. The obvious consequence are a weakening of the 'softer areas' within policing like crime prevention and quality of life issues, which may lead to a possible deterioration in the relationship between the police and the public. Whilst these are important public policy issues, there may also be graver consequences, as seen recently in the Soham murders and the Stephen Lawrence case. Overall, there is also a danger that not collecting community intelligence can result in analysis and assessment being based on fragments of intelligence and thereby a loss of the context (Butler, 2004). Finally, unless the police attempt to collect intelligence on matters of local importance, for example 'violence in public places' and 'anti social behaviour', there is a risk that when there are matters of national or international importance, for example the bombings in London on the 7th of July, the police will fail to receive vital intelligence because they have no history with the community.

More than a decade ago, the Audit Commission (1993) claimed the use of informants is cost-effective, but no one has produced evidence of such *within NIM*. This is an area that is worthy of further research, especially in light of Dunninghan and Norris (1999, p. 76) findings that the cost of using informants were grossly underestimated. There is a real danger that the focus on informants at the cost of community intelligence can lead to

deterioration in the public confidence as discussed by Dunninghan and Norris (1999). If so it is timely to ask if the use of informants in fact is **costing too much**. There is a contradiction in terms that the police can police be risk-knowledge-brokers (see Chapter 2) when information is kept a secret. NIM is in many ways a panoptic device (see Chapter 2) - everyone is expected to feed the centre but the centre is designed on a 'need to know' basis (see Chapter 2), so that those on the outside, including most police officers, cannot look inside. It is very much about *collecting information but not informing*. Grieve (2004) states that is difficult with the present secrecy around intelligence and that is necessary to make intelligence less threatening to the communities to make them come to the police. The latter raises the questions: Is it possible to combine an intelligence-led approach built on a 'need to know' basis with a good relationship with the community built on openness and trust?

This question will be the focus of the final chapter, the Conclusion.

Chapter 6 - Conclusion

This study began with a review of literature around the National Intelligence Model (NIM) and intelligence-led policing to identify if research existed that examined the issue of community intelligence and NIM. NIM was initially designed on the framework of intelligence-led policing developed in the Kent Constabulary (John and Maguire, 2003, p. 66) - that the police should work more *efficiently* by making more use of informants to increase detection rates. This meant that the police increased work with closed sources, which naturally involved secrecy. Several reports have indicated that NIM has difficulties with involving the community, both the public and partner agencies (HMIC, 2003; John and Maguire, 2003; Bichard, 2004), but no research was found that tested if intelligence from the community was being used within NIM. The research therefore wanted to examine police services and their use of intelligence within NIM, to establish the level of integration of community intelligence, and to get an understanding of how such intelligence is being viewed by those who use it – the practitioners.

A key finding in this dissertation is that **although** the NIM in *theory* is **intended** to involve the community, this is not how it works in *practice*. Though NIM is a business model designed to handle 'community issues' within its 'business', placing 'community safety' among desired outcomes, the findings indicate that community intelligence is placed at the bottom of the list, and that the NIM is very much about intelligence-led policing in its purest form, meaning 'rounding up the usual suspects'. This dictates that analysis is predominantly used to find out who was involved with whom, where and with what crime plans and to use performance indicators to display successes in detection, arrest and prosecution of serious and prolific offenders (Tilley, 2003a, p. 4). NIM currently appears to be traditional policing wrapped up in modern, organisational phrases. The study suggests

that there is a resistance within the NIM structure to the use of community intelligence as a source. The main finding in this research is the apparent lack of focus and use of community intelligence within NIM, and that the system seems to *value* other forms of intelligence, like informants and police data.

This research study also suggests that the various interpretations of intelligence that were found amongst both 'experts', academics and practitioners, may be a reason for community intelligence is not recognised as a source. The guidance for implementing the NIM does not give a specific definition of 'intelligence' and this is the central irony of NIM having set out to establish a common language for intelligence – but without a common definition.

Though there is a specific definition of 'community intelligence' in NIM (see Chapter 2), there is an obvious lack of guidance on how to integrate and work with that intelligence within that model. The various interpretations of what community intelligence is, also indicates different ways of using this source of intelligence. A result of this may be that some police forces are using community intelligence, but because they do not define it as such, it is not registered as community intelligence.

NIM is about command and control of policing with its control strategy and Tasking and Coordination Groups (TCGs). It was found in Chapter 4 that it does not put a high faith on trust in the organisation or in the public with its sanitisation process compared to policing models like Community Policing and Problem Oriented policing which emphasise collaborative work involving openness and trust. Manning (2001, p.101) thinks that models such as NIM is premature because they try to embrace *too much* and that the different tasks are not combinable – it is not possible to both have a focus on target and at the same time have a widespread contact with the community.

The above highlights an area for further research into the use of NIM. How does the community itself see the police after the implementation of NIM, and has the relationship between the public and the police improved or deteriorated? Another area worthy of further research is how Crime and Reduction Partners (CDRP) are included in the NIM process. A third important area for further research is the cost-effectiveness of NIM. A fourth area of research is to follow up the work of John and Maguire; is NIM's business interpreted the same throughout the UK, and if not, why not?

During the course of this dissertation events in the United Kingdom have brought the issues discussed here into sharp focus. It is arguable that a National Intelligence Model formed to look at crime and criminal intelligence would not have predicted the bombings of 7th of July and the events of 21st of July. The emerging debate in the police service has been about community intelligence. What for some is a 'nice to do' action, has gained an important and urgent impetus as the United Kingdom comes to term with bombers and 'martyrs'. For the police service to engage with those sections of the British community, i.e. the British Muslim community, about future risk and threats means that the police service will have to rethink its approaches and recognise the limitations of NIM.

There ***is*** intelligence in The National Intelligence Model, but what purpose does that intelligence serve? The answer to this is *the hidden agenda,* hence the dissonance between what it presents; enhancing community safety and quality of life issues, and what it really does; rounding up the usual suspects and heightening the detection rate. There is an emphasis on efficiency when it in fact it should think about effectiveness. For NIM to have an optimum effect, it is vital to include community intelligence as major source of intelligence within NIM. As Williamson claims, the future of policing will be all about trust and networks (2005):

> 'Running in parallel with the recognition of the importance of social networks there are exciting new developments in information technology. This will make an enormous amount of information available to people at all levels and when this starts to happen community policing will have moved from being intelligence led to knowledge based' (Willamson, 2005, p. 1, ph. 15).

The question the author asked at the beginning of this process, 'Where's the 'intelligence' in The National Intelligence Model?' takes on a specific poignancy after the 7th of July. In this case, there was no intelligence. The challenge for the police service is how to respond to this absence, and how to fill NIM with the type and quality of intelligence that will anticipate these future risks. This will require the police service to move away from the command and control processes of NIM to a more complex and negotiated position. The police service and NIM must change, but it will not be able to make these changes until it recognises how it currently is failing to deliver. This paper aims to make a contribution to those changes.

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Appendix A: Open-ended interviews with experts

1) How do you define intelligence?

   Supplementary if needed - how does this definition work in the context of the National Intelligence Model? Does this definition present any problems?

2) What are the common sources for intelligence in NIM?

3) Within the NIM frameworks - how do officers and analysts collect intelligence from the community and partners?

   Supplementary if needed may need to be more prescriptive about partners.

4) What do you see as the relationship between the National Intelligence Model and crime prevention/reduction?

   Supplementary: What are the problems with this relationship?

5) What is the relationship between the National Intelligence Model and problem solving or problem oriented policing?

6) What do you see is the relationship between IT systems and the National Intelligence Model?

7) Other countries are considering implementing a National Intelligence Model, if you were starting from fresh again what would you do differently?

Appendix B: Open-ended interviews – the sample

Interview conducted on the 15th of November 2004.

- **Professor Nick Tilley**

Professor of Sociology at Nottingham Trent University, Visiting Professor at the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science at University College, and Senior Advisor to the Home Office Director of the East Midlands. He spent over ten years as a consultant to the Home Office Research, Development, and Statistics Directorate working in the fields of crime prevention and detection, returning to Nottingham Trent University in April 2003**.** Nick Tilley has edited several books, and written numerous articles on crime prevention, community safety, problem solving, and Problem-Oriented Policing. He is currently undertaking research on Problem-Oriented Policing and The National Intelligence Model.

Interview conducted on the 16th of November 2004

- **Superintendent Steve Richardson**

National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS)

Steve Richardson is Project Manager for CENTREX NIM implementation team.

Interview conducted on the 16th of November 2004

- **Professor John Grieve**

  Honorary Professor at Buckingham Chiltern University College and Chair of the John Grieve Centre for Policing and Community Safety, and Senior Research Fellow at Portsmouth University. He is an Honorary Fellow at Roehampton Institute, Surrey University, and an Honorary Doctor at London Metropolitan University. John Grieve has also been appointed independent Chair at the Greater London Authority's Alcohol and Drugs Alliance. In August 2003 he was appointed as a member of the International Independent Commission for the peace process in Northern Ireland. John Grieve has previously been a National Coordinator for Operational Counter Terrorism, UK. Before that he was the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police.

Interview conducted on the17th of November

- **Tim John**

  LLB (Hons), Staffordshire University, MSc (Econ) in Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Wales, College of Cardiff**.** Tim John has published several books within the areas of intelligence led policing; policing styles; crime reduction; criminal law and the criminal justice process. He is Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice at Glamorgan University**.**

Appendix C: Focused interviews with practitioners

1. What is your understanding of the term intelligence?

2. What do you feel are the important sources of intelligence?

3. What is your understanding of the term community intelligence?

4. What do you feel are the important sources of community intelligence?

5. How does community intelligence inform the work that you do?

6. What do you understand by the word intelligence package?

7. Thinking back over the last 5 intelligence packages could you state what the main source of intelligence was?

8. Thinking back over the last 5 intelligence packages could you say how community intelligence was applied to these packages?

9. Can you think of occasions when community intelligence has been used to inform an intelligence package?

Appendix D: Focused interviews – the sample

The interviews were conducted over two periods of respectively ten days and a week between February and May 2005. The interviews took part at **18** different BCU's and HQ's in **eight** different police forces. This covers approximately a fifth of the 43 police forces in the United Kingdom. The total number of practitioners interviewed was **23**. Both city and rural areas, together with both the South and the Northern part of England and the Northern Ireland, was visited to get a representative sample.

The chart on the next page displays the role of the interviewees. The forces were the interviewees work is not listed, neither are the names. The two latter steps were done to keep the interviewees identity anonymous (due to sensitivity issues).

Interviewee	Role
A	Intelligence manager/coordinator
B	Analyst
C	Intelligence manager/coordinator
D	Intelligence manager/coordinator
E	Intelligence manager/coordinator
F	Analyst
G	Intelligence manager/coordinator
H	Operational leader
I	Intelligence manager/coordinator
J	Intelligence manager/coordinator
K	Analyst
L	Analyst

Interviewee	Role
M	Operational leader
N	Analyst
O	Intelligence manager/coordinator
P	Operational leader
Q	Operational leader
R	Analyst
S	Analyst
T	Intelligence manager/coordinator
U	Operational leader
V	Intelligence manager/coordinator
X	Operational leader