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Corruption and trust in the police: A cross-country study

Gunnar Thomassen

International surveys show that trust in the police varies substantially between countries. This study investigates the underlying causes of this variation, and in particular the effect of perceived corruption in the public sector. A regression analysis of 50 countries worldwide suggests that both perceived corruption in the public sector and trust in government are important predictors of trust in the police. The homicide rate is also statistically significant but seems to have a more modest effect on trust. The findings are compatible with previous research findings that procedural concerns trump outcomes in explaining trust. Moreover, a correlation analysis suggests that perceived corruption in the public sector is more damaging to trust in the police than to trust in other government institutions. A plausible explanation for this is that many consider the police to be an indispensable institution for social order, and corruption is antithetical to this mission.

Introduction

Trust, whether interpersonal or in public institutions such as the police, is a field of research that has grown considerably during the past 10–15 years. A major driver has been the steady accumulation of evidence that trust has many virtues and tangible benefits for a society (Ostrom, 1998; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002). Experimental research, for example, has shown that trust and reciprocity are fundamental for co-operation and collective action (Kohn, 2008; Ostrom, 1998). As for trust in the police, evidence exists that trust not only makes the public more co-operative with the police but also increases compliance with the law (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill & Quinton, 2010; Levi, Tyler & Sacks, 2008; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Thus, identifying the underlying causes of trust in the police has direct and practical relevance to the police as well as to wider society.

This study focuses on cross-national variation in trust in the police. International surveys show substantial cross-national variation in trust (see, for example, the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey), and this study attempts to identify some of the underlying causes of this variation. The study focuses in particular on the link between perception of corruption and trust in the police. While there is probably a complex web of factors accounting for variation in trust, the assumption in this study is that corruption is a particularly important factor. This seems likely both from a theoretical viewpoint and from previous research on trust in the police and other government institutions. A core finding in the research literature is that procedural fairness, impartiality and honesty in government are very important for the creation and maintenance of trust (Hough et al., 2010; Kääriäinen, 2007; Rothstein, 2005; Tyler, 2001). Corruption is, as Teorell (2009, p. 5) points out, "*a way of systematically breaching the impartiality principle*". One should therefore expect corruption to have a strong negative effect on trust in the police. However, there are other factors or features of society that may influence it directly or indirectly, such as rates of crime and public safety, socio-political and economic conditions, and regime characteristics. These factors must also be considered when measuring the effect of corruption on trust in the police. Thus the main research question in this study is: what is the relative effect of perceived corruption in the public sector on trust in the police when controlling for other relevant factors? Another assumption in this study is that the perception of corruption is more consequential for the police than for any other government institution. The main

role of the police is to enforce the law and to provide social order, and it can safely be argued that corruption is antithetical to this mission. Thus, the second research question is whether the perception of corruption in the public sector is more strongly associated with trust in the police than with trust in other government institutions.

A cross-national study of corruption and trust in the police has several advantages aside from the substantial variation in both corruption and trust internationally, and the relative scarcity of such studies. A study that includes countries from various parts of the world permits broad generalization across different cultures about the effect of perceived corruption. It also provides an opportunity to control for potentially important factors, such as type of regime, which is not possible in single country studies. Thus, for the purpose of measuring the relative impact of corruption on trust in the police, data from 50 countries worldwide have been gathered and merged to form one dataset. The data have been extracted from several sources, such as the World Values Survey (WVS), Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, The World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations development data, and the World Bank.

Previous research

Most of the literature on trust or confidence in the police concerns variation at the individual level and within an Anglo-American context. Central themes in the literature include the impact of demographic characteristics (race), contact and experience with the police, and neighbourhood conditions (Bradford & Jackson, 2009). Of particular interest are findings related to contact and experience with the police. These findings suggest that perceptions of procedural fairness, politeness and attention on the part of the police are more important than actual outcome when people evaluate their experiences (Hough et al., 2010; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Tyler, 2001, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Trust, according to Tyler (2001, p. 11), is motive based and grounded in the belief that the police act in "good faith" and try to do "what is right" no matter what the outcome. Fairness and impartiality signal good faith by the police and consequently generate trust.

In many ways, corruption constitutes the ultimate breach of the impartiality principle (Pierre & Rothstein, 2010; Teorell, 2009), and not surprisingly, it has been found to have a strong negative influence on attitudes towards government institutions in general (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003) and the police in particular (Morris, 2011; Tankebe, 2010). Kääriäinen (2007) found in a multilevel analysis of 16 European countries that corruption, as measured by Transparency International, explained most of the variation in trust in the police. Similarly, Morris (2011) found in a multilevel study of 53 countries that corruption had a substantial negative effect on trust in the police after controlling for factors such as ethnic fractionalization, democratization, general life satisfaction and political trust. Tankebe's (2010) study in Ghana suggests that the hypothesized relationship between corruption and trust is valid in a non-Western context too. Controlling for demographics, education and political affiliation, he found that both vicarious experience and evaluation of corruption reforms have a significant effect on confidence. Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be no statistically significant link between personal experience of corruption and confidence in the police. However, he points out that this may be the result of defining corruption narrowly to include only citizen-initiated corruption and not police-initiated corruption, which is more likely to be non-voluntary. Thus the findings "*suggest a differentiation between various types of corruption experience*" when investigating the link with confidence or trust (Tankebe, 2010, p. 313; see also Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011).

Perceptions of crime and police effectiveness are also likely to influence trust in the police. For example, several studies have found a negative association between fear of crime and trust, which may suggest that people hold the police accountable for the prevalence of crime (Jackson, Bradford, Stanko & Hohl, 2012). Skogan (2009), on the other hand, has found evidence of the converse relationship where trust or confidence in the police seems to provide reassurance and thus reduces fear of crime. However, many studies have found that people living in neighbourhoods plagued by poverty, crime and disorder are far less likely to trust the police than those in more affluent neighbourhoods (Bradford, Jackson & Stanko, 2009; Sampson & Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998; Skogan, 2006). In fact, many studies have found that the racial differences in trust that are so prevalent in the U.S. disappear altogether when neighbourhood conditions are controlled for (Sampson & Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). A multilevel study by Jang, Joo & Zhao (2010) provides further evidence of a negative relationship between crime and trust in the police. Controlling for both individual level factors and country-level factors, the authors concluded that people living in countries with higher homicide rates have significantly less confidence in the police.

Variations in trust may also reflect deep structural features of society other than corruption and crime, and so are generally beyond the reach of the police. As Reiner (2010, p. 58) puts it in his analysis of the rise and fall of police legitimacy in the U.K., a concept closely related to trust, "*the all-important factor which facilitated the legitimation of the police was not an aspect of police policy, but the changing social, economic and political context*". A central feature of the post-war (Western) world was the rise of the welfare state with the inclusion and increased prosperity of the working classes. However, since the 1970s, there has been a marked increase in economic inequality throughout Western countries, accompanied by a return of long-term mass unemployment in many countries. How this has affected trust in the police around the world remains largely unexplored, but economic inequality has been found to be a very important predictor of trust in other people (Rothstein & Uslaner 2006; Uslaner, 2002) as well as many other societal phenomena (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). One could very well imagine the police becoming the target of discontent if the prevailing social, economic and political order is widely perceived as unfair. After all, they are the ultimate protectors, willing or not, of the societal order.

Ethnic fragmentation is another factor found to affect trust in the police (Morris, 2011). It is a widespread perception in many countries that minority groups are unjustly targeted by the police and that they are deprived of equal access to police services (Durose, Smith & Langan, 2005; Kochel, Wilson & Mastrofski, 2011; Löwe, 2008). It is therefore no surprise that minority groups tend to have significantly lower levels of trust in the police than the majority of the population in many countries (Bradford & Jackson, 2009; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Röder & Mühlau, 2012).

Empirical studies suggest that trust in the police is positively influenced by trust in government institutions in general and overall satisfaction with the way in which democracy functions (Christensen & Laegreid, 2002, 2003; Jang et al., 2010; Morris, 2011). There is also evidence of a strong statistical relationship between interpersonal trust (trust in other people) and institutional trust. However, the causal nature of this relationship remains unclear. While some argue that trust comes from below through socializing (Putnam, 2000), others argue that trust mainly derives from the top, through impartial institutions that facilitate trust between individuals (Rothstein, 2005). The relationship may also be reciprocal or even spurious.

There are several factors that may account for differences in trust in the police at the national level. Below, I investigate the link between corruption and trust in the

police while at the same time controlling for the effect of contextual variables such as homicide rates, ethnic fragmentation, economic development, economic inequality, civil liberties, interpersonal trust and trust in government.

Data and method

A total of 50 countries worldwide, both developed and developing, constitute the units of analysis in this study. The data for each country have been extracted from several sources including the World Values Survey (WVS), Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003), and United Nations development data. A potential weakness is that the data were collected at different points in time. The oldest dataset (ethnic fractionalization) is from 2003 and the newest dataset is from 2009 (human development index). Ideally, all the data should have been collected in the same year. However, the societal features that are measured and included in the study appear to change slowly and to be very stable over time.

The data have been merged into a single dataset and analysed using both bivariate correlations and OLS regression analysis (using SPSS). The regression analysis is useful in measuring the effect of perceived corruption on trust in the police while at the same time controlling for other relevant factors.

The dependent variable

Data on trust in the police have been extracted from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey collected in the 2005–2008 period. As in previous surveys, the respondents were asked about their confidence in the police and offered four alternative responses: a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, and no confidence at all. For each of the 50 countries included in the study, I have calculated the relative proportion (%) of the population that has either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police; thus, the variable theoretically ranges from 0 to 100. Although it could be argued that only "a great deal of confidence" should be included, the assumption is made here that both "a great deal" and "quite a lot" indicate an overall attitude of trust in the police. The concepts of trust and confidence are also used interchangeably in this analysis, although it could be argued that trust and confidence are somewhat different concepts. However, this seems to be the case, primarily in the context of interpersonal trust, which may be said to have an altruistic or moral component (Mansbridge, 1999, Uslaner, 2002). It is reasonable to assume that trust in institutions, although not value free, is based more on rational predictions and thus is closer to the concept of confidence. In addition, I find that the confidence scores of the 17 European countries included in the study correlate very strongly with their trust score in the European Social Survey (Pearson's r = .842).

Independent variables

Corruption

Measuring corruption is quite "tricky" (Uslaner, 2005). So far, the best measure developed for cross-national studies is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International. The working definition of corruption used by Transparency International is the *abuse of public power for private benefit* (Transparency International, 2009; see also Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). The CPI measures perception

of public sector corruption in 180 countries, using a composite index of 13 expert and business surveys from 10 independent institutions. The Corruption Perception Index ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). For the purpose of making the interpretation of the variable more intuitive, I have reversed the scale so that 0 = least corrupt while 10 = most corrupt.

Intentional homicide

As a measure of violent crime in each country, I use intentional homicides per 100,000 people as estimated by the World Health Organization. Intentional homicide as defined here means all death caused by another person with intent to injure or kill by any means (WHO, 2004). It excludes deaths due to legal intervention or operations of war. The reason that I do not use a broader measure of violent crime is that reliable statistics are very hard to come by, even in countries such as Norway and Sweden. The only exception to this rule is homicide statistics, which are fairly reliable, at least in the most economically advanced nations. However, for countries in the third world, even homicide statistics should be treated with caution, especially in those experiencing internal conflict. Nevertheless, I consider that the data provide at least an approximate estimate of differences in numbers of homicides across countries.

Socio-economic development

As a measure of socio-economic development, I use the UN Human Development Index (UNDP, 2010). The HDI measures three basic dimensions of human development: life expectancy, educational attainment and income. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are aggregated into a composite index with a geometric mean. The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum level for each dimension, called goal posts, and shows where each country stands in relation to them expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A low score indicates a low level of development, and a high score indicates a high level of development.

Economic inequality

As a measure of economic inequality, I use the GINI index developed by the World Bank for distribution of family income. The GINI index is widely used as a measure of inequality and is considered very robust. It has many desirable properties, such as mean independence, population size independence and symmetry (Haugthon & Khander, 2009). The index used here ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality).

Ethnic fractionalization

Data measuring ethnic fractionalization have been taken from Alesina et al. (2003). The variable takes into account both racial and linguistic characteristics of the population, and indicates the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups. Thus, theoretically the variable ranges between 0 (no fractionalization) and 1 (complete fractionalization).

Civil liberties

As a measure of the level of political freedom or liberty in each state, I use the Civil Liberties score developed by Freedom House. The Civil Liberty score takes into account freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference by the state. The liberty score ranges from 1 to 7, which indicate the lowest and highest levels of freedom, respectively. To make this intuitively understandable, I have reversed the scale so that a

high score indicates a high degree of freedom. The civil liberty scores used in this study were collected the same year as the trust data.

Interpersonal trust

Interpersonal trust is also taken from the World Values Survey. It uses the following question to measure interpersonal trust: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Respondents are offered two possible responses: "Most people can be trusted" and "Can't be too careful". For this analysis, I have registered the percentage of people in each country who respond that most people can be trusted.

Trust in government

To ascertain whether trust in the police might stem from a more general and diffuse trust in public institutions, I have aggregated WVS data on confidence in the government. As with the above question regarding police, there are four possible responses: a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, and no confidence at all. I have calculated the relative proportion (%) of the population that has either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in government; thus, the variable theoretically ranges from 0 to 100.

Variations in trust in the police

A natural starting point for the analysis is to examine the distribution of the dependent variable trust in the police. There is a great deal of variation across the 50 countries in the sample, as can be seen from Table 1. The proportion of the population reporting a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police ranges from 92% to only 16% (see also Appendix, Table I).

Table 1 about here

The statistics in Table 1 suggest that the distribution is approximately normal (this is confirmed by visual inspection of a histogram). The average proportion of the population with confidence in the police is 55.9 %, while the median is 56.5% with a standard deviation of 19.3%. The distribution is only slightly skewed towards the lower end (–.159). The great variation and approximately normal distribution of the dependent variable make it very well suited for further statistical analysis.

Correlates of trust in police

Before moving on to the multiple regression analysis, it may be useful to investigate the bivariate relationship between trust in the police and the independent variables described above. The statistical relationships (Pearson's r) between trust in the police and these factors are reported in Table 2.

Table 2 about here

As Table 2 shows, many of the independent variables have a strong and statistically significant relationship with trust in the police. With the exception of two variables, ethnic fragmentation and economic inequality, they all have coefficients larger than ± .40, and all except economic inequality are significant at the 0.01 level. Not surprisingly, the correlation between corruption and trust is negative, and it is by far the strongest relationship identified in the bivariate analysis (Pearson's r = –.74).

However, one can also see that homicide rates, which I have log transformed because of some extreme outliers, correlate quite strongly with trust in the police (Pearson's r = –.50), suggesting that concerns about crime matter. Furthermore, there is a strong correlation between trust in the police and trust in general, particularly trust in other people (Pearson's r = .58), and trust in government (Pearson's r = .49). Finally we see that both the level of human development in the country and the status of civil liberties have a fairly strong statistical relationship with trust in the police (both Pearson's r = .44). The weakest correlations are with ethnic fractionalization (Pearson's r = –.39) and economic inequality (Pearson's r = –.29), which have a more moderate relationship with trust in the police.

Predictors of trust in the police

The bivariate analysis suggests that several factors influence trust in the police at the national level. To measure the effect of each independent variable more accurately, the other variables need to be controlled for in a multiple regression analysis. For that purpose, I use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. In Table 3, I present the result of the regression analysis with all the independent variables included in the model.

Table 3 about here

The full model with all the specified variables included seems to explain approximately 74% of the variance (R^2 = .739). Three of the variables are statistically significant, namely, corruption, trust in government and intentional homicide. Corruption has the strongest effect on trust in the police, with a standardized (beta) coefficient of –.554. The unstandardized coefficient (B) is –4.47. This means that for every unit a country moves up the (reversed) corruption perception index, which ranges from 1 to 10, the relative proportion of the population that has a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police decreases by approximately 4.5%. Furthermore, we see that the level of trust in government has an almost equally strong (positive) effect on trust in the police, with a beta coefficient of .466. Finally, we see that intentional homicide has a moderate but still statistically significant impact on trust ($p < 0.1$), with a standardized (beta) coefficient of –.265. The socio-economic and political variables included in the model appear to have no direct impact on aggregated trust in the police.

A note of caution has to be raised about the possibility of multicollinearity, because many of the independent variables correlate quite strongly with each other (see Appendix, Table II). Of the 28 pairs of possible correlations between the independent variables, two coefficients are over ± .70, six are above ± .65 and five are over ± .50. To test for possible multicollinearity, both the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores were checked. Although some of the tolerance scores are quite low in the model, they are nevertheless all above/under the score considered to indicate a problem with multicollinearity (see Appendix, Table III).

Interestingly, the only independent variable in the model that does not correlate with corruption is level of trust in government. One might suppose that trust in government would be at least moderately correlated with corruption, but there is in fact no statistically significant relationship between the two variables. Corruption does indeed correlate with trust in public institutions such as parliament and the civil service but only to a moderate degree (Table 4). We also see that corruption correlates quite strongly with trust in the legal system although not as strongly as with the police. Corruption, it seems, is first and foremost damaging to trust in policing and judicial institutions.

Table 4 about here.

Discussion and conclusion

The study suggests that perceived corruption is an important predictor of trust in the police and that it explains a substantial part of cross-national variation in trust. The findings are consistent with previous research on corruption and trust as well as with an impressive amount of evidence demonstrating the importance of honest, fair and impartial policing in creating trust in the police. Corruption represents a clear violation of these principles and is therefore likely to undermine trust in the police. Corruption also appears to be more damaging to trust in the police than to other public institutions such as parliament, the legal system and the civil service. The partisan nature of representational institutions such as parliament and cabinet probably makes them less vulnerable to violations of the impartiality principle than bureaucratic institutions. One of the main findings in Anderson and Tverdova's (2003) study on trust in government was that the effect of corruption is contingent on whether the respondent supported the incumbent. However, it is not clear why the legal system and the civil service should be less vulnerable to corruption. One explanation is that the potential consequences of police corruption are very serious for most people. Because the police force is the main provider of basic public security, widespread police corruption can severely undermine the quality of life of the citizens (Goldsmith, 2005). The police are also considered by many to be an indispensable institution for social order. In this role, it is imperative that the police act in an honest and impartial manner. Thus, many expect the police not only to abide by the rules but also to act as role models.

Trust in government appears to be another important predictor of trust in the police. The effect of trust in government is almost equal to the effect of corruption on trust in the police. This finding is in line with previous research suggesting that trust in government benefits the police (Morris, 2011). The benefits of trust in government may be both direct and indirect. First, it is reasonable to assume that trust or distrust in government is to some extent transferred to the police (Morris, 2011). Trust in one institution tends to extend to others (Christensen & Laegreid, 2002). However, trust in government may also have an indirect effect on trust in the police by making the public more receptive to policing. Acting on behalf of the government is presumably less risky if the public is positive and trusting in the state and the government. Moreover, a government that is considered trustworthy may also generate less demand for police intervention because citizens are more willing to comply with laws and regulations passed by the government. Previous research has shown that police–citizen encounters are far more likely to result in loss of trust than the opposite (Skogan, 2006; Bradford et al., 2009). Thus, the less the police are needed in society, the better for trust in the police.

Homicide levels were found to have a statistically significant effect on trust in the police, but they appear to explain far less of the variation than corruption and trust in government. Thus, the finding is compatible with previous research suggesting that procedural concerns trump outcomes in explaining trust. However, it may be that other more common types of crime also have an effect on trust in the police. Research from the U.S. and the U.K., for example, suggests that minor crimes and disorder have a significant impact on trust in the police (Kautt, 2011; Myhill & Bradford, 2011). In fact, such "signal crimes" appear to have a stronger effect than more serious crime. Thus, future cross-country studies on trust in the police should, if possible, include other types of crime than homicide.

The remaining variables in the model were not found to have any significant impact on trust in the police. There may, however, be an indirect link between trust in the police and some of these variables. Interpersonal trust, for example, has previously been found to be a very important predictor of corruption, while economic inequality has been found to be a very important factor in explaining variations in interpersonal trust (Uslaner, 2005, see also Rothstein & Uslaner, 2006). The possible indirect links between these independent variables and trust in the police should be examined further.

In addition, there may be an indirect link between socio-economic development and trust in the police. The Nordic welfare states (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland), for example, are all characterized by exceptionally high levels of trust in the police. It may be that, as Kääriäinen (2007) contends, active welfare policies help to reduce the levels of crime and conflict in these countries. This again has the double benefit of reducing demand for the police while at the same time giving the police credit for the relatively low levels of crime.

The list of independent variables included in this study is not exhaustive. There are other factors that may account for some of the differences in trust. The low-trusting countries in Eastern Europe, for example, have a legacy of totalitarian regimes that actively sought to sow distrust between citizens, and the primary goal of the police in these states was to protect the regime rather than to serve the public. This legacy is likely to affect trust and will continue to do so for many years to come. Trust over time appears to be a persistent phenomenon that changes very slowly (Egge, Strype & Thomassen, 2012; Inglehart, 1999). Some nations have also recently experienced, or are currently experiencing, internal war and conflict. This should be taken into consideration when analysing differences in trust. Finally, while most of the countries included in the study seem to fall along the trust continuum roughly as expected, there are some exceptions (see Appendix, Table I). Some, such as Turkey, Italy and Mali, score and rank surprisingly high, while the Netherlands, which is otherwise quite similar to the Nordic countries, scores and ranks unexpectedly low. Such cases deserve closer examination. For example, is it a measurement error or are there particular factors, historically, culturally or otherwise, that might explain why the Dutch police score comparatively low? Studying these seemingly anomalous cases may offer new insights into the creation of (dis)trust.

This study has used only one general measure of trust in the police. However, the research literature suggests that trust is a multidimensional concept reflecting perceptions of effectiveness as well as procedural justice and moral alignment (Hough et al., 2010; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Jackson et al., 2011). Future comparative studies should therefore also examine how dimensions of trust vary between countries and in relation to structural variables such as corruption, crime, and economic inequality. Better and more nuanced measurements of corruption are also needed. Studies suggest that not all types of corruption have a negative effect on trust in the police (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; Tankebe, 2010). A measure that differentiates between various types of corruption could help to advance our knowledge of the relationship between corruption and trust.

The apparently strong link between corruption and trust highlights the importance of working actively to reduce both actual and perceived corruption, especially for the police. If broad sections of the public lack trust in the police, it will be very hard, if not impossible, for the police to fulfil their basic tasks. However, trust in the police does not only concern advancing co-operation and compliance with the law. A lack of trust in the police is also likely to undermine many people's sense of safety

and ultimately their subjective well-being. Trust in the police should therefore be seen as a goal in itself, not merely a means to an end.

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Tables and Appendix

Table 1 Trust in the police across 50 countries

Mean	55.9
Median	56.5
Standard Deviation	19.3
Skewness	-.159
Minimum	15.8
Maximum	91.8

Table 2 Correlates of trust in the police

Independent variables	Pearsons r
Corruption (CPI)	-.74***
Intentional homicide (rate per 100000)	-.50***
Ethnic fractionalization	-.39***
Human development index (HDI)	.44***
Economic inequality	-.29**
Civil liberties	.44***
Interpersonal trust	.58***
Trust in government	.49***

***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1 level.

Table 3 Predictors of trust in the police

Model	B	Std. Error	Beta	t
Constant	104.56***	28.13		3.717
Corruption (CPI)	-4.47***	1.30	-.554	-3.435
Homicide rate (Log transformed)	-31.74*	17.11	-.265	-1.855
Trust in government	.58***	.11	.466	5.315
Interpersonal trust	.10	.13	.094	.776
Income inequality	-.13	.26	-.068	-.522
Development (HDI)	-13.32	16.21	-.120	-.822
Civil liberties	-.35	1.59	-.025	-.220
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.41	8.86	-.018	-.159
Adjusted R²	.739			
F	17.239***			

***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1 level

Table 4 Correlation between corruption and trust in various public institutions

Police	Government	Legal system	Civil service	Parliament
-.744***	-.102	-.450***	-.271*	-.285**

***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1 level.

Appendix

Table I. Relative share of the population reporting to have a lot of confidence or quite a lot of confidence in the police

Country	%
Finland	91,80
Norway	87,30
Switzerland	83,50
Australia	83,10
Hong Kong	82,90
Canada	81,70
Italy	78,30
Sweden	77,80
New Zealand	75,70
Malaysia	74,60
Germany	73,90
Great Britain	73,00
Turkey	72,00
France	71,20
United States	70,30
Mali	67,20
Japan	66,90
Cyprus	64,90
India	64,10
Spain	64,00
South Africa	61,90
Morocco	61,40
Netherlands	59,40
South Korea	58,60
Chile	57,10
Iran	55,90
Bulgaria	54,80
Ghana	54,70
Uruguay	53,00
Burkina Faso	52,60
Indonesia	50,70
Colombia	49,80
Georgia	47,10
Poland	47,10
Zambia	45,00
Brazil	44,80
Thailand	43,50
Romania	39,80
Slovenia	38,40
Taiwan	37,50
Serbia	35,00
Ukraine	34,00
Mexico	33,60

Russian Federation	33,30
Ethiopia	32,10
Trinidad and Tobago	28,00
Guatemala	24,90
Moldova	24,30
Argentina	21,30
Peru	15,80

Table II. Correlation matrix for independent variables

	CPI							
CPI	1	Civ lib						
Civ. Lib	-.69***	1	Ethnic					
Ethnic	.57***	-.54***	1	Homic				
Homic	.59***	-.52***	.64***	1	HDI			
HDI	-.74***	-.69***	-.69***	-.65***	1	Inequal		
Inequal	.34**	-.39***	.42***	.71***	-.34**	1	Int trust	
Int trust	-.69***	.41***	-.41***	-.40***	.52***	-.46***	1	Trust gov
Trust gov	-.10	-.07	.17	.21	-.21	-.27*	.06	1

***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1 level.

Table III. Collinearity Statistics (First Model)

Independent variables	Tolerance	Variation Inflation Factor (VIF)
Corruption (CPI)	.218	4.578
Homicide rate (Log transformed)	.279	3.583
Trust in government	.740	1.351
Interpersonal trust	.388	2.578
Income inequality	.339	2.946
Development (HDI)	.268	2.730
Civil liberties	.446	2.244
Ethnic Fractionalization	.452	2.214